As human beings increase their capacity to transform their environment, the organizations and instruments that make this transformation possible acquire growing independence from those who use them. A power plant, a computer network, or an industrial facility operates through relationships whose complexity exceeds the understanding and control of any individual. Meanwhile, natural ecosystems are progressively incorporated into administrative structures that reduce their independence.
Civilization seems to produce increasingly autonomous entities while simultaneously diminishing the possibilities of autonomy for the organisms and communities subjected to them. Object-Oriented Ontology (OOO), primarily associated with Graham Harman, offers a distinctive perspective on this problem. His philosophy questions the ontological subordination of objects to human relationships and maintains that no entity can be completely reduced to its components, functions, or effects. A mountain, an organism, a machine, or an institution possesses a reality that exceeds any particular interaction. Harman (2013) extends this principle to natural, artificial, and even fictional entities, rejecting the notion that human existence constitutes the privileged foundation for understanding the world.
Ontological autonomy does not allow us to establish normative distinctions between entities. A forest and a factory can both be recognized as objects irreducible to their functions, but this assertion does not explain why the ecological independence of the former should be preserved against the expansionist demands of the latter. The flat ontology defended by Harman grants both an equivalent ontological status without necessarily maintaining that they possess identical moral value. However, this very neutrality limits its ability to distinguish the consequences of different forms of existence. The question concerning the nature of objects remains separate from the question concerning the conditions that allow other beings to preserve their independence.
The difference between existing with ontological independence and possessing effective autonomy becomes especially important in industrial societies. A technological infrastructure can maintain its operations with relatively limited human intervention while simultaneously forcing entire communities to adapt their activities to its requirements. This reversal of the relationship between human beings and technology constitutes one of Theodore Kaczynski’s central concerns in Technological Slavery (2010), where he examines how the expansion of technological capabilities can be accompanied by a progressive loss of control over the material conditions of existence. His concept of the power process encompasses the possibility of establishing goals, making efforts to achieve them, and experiencing some degree of control over one’s own decisions.
Autonomy has a dimension associated with the effective capacity to direct one’s own existence without constantly depending on external organizations. A society may guarantee numerous formal freedoms while its inhabitants have little influence over the systems that determine the fundamental conditions of their lives. A forest can sustain processes of regeneration, competition, ecological succession, and nutrient cycling without any authority responsible for establishing its objectives. Its functioning responds to interactions between organisms and environmental conditions that precede any human planning. An industrial plantation, by contrast, depends on decisions concerning yields, selected species, production cycles, and economic requirements.
Although both systems contain living organisms, their operating conditions are different. The former preserves relatively independent ecological processes; the latter incorporates those processes into a structure of externally defined objectives. The more sophisticated a device becomes, the greater the number of conditions that may be necessary to keep it operational. By contrast, the relative independence of an ecosystem results from evolutionary and ecological processes whose continuity does not require deliberate integration into an industrial structure. Naturally, ecosystems also contain dependencies, conflicts, and disturbances; their autonomy does not amount to permanent harmony. What distinguishes them is the absence of a technical organization that systematically subordinates their functioning to productive ends defined from outside.
In Anti-Tech Revolution: Why and How, Kaczynski (2016) develops an explanation of technological expansion through self-propagating systems. These systems tend to preserve their existence, increase their capabilities, or produce similar structures, even when their members pursue different objectives. Companies, institutions, and organizations can acquire dynamics relatively independent of the particular intentions of those who participate in them: competition favors certain forms of organization and penalizes others, producing transformations that no one need have consciously planned. Recognizing the ontological independence of an industrial network does not provide sufficient criteria for evaluating the dependence that network creates for other beings. A hydroelectric power plant possesses properties irreducible to the intentions of its builders, but it also alters a river’s flow regime, interrupts ecological processes, and reorganizes the activities of the populations inhabiting its watershed. Its reality exceeds our representations, while its material effects reduce the possibilities for independent development among other entities. The autonomy of one object can become a condition of subordination for numerous organisms and communities.
The problem becomes more profound when we consider the technological tendency to incorporate natural processes into systems of administration. Industrial agriculture, genetic engineering, environmental automation, and surveillance devices make it possible to intervene in phenomena that previously remained beyond the direct control of human institutions. These interventions can generate concrete benefits, but they also establish new relationships of dependence. An organism modified for particular productive conditions may require infrastructure to ensure its survival; a community that abandons traditional practical knowledge may ultimately depend on technologies whose maintenance exceeds its capabilities. The expansion of control over nature can be accompanied by a reduction in the autonomy of those living within the resulting system.
Kaczynski finds in this dynamic a reason to distrust proposals that seek to resolve technological problems through more sophisticated technological administration. In Industrial Society and Its Future, he maintains that the components of industrial technology considered beneficial are structurally connected to those that produce undesirable consequences. The development of one technology modifies the conditions under which others must operate, encouraging new needs and forms of dependence. The issue extends beyond the individual preferences of consumers or rulers, because operational requirements are reproduced through relatively independent institutional relationships. A political reorganization may alter the distribution of power within the system without necessarily changing the technological conditions that sustain it. While ecological autonomy constitutes a condition that allows the continuity of processes relatively independent of human will, technological autonomy, by contrast, can develop through the progressive incorporation of other processes into its own structure. Both produce complex relationships, but their consequences for the freedom of organisms and communities can be profoundly different. The fundamental contradiction of technological civilization lies in the fact that its expansion requires progressively subordinating to its own functioning what originally existed independently of it. Each transformation can be justified through particular benefits, but their accumulation produces a deeper modification: the natural world loses its capacity to develop apart from the purposes established by human organizations.
A civilization also deserves to be judged by what it is capable of preserving in the face of its own possibilities for expansion. Technological domination constitutes an expression of power, but the capacity to exercise it does not, by itself, establish whether doing so is desirable. Recognizing limits requires admitting that there are realities whose value exceeds any benefit that might be obtained through their transformation. The defense of wild nature thus carries a deeper meaning than the administrative conservation of resources: it represents the willingness to allow something to continue existing beyond the reach of our systems of control. A civilization that needs to reorganize the whole of reality to guarantee its own continuity ultimately destroys precisely what might justify its existence.
References
Harman, G. (2013). An outline of object-oriented philosophy. Science Progress, 96(2), 187–199. https://doi.org/10.3184/003685013X13691199842803
Kaczynski, T. J. (2010). Technological slavery: The collected writings of Theodore J. Kaczynski. Feral House.
Kaczynski, T. J. (2016). Anti-tech revolution: Why and how. Fitch & Madison Publishers.
Tags: industrial society, ted kaczynski