Amerika

In every aspect of an egalitarian society, there is a public dogma and a private truth. The degree to which we can see reality is the private truth, and the public dogma is what is designed to conceal that truth so that people can feel good about themselves and their futures.

This starts with the innocent need to communicate. Most people are not going to wade through complicated documents or theories, so we use visual aids and simplified terms to communicate, losing meaning at every stage of this reduction.

At the most basic level, when communicating with others, we use a binary: “good” is what we want, “bad” is either (a) its opposite or (b) everything else, for Leftists. This is the basis of all socializing, namely designating some things as permissible and others as bad.

The difference is that a healthy society bans the destructive, where a tyranny bans anything but its own dogma. We see the latter condition in the West after the Leftist takeover because certain notions like IQ, class differences, and racial differences are wholly taboo to even mention.

Unhealthy societies arise when the normies gain control. They are always more numerous; if not oppressed, they take over from their leaders. The angry failed children of elites befriend the normies in order to take revenge on their own parents, and then a Revolution inverts that society.

Normies seek someone to administrate so that normies do not have to change their personal behavior or thinking; these tyrants then ban methods in order to force thinking into narrow slots, creating a feedback loop of more Leftism and less realism. Society goes insane this way.

Contrary to the drivel you read on the Right-wing internet, it is not BlackRock, The Jews,™ or the US doing this; it is a global obsession with equality. Egalitarians always seek normie rule because that way the rules are abolished and the lack of competence allows people to abuse the system.

Normie-media specializes in splitting every issue in two so that no complete answer exists. Like all good con-men, they special in partial truths, saying things that are true but not the complete picture so that the brain of the marks fills in the rest with happy stuff, causing them to accept the con.

On the Left, we hear about how Ukraine must win so that democracy, civil rights, and civil liberties can triumph; on the Right, we hear mostly that Ukraine is a money-laundering scheme and none of our business. Both of these perspectives are not just wrong but stupid.

The Left wants to hide the fact that 1914 and 1939 have visited us again: the Ukraine war is a war for national independence, very close to ethnic independence, and this means that it is a war for the principle of nationalism. “Ukraine for the Ukrainians!” is the opposite of diverse Russia.

The Right plays the usual game of emotional ironist. Whatever the Left does, they oppose, instead of realizing that wars for nationalism (instead of wars for democracy) are a Right-wing ideal. What we pay for Ukraine is a small fraction of what we pay for domestic anti-poverty and anti-racism programs.

You never hear the Right mention that, however, because it is unpopular to go after entitlements. People like free stuff from government; to take it on is viewed as political suicide, although some of us argue that this is not the case with a Right-wing electorate.

In reality, what is going on in Ukraine is mostly apolitical, although politics is involved with making it happen because Ukraine needs weapons and money from somewhere. Ukraine wants to exist and not to be absorbed into Russia as first the Soviets and later Vlad Putin have attempted to do.

The first part of this is to realize that for centuries Russia has been trying to ethnically replace Ukrainians in order to make Ukraine part of Russia, a tame vassal state which serves as a buffer zone, in addition to dominating its naval ports:

When Ukraine was a part of the Soviet Union, a policy of Russian in-migration and Ukrainian out-migration was in effect, and ethnic Ukrainians’ share of the population in Ukraine declined from 77 percent in 1959 to 73 percent in 1991. But that trend reversed after the country gained independence, and, by the turn of the 21st century, ethnic Ukrainians made up more than three-fourths of the population. Russians continue to be the largest minority, though they now constitute less than one-fifth of the population.

In other words, what makes Russia nervous is that its genocide has been interrupted by the resurgence of Ukraine, which has not been courted by the West so much as wanted to distance itself from Russia and the crushing poverty provided by Russian domination.

The Ukrainians are
nationalists who want a more functional system than Communism, and they see a chance to do this if they side with the West:

In 1941, an ultra-nationalist movement — the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) — sided with German forces in 1941 during the invasion of western Ukraine, a territory that had only been annexed two years prior, after Germany and the Soviet Union carved up Poland. The Soviet annexation had destroyed civil and political society and led to mass arrests and deportations, leaving the underground OUN as the only viable Ukrainian force.

The OUN’s proclamation of “renewed” Ukrainian statehood in June 1941 was quashed by Germany. Their involvement with German battalions and militias turned them into “fascists” in Soviet propaganda, and Ukrainian nationalism became associated with fascism. Putin’s claim that he is “denazifying” Ukraine is a continuation of the wartime Soviet narrative that aims to delegitimize Ukrainian nationalism, or the very idea that Ukrainians determine their own destiny.

The charge that Ukrainians are “Nazis” fits well into the Putin narrative, but he stole it from the Americans and Europeans, who have been painting their enemies as Nazis, White Supremacists, “racists,” and fascists in order to overthrow them since the earlier part of last century.

Putin has, instead of leaving behind the Soviet dogma, re-stated it in a new form, much like China hybridized Maoism with capitalism to produce its current mixed economy system. This means that he is advocating the multi-racialism of the Soviet empire.

After the dust settled from WW2 and the fall of Communism, Ukraine moved toward the West while trying to stay friendly with Russia, mainly because Ukraine saw its destiny as separate from where Russia was headed:

President Kravchuk’s immediate priority was state building. Under his stewardship, Ukraine quickly established its armed forces and the infrastructure of an independent state. Citizenship was extended to the people of Ukraine on an inclusive (rather than ethnic or linguistic) basis. Ukraine received widespread international recognition and developed its diplomatic service. A pro-Western foreign policy was instituted, and official pronouncements stressed that Ukraine was a “European” rather than a “Eurasian” country. The state symbols and national anthem of the post-World War I Ukrainian National Republic were reinstituted.

The economy grew steadily in the first years of the 21st century, but the political situation remained tense in Ukraine as it sought membership in NATO and the European Union (EU) while also pursuing closer relations with Russia—a delicate balancing act.

Ukraine’s pro-European trajectory was abruptly halted in November 2013, when a planned association agreement with the EU was scuttled just days before it was scheduled to be signed. The accord would have more closely integrated political and economic ties between the EU and Ukraine, but Yanukovych bowed to intense pressure from Moscow.

Part of this came from painful lessons of history, namely the tendency of Russia to batter Ukraine whenever Ukrainian nationalism became too popular, including the genocide known as the Holodomor which added to Ukrainian distrust of Russia:

In the early 1930s, to force peasants to join collective farms, Soviet leader Joseph Stalin orchestrated a famine that resulted in the starvation and death of millions of Ukrainians. Afterward, Stalin imported large numbers of Russians and other Soviet citizens—many with no ability to speak Ukrainian and with few ties to the region—to help repopulate the east.

Because eastern Ukraine came under Russian rule much earlier than western Ukraine, people in the east have stronger ties to Russia and have been more likely to support Russian-leaning leaders.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Ukraine became an independent nation. But uniting the country proved a difficult task. For one, “the sense of Ukrainian nationalism is not as deep in the east as it is in west,” says former ambassador to Ukraine Steven Pifer.

In the east of Ukraine, the largest number of Russians were settled, many sent there by the Soviet regime. Consequently east Ukraine has some confusion about its ethnic identity, but as a whole, the nation seems to be enthusiastic about escaping the impoverished Russian bloc.

Long before the current war, Ukraine had made its choice about heading Westward, mostly because this provided Ukraine with the ability to be independent, where partnership with Russia always meant that it would be swallowed up through a process known as Russification:

De-Russification predates the February invasion, and it has often merged with de-communization. For example, the names of cities, villages and streets referring to Soviet history and luminaries fell under a ban approved by Ukraine’s parliament in April 2015. And since 2016, all information on notice boards at railway stations and airports can only be given in Ukrainian and English — and not Russian

Those from the modern West will understand Russification immediately: it is civic nationalism, or the idea that a state unites random people together into an identity based more on politics, legal system, and economic system than culture, race, or history.

Russification also mirrors the desire of moron conservatives for “assimilation,” or people coming to this country to become warm bodies who believe in the Constitution and have no culture or race of their own, another form of “equality” based in the assumption that there are no differences between peoples.

Much like the Hispanic assimilation of the American population that is currently ongoing, or the conversion of Europe into an Islamic caliphate, Russification is a form of genocide based on replacing Ukrainian ethnicity and culture with a Russian political identity:

Over the centuries, Russification has been deployed by various Russian rulers to force the cultural and linguistic assimilation of the country’s non-Russian population. That general definition, however, does not capture the brutal violence, chauvinism and cruelty that has historically accompanied this policy. Russification goes beyond merely asserting the superiority of Russian culture: It is the weaponization of such sentiments to systematically marginalize and even extinguish other nationalities and cultural identities.

Several nationalities have withstood the worst of Moscow’s Russification policies, including Poles, Lithuanians, Ukrainians, Kazakhs and Finns. Imperial leaders often imposed strict Russian language mandates, formal recognition of Russian traditions and cultural norms above all others and the insertion of Russian and pro-Russian leaders into influential offices and posts.

For centuries, Moscow has used the intersection of law and religion as a tool for absorbing far-flung populations across the Russian empire. At first, local religious traditions would be tolerated and even encouraged so long as religious leaders demonstrated loyalty to the state. Then, as the capital tightened control, it would use the law and prospects withdrawing state support to control local clerics and supplant local traditions in favor of dictates from the center.

We know this has happened in Ukraine not just because of the history of other victims of Russification in the Eastern Bloc, but because Russia is actively attempting to brainwash children in east Ukraine into accepting the Russian language, political history, and legal system as “good.”

Even more, we can see how Russia has since before the Soviet times sought to subdue Ukraine in order to keep it captive and use it as a buffer zone against Europe, since the Russian imagination fears European invasions.

In fact, the process of Russification accelerated when Ukraine began to break away from Russian-controlled candidates and assert its independence, causing Moscow to use immigration as a weapon for breaking Ukrainian culture:

Ukrainian officials and analysts say hundreds of thousands of people from across Russia have been brought into the disputed region in an effort by Moscow to transform the composition of its population.

“Since 2014 there has been a mass movement of people from Siberia,” Sergei, who moved to Crimea from St. Petersburg and who blogs under the name Yan Laros, told RFE/RL in March. “At first they went to Krasnodar, but now they have actively begun settling Crimea. Sometimes you get the impression that half of Siberia has suddenly decided to move here.”

Andriy Klimenko, editor in chief of the BlackSeaNews website, wrote about the demographic manipulations in June 2017. “The demographic situation in Crimea is viewed by Russia exclusively in the context of forming…a loyal population that is optimized in terms of the cost of maintaining it and is not capable of civic protests or other forms of independent political activity,” he wrote.

Now let us see what some of the bad guys of international politics assert. First, a blatant lie that conflates the nation-state with the nation in order to portray Moscow as the new Hitler, as both moron Leftists and moron conservatives in the US tend to do:

Moscow depicts its actions in Ukraine, however, as serving a broader goal, to protect ethnic Russians and Russian speakers abroad wherever they may be endangered.

If we taught all of Kenya to speak Russian, would they be “Russians”? The Wilson Center is deflecting from the reality, which is that Russia seeks to obliterate ethnic distinctions in order to assert a Russian political identity upon captive peoples.

The fanatical liars at The New York Times joined the chorus of trying to portray Russia as Hitler, something conservatives unfortunately bought into as well, causing many of them to idealize Russia for contrarian, ironist, or simply political reasons in hoping for real nationalism:

But in waging war on Ukraine, President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia has been driven by a different concept, ethno-nationalism. It is an idea of nationhood and identity based on language, culture and blood — a collectivist ideology with deep roots in Russian history and thought.

Putin however has made it clear that he opposes nationalism; he wants a powerful State that enforces language, legal system, economic system, and political system upon those around Russia so that Russia can control them, similarly to how the West uses “diversity” worlwide as a method of control.

These types of societies use frozen conflict in the form of constant ethnic tensions endemic to all diverse societies as a means of keeping their people unstable so that culture does not challenge the dominance of the state and its apparatus, both bureaucracy and political system.

A civilization in the grips of diversity becomes paralyzed; it cannot make decisions because it no longer has shared cultural values to form the basis of those decisions, so it rationalizes from precedent and simply doubles down on what it has been doing even as it fails.

By introducing enough Russians to Ukraine, Russia can freeze the culture through permanent conflict, enabling Russia to treat Ukraine as a vassal state designed to support the empire without enjoying equal status in the enjoyment of its fruits:

But for centuries, within the Russian Empire, Ukraine was known as “Malorossiya” or “Little Russia.”

The use of this term strengthened the idea that Ukraine was a junior member of the empire. And it was backed by czarist policies dating from the 18th century that suppressed the use of the Ukrainian language and culture. The intention of these policies was to establish a dominant Russia and later strip Ukraine of an identity as an independent, sovereign nation.

Ethnic Ukrainians lived across the country before it was incorporated into the Soviet Union. In 1932-33, Soviet leader Joseph Stalin orchestrated a famine that killed some 4 million Ukrainians in the eastern regions. The famine, known as “Holodomor,” made it possible for ethnic Russians to move into the territory of Ukraine.

Ukraine was on track to sign an association agreement with the European Union in 2013. Instead, Yanukovych decided to join an economic union with Russia. This set off mass protests around the country that resulted in Yanukovych’s being ousted. Putin then annexed Crimea on the pretext of protecting ethnic Russians living on that peninsula.

The history of Ukraine after the Cold War shows a slow, steady movement away from Russia and toward not the West per se but the Western model of free international trade and civil liberties as a means of enabling free enterprise.

Not surprisingly, relatively recent history shows why Ukraine distrusts Russia for foisting democide upon them:

Russians compose a majority in Crimea because of energetic Russification there and the 1944 mass deportation of Crimean Tatars, who are only now approaching their pre-deportation population levels on the peninsula.

Even more, we can see that Russia has broken its own treaty with Ukraine which guaranteed safety in exchange for the vast Soviet-era nuclear arsenal stored in Ukraine at the time of the Soviet collapse:

Ukraine gave up its nuclear weapons in the 1990s in return for security guarantees from the US, UK and Russia.

While some Western sources tend to overstate this, the first “color revolution” in Ukraine was Russian-engineered and designed to rule the country through pro-Russian leaders who turned out to be more corrupt than even the norm in Eastern Europe:

The protests of late 2004 initially succeeded in preventing Kremlin-backed candidate Viktor Yanukovych from stealing the Ukrainian presidency and made possible the election of his reformist rival, Viktor Yushchenko. However, Yushchenko soon found himself beset by infighting and was unable to lead Ukraine decisively towards Euro-Atlantic integration during what proved to be a hugely frustrating five-year term in office. This paved the way for Yanukovych to mount an unlikely comeback and win the 2010 presidential election race.

Nevertheless, the Ukraine of 2010 was a very different proposition to the country Yanukovych had first sought to rule six years earlier. Thanks to the Orange Revolution, Ukraine’s media landscape was no longer subject to the kind of smothering government censorship that had existed prior to 2004. In its place was a lively if imperfect form of journalistic freedom that reflected the competing interests of the country’s various oligarch clans. Once he became president, Yanukovych was unable to put the genie of a free press back into the bottle. Instead, his attempts to reverse the gains of the Orange Revolution helped spark the 2014 uprising that led directly to his downfall.

The Orange Revolution also had a profound effect on the way Ukrainians perceived themselves and their national identity. For the first thirteen years of independence, the political, cultural, social, and economic boundaries between Ukraine and Russia had remained blurred. Most people on both sides of the border continued to regard the fates of the two notionally separate countries as inextricably intertwined. This changed dramatically in 2004 when millions of Ukrainians mobilized in defense of free elections.

The protests served as a national awakening, establishing Ukraine’s democratic credentials and setting the country on a path that diverged sharply from the increasing authoritarianism of Vladimir Putin’s Russia.

The pro-Russian candidates quickly imposed an iron rule that was more than the usual authoritarianism, but a systematic dismantling of Ukrainian nationalism through policy:

The presidential election of 2004 brought Ukraine to the brink of disintegration and civil war. Cleared to seek a third term as president by the Constitutional Court, Kuchma instead endorsed the candidacy of Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych, who was also strongly supported by Russian Pres. Vladimir Putin. Yushchenko—running on an anticorruption, anticronyism platform—emerged as the leading opposition candidate, but his campaign was prevented from visiting Yanukovych’s stronghold of Donetsk and other eastern cities. In September Yushchenko’s health began to fail, and medical tests later revealed he had suffered dioxin poisoning (allegedly carried out by the Ukrainian State Security Service), which left his face disfigured. In the first round of the presidential election, on October 31, Yushchenko and Yanukovych both won about two-fifths of the vote. In the runoff the following month, Yanukovych was declared the winner, though Yushchenko’s supporters charged fraud and staged mass protests that came to be known as the Orange Revolution. Protestors clad in orange, Yushchenko’s campaign colour, took to the streets, and the country endured nearly two weeks of demonstrations.

As demonstrations gave way to rioting in January 2014, Yanukovych signed a series of laws restricting the right to protest, and hundreds of thousands took to the streets of Kyiv in response. Bloody clashes between police and protesters ensued, with dozens injured on each side. On January 22 two protesters were killed in skirmishes with police, and demonstrations soon spread to eastern Ukraine, a region that traditionally had supported Yanukovych and closer ties with Russia. Protesters occupied the justice ministry in Kyiv, and the parliament hastily repealed the anti-protest measures.

The bloodiest week in Ukraine’s post-Soviet history concluded on February 21 with an EU-brokered agreement between Yanukovych and opposition leaders that called for early elections and the formation of an interim unity government. The parliament responded by overwhelmingly approving the restoration of the 2004 constitution, thus reducing the power of the presidency. In subsequent votes, the parliament approved a measure granting full amnesty to protesters, fired internal affairs minister Vitaliy Zakharchenko for his role in ordering the crackdown on the Maidan, and decriminalized elements of the legal code under which Tymoshenko had been prosecuted. Yanukovych, his power base crumbling, fled the capital ahead of an impeachment vote that stripped him of his powers as president. Meanwhile, Tymoshenko, who had been released from prison, traveled to Kyiv, where she delivered an impassioned speech to the crowd assembled in the Maidan. Fatherland deputy leader Oleksandr Turchynov was appointed acting president, a move that Yanukovych decried as a coup d’état. On February 24 the interim government charged Yanukovych with mass murder in connection with the deaths of the Maidan protesters and issued a warrant for his arrest.

The Russian takeover deliberately fostered corruption as a means of neutralizing the Ukrainian political process:

In Ukraine, former Orange Revolution hero Viktor Yushchenko mustered only 5.46 percent of the vote in the 2010 presidential election. After he refused to endorse longtime frenemy Yulia Tymoshenko in the second round and signed a controversial election law, Yushchenko’s 2004 political rival, Viktor Yanukovych, assumed the throne. The new president then proceeded to have Tymoshenko and former interior minister Yuriy Lutsenko imprisoned on trumped-up charges and banned from contesting the 2012 elections. The media has come under relentless assault, corruption has worsened, and the election laws have been changed to benefit Yanukovych’s Party of Regions. A Forbes Ukraine study showed that nine of the top 10 winners of government tenders in 2012 were affiliated with the ruling party or lead state-controlled companies — tellingly, the president’s 39-year-old son, Alexander Yanukovych, leads the list of those making successful bids for government contracts. Yanukovych shows no interest in curbing corruption, despite a professed commitment to reform at the beginning of his presidency.

Not surprisingly, Ukraine wants to be free from Russia, and aligning itself with the West — the only other option, since China is allied with Russia — serves to reject the Russian narrative and expand a populist nationalism in Ukraine.

In my view, this is beyond politics itself. Ukraine simply wants to be free. They will use the West as a means to that end and discard it if it ever becomes a threat to Ukrainian autonomy. Their goal is to be more like Poland, an Eastern European country which broke free from the Soviet Bloc mentality.

Conservatives in the USA reveal themselves to be unworthy of rule when they assert a contrarian anti-Ukraine agenda, since by doing so they are letting the Left lead, instead of finding a conservative solution to the issue.

As things have it in the long term, the world benefits from a free Ukraine and, more importantly, the principle of nationalism. The State is less important than the culture, and the culture is tied to the ethnic group, which is why the Russians and conservatives seek to abolish it.

The Left has a more devious strategy which is that, like Russia, they will offer Ukraine friendship and then betray it by bring in the Western Leftist system that insists on diversity and civil rights as a means of destroying culture.

Having seen the Ukrainian mentality after the Cold War years, it seems to me that when the West makes these demands, Ukraine will go its own way yet again, possibly allied with other pro-nationalist governments in Poland and Hungary.

Tags: diversity, frozen conflict, nationalism, russia, ukraine