For the first time in Western history crime has become a product. We may have had dictators, Tyrants, Kings and Popes in the past, driving for all sorts of enterprises utilizing all sorts of products, but all of them always aimed at being productive, not extractive in themselves.
The current thirty-five-year-old South African regime was formed of the tripartheid alliance between the South African Native National Congress (mainly a Xhosa tribal political Left-wing and Black Nationalist party which changed its name for media purposes to only African National Congress in 1923), the South African Communist Party (SACP, mainly a Soviet-inspired mistake) and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU, being a trade union federation having twenty one affiliated trade unions itself and one of three federations in the country).
Historically, the conservatives (tribal traditionalists) in the Xhosa-based ANC were looking to find constructive ways to engage with the English Colonial Government which led them by their noses around the “garden,” but when the next generation, exposed to better education (Oliver Tambo and Mandela had law degrees) grew up, they became much more English-style Left-wingers based on the Communist influence in the 1940s, and challenged their traditional tribal leadership.
When the Zimbabwean born Zulu Albert Luthuli appeared, he deviated from the Xhosa tribal nature and sponsored protests and labor strikes against the (also) next generation Government of South Africa, which was the National Party still under British colonial control, using the same policies but translated into the Afrikaans language. Some of the young guns broke off from the ANC and established the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) moving from a defiance campaign to outright militancy in the 1950s while the country was still under British Colonial rule. Denied avenues for political change, the ANC and PAC young guns first turned to sabotage and then began to organize outside South Africa for guerilla warfare. Then in 1961 (still under British Colonial Rule), Mandela established Umkhonto we Sizwe (the Spear of the Nation).
According to Britannica the Sharpeville Massacre occurred on 21 March 1961 (under British Colonial Rule) and South Africa’s Prime Minister at the time only declared independence from Britain on May 31, 1961. However, his intention was described in a formal notice to the Conference of Commonwealth Prime Ministers, which stated a requirement to change from a Monarchy to a Republic (not a democracy), which is why the Republic of South Africa was established. At the time, liberals in Britain were already running cover for the ANC and undermining the Republic to later overthrow it via the same ANC, aimed at bringing it back under “control” as it were. It is noteworthy that the first country to be “awarded” after 1994 for support provided to the ANC was Britain, when they were awarded a $3 billion deal for weapons the country did not need after the conflict and which 61% voters did not want (per Terry Crawford-Brown in The Arms Deal Scandal).
Fast forward to 1990 again, the Republic of South Africa faced external sanctions and decided to change (again), but this time to a democracy that Left-wing liberals in the Western world wanted and that the ANC, SACP and COSATU alliance aligned with as well. When the Western partners were paid back (with the Russians not getting the recognition they wanted despite not being “Soviet” anymore), they set about redistributing wealth to their own card-carrying alliance cadres waiting patiently in Luthuli House. This action is described as “deploying” connected people to powerful jobs. In other words, they don’t employ people, they deploy them, meaning such people are always politically linked and every decision made is politically inspired (and authorized) in some form or fashion outside of the normal bureaucratic structures. One example is that the normal Government Departments were subsequently “clustered” allowing Luthuli House direct insight and control over any Minister and any department actions taken.
These changes directly caused the rise of black diamonds described in another document:
Driven primarily by government policy particularly after 1994, these changes have among other effects offered tailor-made opportunities to the educated and resourceful black South Africans (so-called ‘black diamonds’) in the townships to rise on the socio-economic ladder.
Little research was done on the rise of “BDs” because it was viewed as politically tainted, but essentially, they were the next generation (again) eager to push their old seniors to “step aside” so they can also “eat from the trough.” But the seniors realised they were in a good spot and decided to simply bloat the bureaucracy for even more political benefits (not more profits). E.g., being shareholders in White companies, they would be handsomely rewarded with yearly profits, but would still insist on more Black employees, managers and executives which would allow them to “recommend” family members for those added politicized benefits.
It must be said at this point that none of the above is surprising. In fact, it was predicted, thinking that there would be some self-imposed rational limitation e.g., when profits drop due to bloated bureaucracy, that the shareholders would put a brake on it. By the time Mbeki was recalled (fired) in Sept 2008, it was clear that no brakes would be applied. Some ANC commentators said that the political “phase” of the “revolution” was over and that the “social” phase of the “revolution” would now begin with Zuma. By 2025, Ramaphosa continued with this militant rhetoric now progressing to a “permanent revolution” to be pursued until everybody is equal using the Freedom Charter as guidance (not the Constitution), and implementing a policy called National Democratic Revolution (NDR), something that was not approved by Parliament. In fact, it is a centralist guidance for cadre deployment, i.e., many, many more black diamonds to be deployed (even if they are not South African) due to pressures from neighbouring countries also wanting “payback” including “benefits” and remittances.
From above it appears that black diamonds are not only pursued energetically top-down, but that likewise such black diamonds also pursue even more benefits bottoms-up – metaphorically perhaps a two-way street getting wider and wider. It is therefore incumbent on any analyst looking at the continuing changes in the South African landscape, to consider the dominant effect of black diamonds, because it is not visible in any other African country.
Independent investigation of the Black Diamond (BD) cultural effect using the Hofstede Cultural Index methodology found that the dimension or index specifically applicable to black diamonds having a dominating effect on South African culture is Indulgence versus Restraint. People that have restraint are risk-averse and would for example save money for a rainy day. But Black Diamonds are indulgent, easily spending their money on expensive cars and clothes before putting down a deposit for a house. Many would therefore remain in townships or on tribal lands (the Zulu King controls about three million hectares), where they don’t pay property taxes and where children are still raised “by the village,” which is equal to bad parenting, because those children are encouraged to also become the next generation of black diamonds thereby perpetuating this phenomenon.
However, further implication of this cultural deviation reveal the following:
Indulgence describes those peoples that perceive to have control over their lives (leaders/black-diamonds), while Restraint peoples perceive themselves happy to work, and whatever happens to them won’t be their own doing (they don’t take moral responsibility, which is like saying plausible deniability).
For example, one could say that a liberal black diamond has control over his life because of his indulgence, while those not having the money, doing lowly work, exhibit conservative tribal restraint quite happily because they don’t take moral responsibility. The conservative will do the work, but the liberal must take moral responsibility, which is perhaps a strange arrangement, but, even if it can work, black diamonds are not leaders of the tribe meaning they refuse to take moral responsibility because it is “only money” and they are deployed, not employed, therefore not the leader and can’t be held accountable. One could therefor try to say that Ramaphosa is the leader, but he is not the leader, Luthuli House can recall him at any time they wish and there are six “leaders” in the ANC top six, which may become top eight according to rumours floating around.
The big difference between South Africa and other African countries is a persistent layer of black diamond cadres continuously strengthening their own reach. If only this “strength” meant productivity, it could still be motivated, but it doesn’t. In the book Crossing the Chasm the author explained how new or different products under development can be successfully marketed, say, by first engaging people tending to be early adopters of technology to enable a learning curve from the market, before jumping the gap to the mass market, where much bigger profits can be realised.
The product black diamonds developed and marketed to early adopters was successful, and now they are marketing it to the mass market. The only problem is that they have commercialized crime for the mass market, turning it into a veritable product that can be marketed across borders using International Relations. The Global Initiative Against Transnational Crime produced a report called The Business of Killing in 2023 as follows:
The fact that there is a commercial market for violence has been recognized by the South African state: several commissions of inquiry into violence have been established, including the Moerane Commission of Inquiry into political assassinations in KZN. Several task forces investigating and prosecuting violence have also been established.
However, despite the high levels of targeted killings in the country, and even though there is recognition of this criminal market by the state, there is no dedicated state-level database that disaggregates targeted killings, which are instead grouped under the umbrella category of murder in the police annual crime reports, and there is still no consistent collection of data on the topic. Given this lack of disaggregated data pertaining to targeted killings, the GI-TOC has developed a database quantifying and categorizing assassinations, which records cases since 2000.
For the first time in Western history, crime has overtly become a product ready for the international market.
Tags: black diamonds, communism, diversity, south africa