Democracy will fall soon, mainly because it can no longer make decisions. Rather than appreciate traditional wisdom that says that democracy divides a population into special interest groups, the West adopted diversity, which adds even more divisions of special interest groups, and finally has ended up as a bunch of bickering monkeys unable to see the forest for the trees.
When a democracy is young, it seems like an efficient way to make decisions: rely on utilitarianism, or the idea that whatever most people like is the best solution, and you get a clear statement of what most people are thinking. They call it the “wisdom of crowds,” forgetting that this phenomenon deals best with finite qualities and does poorly with leadership.
Leadership requires not a momentary look at what is popular, but consistent action toward goals which may be invisible over the horizon of time. This conflicts with the democratic idea of choosing what people are thinking about right now to see what may benefit them in the short term.
As it turns out, those short-term and long-term visions collide as democracy balkanizes into opposed special interest groups:
The research, conducted by Zachary Neal, an associate professor of psychology and global urban studies at Michigan State University, is among the first to measure polarization not only by examining the frequency of parties working together, but also by demonstrating how they’ve grown more distant than any other time in modern history.
“What I’ve found is that polarization has been steadily getting worse since the early 1970s,” he explains in a university release. “Today, we’ve hit the ceiling on polarization. At these levels, it will be difficult to make any progress on social or economic policies.”
The full study was published on September 24, 2018 in the journal Social Networks.
Why the 1970s? Perhaps it had something to do with how the Left took over culture in 1968. After that time, you were either with the Left, or against it. The only brief respite came in the 1980s when Ronald Reagan ran on a moderate conservative platform in order to undo the damages of the Carter years and the 1960s. He came close.
An uneasy truce began after that with the next Leftist president, which was Bill Clinton. At that point, things were highly polarized, but owing to economic growth from the dot-com boom and “fast money” policies, Clinton seemed beyond criticism, and when he adopted some conservative reforms, became nearly untouchable. People refrained from rocking the boat so that the good times could continue
When the Clinton years ended in a haze of scandal and hints of the upcoming financial crash, we returned to a quasi-conservative with George W. Bush, who made some positive changes but then became obsessed with the globalist mission of bringing democracy and consumerism to the world.
After that, the West went further into its diversity and globalism agenda with Obama in the US and a strengthening of the EU in Europe. Those both ended in soft disaster, meaning that no horrible events came from them, only a weakening of civilizations that left people feeling lost and adrift while social infrastructure slowly collapsed.
With the rise of Farage, Trump, and Brexit, the fragile truce that began in 1968 caved in as people realized that without us stopping it, the Leftist machine was going to take over everything here just as it did in the former Soviet Union. At this point, the peace evaporated because it became clear that we could not take a middle path, and we were either in favor of the Left or would be seen as opposing it.
That caused people to polarize into two sides instead of many and led to the conditions for civil war in which we presently find ourselves:
I never thought I’d end my career covering a civil war in America.
…There’s the battle between those who feel the American dream has slipped from their grasp and those who can easily pass it on to their kids. There’s the one between rural small-town Americans and “globalized” city slickers, who, the small-town folks are sure, look down upon them. There’s the fight between the white working-class Americans who feel that their identities are being lost in an increasingly minority-majority country and the Americans who embrace multiculturalism. And there’s the struggle between men who believe that their gender still confers certain powers and privileges and the women challenging that.
…In a tribal world it’s rule or die, compromise is a sin, enemies must be crushed and power must be held at all costs.
In other words, once we lost national identity as a Western European nation, our country fragmented into many special interest groups. These no longer trust that others have the same goals that they do, so have become paranoid and view other groups as manipulators who are exploiting them. Class, race, culture, religion, and heritage are all part of this great division.
People feel that their “identities are being lost in an increasingly minority-majority country and the Americans who embrace multiculturalism” because they are seeing their countries changed from unique things into the same generic mixed-race shopping mall that California has become. We have lost identity; we have become directionless and disunified as a result.
This disunity causes us to see other political orientations not just as competing points of view, but as competing types of societies. If we no longer have unity, we no longer need to tolerate each other, and then we can point out the parts of their ideal which are alien and destructive to us.
Some have looked more clearly into the source of our division and found that erasure of identity leads to populism as people see the Leftist endgame and want out of it:
Matthew Goodwin and I argue that both nativism and racism can be problematic terms in the context of contemporary European and American politics, while the fascist tag is inappropriate for this family of parties (though not extremist ones like the Greek Golden Dawn). ‘Nativist’ was coined in 19th century America to refer to those who sought to restrict new immigration to just Protestants, but today the term is typically used to refer to anyone who raises questions about the need for extensive new immigration and/or who seeks to defend national culture and traditions. The term ‘racist’ entered common usage in the 20th century, initially referring to the belief that the world was divided into hierarchically ordered races (a view for a time reinforced by racial science), and to a belief in dangerous Jewish conspiracies. Today the scholarly focus is more on a widespread ‘new racism’, which is based on allegedly irreconcilable cultural differences, together with ‘institutional’ and ‘implicit’ racism that do not require any conscious bias or prejudice.
…Turning to the views of national populist voters generally, although a minority wear the racist badge with pride, we find that large numbers reject the white supremacism and narrow ethnic nationalism that is often associated with them by critics. In Western Europe and the US, few seek to restrict immigration to those who would immediately fit into the dominant culture, though fears about Islam are widespread and many seek to restrict the welfare rights of new economic migrants (a policy which has helped national populists appeal to former social democratic voters in countries like Denmark and Sweden, where such budgets have been under strain).
Moreover, many of the issues raised by national populists address larger questions, such as the importance of a sense of belonging and community in the face of often unprecedented rates of ethnic change. Some European countries have close to, even a higher, percentage of foreign-born population than the US, ranging from 11-17 per cent in Austria, Sweden, Britain, Germany, France and the Netherlands, while in France the number of Muslims is projected to rise from 9 to 17 per cent by 2050. Surveys show that across Europe and the US overwhelming majorities say that they feel strongly attached to their nation (an average of 82 per cent). It is, therefore, hardly surprising that many are concerned about the implications of growing hyper-diversity, and linked issues such as maintaining the trust which is so central to stable political and social life.
Reading through this somewhat dense text, we see that populists are those who are no longer afraid of being called “racist” or “fascist” for not wanting their societies to be assimilated by much greater groups of third world immigrants. People like their nations, and know that after demographic change, those nations will no longer exist.
Since the 1990s, social change has picked up and the social engineering of the Left has sought to “fundamentally transform” enough different places to make the alteration in national character known. People are seeing how globalism means that their countries become properties, not unique spirits or groups, and how much is being lost through this insanity.
The terms “racist” and “fascist” arise because both of those groups embrace nationalism, or the idea that one ethnic group comprises each nation, and that by extension, diversity destroys nations and cannot function. The Left wishes to suppress this knowledge and so it makes nationalist ideas taboo.
They do this so that they can continue ethnic replacement of their opposition, who are dissidents to Leftism and therefore an obstacle to Leftist world domination:
President Trump has declared war on America’s changing demography. His administration has followed through on that strategy with a proposal to add a question to the 2020 census asking about citizenship.
What this selective underenumeration will not do is make America’s growing racial minority populations disappear. The losers from this undercount include members of Mr. Trump’s older white base, who will suffer from lost investments in a younger generation, whose successes and contributions to the economy will be necessary to keep America great.
America’s white population is growing tepidly because of substantial declines among younger whites. Since 2000, the white population under the age of 18 has shrunk by seven million, and declines are projected among white 20-somethings and 30-somethings over the next two decades and beyond. This is a result of both low fertility rates among young whites and modest white immigration — a trend that is not likely to change despite Mr. Trump’s wish for more immigrants from Norway.
This article fails to mention that this changing demography was entirely created by the Left, who under Senator Ted Kennedy endorsed the Hart-Celler Act in 1965 which altered our immigration from pro-European to favoring the third world.
Let that sink in for a moment. The Left is blaming us for pushing back against their change to how our society worked, since we have now seen that this new immigration agenda is not working so well. In fact, we are pushing back against all “we are all one” type initiatives.
National populism — a good enough term for the mellow mix of libertarianism, social conservatism, and opposition to increasing diversity championed by luminaries like Nigel Farage and Donald Trump — opposes the Leftist tendency to make all of society into a mass without differences between its members. National populism is a pushback against egalitarianism itself
Some even correctly identify the sympathy between national populism and nativism, a movement to resist “fundamental transformation” by white ethnic mixing from two centuries ago:
According to Mudde, a professor at the University of Georgia, nativism is an almost exclusively American concept that is rarely discussed in Western Europe. The term’s origins lie with mid-19th century political movements in the United States—most famously the Know Nothing party—that portrayed Catholic immigration from countries such as Germany and Ireland as a grave threat to native-born Protestant Americans…Nativism arose in a natural place: a nation constructed through waves of migration and backlashes to migration, where the meaning of “native” is always evolving.
Nativism, Mudde told me, is “xenophobic nationalism.” It is “an ideology that wants congruence of state and nation—the political and the cultural unit. It wants one state for every nation and one nation for every state. It perceives all non-natives … as threatening. But the non-native is not only people. It can also be ideas.” Nativism is most appealing during periods when people feel the harmony between state and nation is disappearing.
…Whether nativism involves opposing the European Union because Germans have to bail out Greeks, or opposing multiculturalism because it means accepting forms of Islamic dress, the idea is that “there is a native population or a native culture that should be given priority over other kinds of cultures.”
As it turns out, we discuss nativism quite a bit on this blog, including how history proved it right and how diversity problems of today were predicted long ago as the heritage American nation found itself facing waves of impoverished immigrants from mixed-white countries like Ireland, Italy, Greece, and Spain as well as mixed-white groups such as Jews and Travelers who wanted to come over. Nativism says that each nation has a founding population, and that population should keep it, which means that other groups have to go elsewhere. So far, nativism has turned out to be correct and the “we are all one” diversity and equality type plans have all run aground in disaster.
In each nation, people are realizing that the more nations that are brought to the table, the less any one nation has the ability to act as it needs to, and the less specific the rules will be to its circumstances. If you join a group, expect your interests to be minimized in favor of those of the group; this is not a problem when the group consists of people like you, but groups of nations like the EU tend to expand outward and invariably become less distinctive. That in turn makes them hostile to the interests of national groups.
For those who are new to history, the West just got done — on the historical scale — fighting two epic wars of democracy versus nationalism. WWI and WWII both consisted of the pro-democracy powers trying to finish what the national revolutions following the French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars had started, which was a quest to ensure that every other nation used the same democratic system and thus behaved the same way as the Allied powers did.
It was both a conflict for a certain type of political system, and a war against the distinctiveness of nations which made them resist the “we are all one” instinct of the group. The Allies wanted Europe to share an economic and political system so that its trade could go further, and out of that desire, it provoked a backlash which it then punished with two wars that it won through superiority of numbers guaranteed by American entry into the war.
The order established by those wars lasted for some time, but like all political systems, it is a virus and acts in self-interest like everything else in nature. As a result, it grows. It grew into civil rights during the postwar period when we applied our wartime ideology to domestic issues, and it competed with Communism by becoming more socialist and pro-“freedom” in the 1960s in order to offer something that the Soviet Union could not, and then after Communism fell, it fully hybridized socialism and capitalism into a consumerist system that used tax-and-spend to subsidize its underclass population growth and thus generate economic activity to increase demand for its currency.
National populism and the recent Right-wing movements — all of which arose from the European New Right — may not explicitly define themselves this way, but they are the opposition to the postwar order of consumerism plus “globalism” or diversity at home and international trade having sway over national customs globally.
This friction presents itself as the loss of common purpose in Europe, which really means that Europe is experiencing defections from the Leftist world order of liberal democracy, consumerism, and globalism:
In recent weeks, I’ve travelled to a number of European capitals. What I picked up is that a fragmentation of minds is under way, even though so many contemporary themes, from globalisation to migration, are the common concern of all Europeans. There is particular pathos to this as the centenary of the 1918 armistice approaches. With a key European parliament election just seven months away, the psychological divisions across the continent seem to be deepening, not diminishing.
This is not just about the tensions between populist and non-populist governments. We know that two camps are pitted against one another: on one side, Hungary’s “illiberal democrat” Viktor Orbán, Poland’s nationalist leadership, Italy’s far-right strongman, Matteo Salvini; on the other, France’s Emmanuel Macron, Germany’s Angela Merkel and the Netherlands’ prime minister, Mark Rutte.
…A few weeks ago, during a debate on Europe in Vienna’s Burgtheater, I made the point that the Austrian foreign minister Karin Kneissl’s association with the far-right Freedom party embodied precisely the danger Europe faces: the go-it-alone message and the danger of democratic backsliding that comes when xenophobic nationalist parties gain power.
You have one of two options: either you support the natural selection model, in which each country does its own thing and some succeed more than others, or the egalitarian model, in which every nation is standardized to the same system so that there are no losers. This mirrors the class warfare nature of egalitarianism itself, which tries to eliminate differences between people so that there can be an end to struggle and the hierarchy that it produces, which we might see as a rejection of nature or life itself.
“We are all one” appeals to humans for the same reason that pacifism, inclusiveness, camaraderie, and acceptance do: it gives us a little human world in which the coldness of life is upended, and humans decide to make each other feel good and exclude the world and its demands from the experience. This consolation proves as old as humanity, and perhaps even older, since we see wild species do it as well.
However, “we are all one” is also self-interested, and people quickly use it as a path to power, which makes it into the norm but also gives power to those who have no idea how to wield it. We have lived too long under peasant-kings like Angela Merkel and Claude Juncker, but most cannot see what is actually wrong with them. They are salespeople using ideology to vault into power at a level beyond their understanding.
People across the West, who basically gave up after the horrors of WW1, have begun to rediscover their will to live. Specifically, they want to thrive among people like them without the intrusion of government and industry, and they are willing to throw away the social safety net and international commerce in order to do so. Their new desire is self-sufficiency, and if that means no iPads and quinoa, they are OK with that.
This new outlook challenges the existing liberal order, and presents to us the need to launch off on our own direction again instead of following the herd toward what groups of people always find pleasing:
Yet for all the significance of those two unfolding stories, the cumulative threats now facing the European Union could be of longer term and greater geopolitical significance. That’s because that the same brand of nationalism and populism that unifies Trump’s voters, and inflames his detractors at home and abroad, is a far more fundamental challenge to one of history’s great experiments, the European integration project that evolved after World War II.
…What’s too little understood in Washington and Europe alike is the crucial role the U.S. played in the development of a unified, secure and economically strong Europe. Indeed, today’s modern, prosperous, democratic European Union of 28 states – including some eleven former members of the Soviet bloc – is one of the United States’ greatest foreign policy accomplishment.
With the rise of Trump, America has rejected its postwar role. Trump has always said “America first,” and by doing so, he has rejected the comfortable system that allowed European socialism to thrive on American defense dollars. He has repudiated the military-industrial complex and demanded that instead of American military rule of the globe, there be independent nations who come together when convenient to eject threats from their spheres of influence.
In doing so, he has rejected the WW2 order and the WW1 crusade that began it. Our goal as Americans is not to enforce “we are all one” through liberal democracy and consumerism, but to stand for our own interests, and encourage others to do the same. This is a first step toward balkanization, or the separation of racial, religious, cultural, and ethnic groups into their own civilizations so that each may pursue its values to whatever end they deliver.
Part of this includes the recognition that the anti-racism of the WW1-WW2 era is a mistake, since diversity presents nothing but an impediment to unity of the nation, which in turn implies that diversity will be leaving us soon much like other failed policies from the postwar era:
Most immigrants coming to Canada want to build a new life in a free and democratic society, escaping tyranny, prejudice or poor economic circumstances. Their local ethnic communities help them get adjusted to their new home. But it is nonetheless true that Canada faces a real test in maintaining national identity when so many people come from disparate backgrounds, and in avoiding problems that occur with ethnic conflict.
In principle, diverse populations can be economically rewarding. They provide more product and service choices. Immigration brings workers with a greater variety of backgrounds. Immigrants can even spur more innovation since people with different perspectives combine ideas in ways that would not happen with homogenous societies.
However, the flipside is fragmentation — when citizens identify more strongly with a social group rather than the nation as a whole, potentially leading to conflict. Conflict itself erodes trust in institutions and encourages corruption…What researchers have found is that voters who identify more strongly with the “nation” rather than their particular sub-group, are more cognizant of the country’s overall well-being.
When your goal is to avoid membership in those large groups which reduce your own input to one of many voices, fragmentation becomes unacceptable. Those who identify with the founding group care about the well-being of the nation, but everyone else belongs to one of many bickering special interest groups, caring only about their group as the nation careens toward doom.
In the 1940s as in the 1840s, people were herding toward fear of strong power, since that could interrupt their personal life plans with the need to support orders larger than the individual like culture, faith, heritage, and purpose. Instead they elected democracy, which allowed them to separate from the process of the nation and become merely consumers who rented space within national boundaries in order to participate in one political and economic system more than another.
One reason that many of us rejected the Neoreaction idea of “patchwork,” or people shopping by governments based on what they offer, is that it merely extended this concept further. Nation became government which became product. This destroys any actual unity and replaces it with a temporary alliance of convenience, based on the shallowest commonality which can be found between human beings. The sense of significance, belonging, meaning, and purpose which comes with an actual culture and nation becomes forgotten, replaced by the state itself and the herd behavior upon which it relies for power.
The West revolts against fragmentation. The many aspects of breakdown of our society — fragmentation, diversity, special interest groups, fighting for power — all result from this flight from unity, not just of citizens with nation but of the elements within the nation, such as religion, science, culture, and heritage. When these are united and have a common root, life is good and sane; when they are not, life becomes neurotic, ridden with conflict, ugly, and predatory.
The Left of course translates this dissident behavior into the only language that they know, class warfare, and by doing so claims that this is an economic/social struggle instead of one for the soul of the nation, as Unabomber victim David Gelernter writes:
The difference between citizens who hate Mr. Trump and those who can live with him—whether they love or merely tolerate him—comes down to their views of the typical American: the farmer, factory hand, auto mechanic, machinist, teamster, shop owner, clerk, software engineer, infantryman, truck driver, housewife. The leftist intellectuals I know say they dislike such people insofar as they tend to be conservative Republicans.
…Those who voted for Mr. Trump, and will vote for his candidates this November, worry about the nation, not its image. The president deserves our respect because Americans deserve it—not such fancy-pants extras as network commentators, socialist high-school teachers and eminent professors, but the basic human stuff that has made America great, and is making us greater all the time.
In other words, we have real members of the nation who care about it, and they oppose the international elites who see this nation as a means to an end, namely of their own wealth and safety. International elites buy multiple citizens and jet between homes in different places in order to avoid instability that, like the fluctuations in the market, they profit from by anticipating the disorder and betting on places where slightly more order remains.
Trump’s audience are those who do not intend to leave. Even if they had the money, they would not leave their beloved communities and the land they are bonded to. They like being where they are, and they distrust those who can skip out on the beauty of an exceptional place to go somewhere else simply to avoid the bother of dealing with a little social shakeup. They distrust those who do not have an intense bond to their community, their people, and the land that supports them.
If you feel inklings of a rural-versus-urban divide, you might be correct, since the essence of the urban is detachment. Detachment from the land, from the tasks required to produce raw materials, and from anything but the human-only world of feelings, emotions, and judgments in which one must be expert in order to succeed in marketing, business, law, and sales. Cities are humanism, “we are all one,” and the type of thinking that drives the EU, all in one place. They are alien to the notions of unity between people and land that are present in the country.
However, that misses the broader picture, as do all narratives of class warfare. Class is inherent to who we are; we are all born with a set of abilities than place us somewhere on a hierarchy, both vertical and horizontal, of who does what in a highly functional society. This class division obscures a larger truth, namely that this is a white civil war fought by those with the most money, education, and experience first, but spreading outward:
The report, “Hidden Tribes,” breaks Americans into seven groups, from left to right, with names like Traditional Liberals, Moderates, Politically Disengaged and so on. It won’t surprise you to learn that the most active groups are on the extremes — Progressive Activists on the left (8 percent of Americans) and Devoted Conservatives on the right (6 percent).
These two groups are the richest of all the groups. They are the whitest of the groups. Their members have among the highest education levels, and they report high levels of personal security.
We sometimes think of this as a populist moment. But that’s not true. My first big takeaway from “Hidden Tribes” is that our political conflict is primarily a rich, white civil war. It’s between privileged progressives and privileged conservatives.
In other words, much like the election of Donald Trump, this struggle plays out between those with actual experience of how to run businesses, groups, institutions, and systems within our society, and they are divided between those who want the status quo to continue and those who see it as moribund.
Some recognize that Leftism has destroyed much of our society, while others — perhaps those who benefit personally from Leftism, or lack the ability to see beyond their immediate personal sphere — want more of the same because it is working for them.
They might even be divided by those who think solely of themselves versus those who think about the “community,” a difficult definition comprising not just other people but the continuity of their traditions, their beliefs, and their future. Some realize that their future is tied with community, while others do not, and this produces the fundamental clash dividing the West into individualists and tribalists:
I’m using “tribalism” to refer to what George Orwell, in an essay he wrote at the end of the Second World War, meant by “nationalism”: “the habit of identifying oneself with a single nation or other unit, placing it beyond good and evil and recognising no other duty than that of advancing its interests. . . . The abiding purpose of every nationalist is to secure more power and more prestige, not for himself but for the nation or other unit in which he has chosen to sink his own individuality.”
In other words, you either identify with self+community or you identity simply with self. Not surprisingly, this pairing comports with political divisions in psychology:
Haidt and his colleagues synthesize anthropology, evolutionary theory, and psychology to propose six innate moral foundations: care/harm, fairness/cheating, liberty/oppression, loyalty/betrayal, authority/subversion, and sanctity/degradation.
…The moral mind, to him, resembles an audio equalizer with a series of slider switches that represent different parts of the moral spectrum. All political movements base appeals on different settings of the foundations—and the culture wars arise from what they choose to emphasize. Liberals jack up care, followed by fairness and liberty. They rarely value loyalty and authority. Conservatives dial up all six.
In other words, Leftists value individualism; conservatives preserve the individual, as survival is important, but add to it loyalty and authority, which translate to membership in a group and concern for the prevalence of its traditions, which requires hierarchy.
These two political viewpoints prove incompatible. Someone who values the individual only, as seems to have been the winning side in the twentieth century, will never understand someone who values individual+community, including the intangible (or long-term) aspects of community. They are like different species, getting ready to separate.
As it turns out, this fundamental divide extends beyond political parties to individuals who identify as independents associating with one outlook over the other and ending up forming a Left/Right divide within the middle ground:
According to the Gallup polling firm, the identity that people choose most often is actually “independent” – not Democratic or Republican. In 2017, 42 percent of Americans chose this label – up from the low 30s just 14 years ago, in 2004.
However, three-quarters of these “independents” admit, when asked, that they lean toward favoring the Democratic or Republican Party. Judging by how they vote or what they think of national political leaders, the truth is that these “leaners” really are partisans rather than independents. Apparently, many people who like to think of themselves as independent-minded and free of party influence just aren’t.
Only about 10 percent of Americans are what we call “pure independents” – that is, people who identify as independents and claim not to favor either of the two major parties. Nor has that percentage grown in recent years. This means that the vast majority of Americans – consistently around 90 percent – are partisans.
In other words, you are wired to take one path or the other, and this probably varies with where you fit in the social structure. Peasants think only of themselves; kings thing of not just other people, but the whole of tradition, continuity, power, and finding the best solution for the long term and not just a temporary expedient until the next guy takes over.
This means that the divisions that we see now are permanent. Our society has splintered itself by adopting Leftism, which has forced people to be either denialists who defend a clearly dying civilization, or those who think more clearly about the long-term future and want a civilization which is ascendant instead of dying.
Our current situation came about because a higher population clashed with less organized and lower IQ ones. Heritage America, or the Western Europeans who created this civilization, had a code of behavior which rewarded the good and punished the bad. Simpler populations saw no reason to play along with this, and so crept in and took advantage of the goodwill extended to them.
What resulted was a clash between the standards of groups. Heritage Americans played by certain rules, and went along with the Other groups until it became clear that those groups were not playing by the same standards, and now we are seeing that these Other groups must go because we need our standards.
In other words, Heritage America is saying to the post-1800 newcomers, “you didn’t play by our cultural rules, and therefore you are bad,” which means that a permanent schism will erupt:
Heritage America is finished because nobody respected the rule of law other than Heritage Americans. And those that did respect the law, manipulated it for their whims and purposes and changed it for their own narcissistic reasons…or worse, politically conspired intentionally against Heritage America.
That in turn means war, much as it did in 1861. When different groups are thrust into the same political space, conflict results, mainly because diversity never works, even if within the same race. We have nothing in common in America anymore, and it means that we will fragment, and each group will go its own way.
Although this sounds lugubrious, think of it this way: human history is receiving clear answers. Limited democracy still becomes mob rule. Diversity of any form destroys a nation. Those who see the long term must rule the rest, or those who see only the short term will destroy them. We are not all one; we are in fact, a varied and complex structure that requires separation not false unity.
Tags: civil war, Culture, diversity, national populism, nationalism, populism, tribalism, tribes