Amerika

Furthest Right

Common Sense Makes No Sense at All

Few expressions are as frequently repeated in contemporary political discourse, and yet as devoid of substance, as “common sense.” Politicians, journalists, activists, and all manner of aspiring interpreters of the popular will invoke it with the confidence of someone proclaiming an indisputable truth. We hear about common-sense policies, common-sense solutions, and the need to recover some supposed common sense that once governed our societies. The expression has become a universal formula of legitimation, sufficiently vague to accommodate any ideology and sufficiently pretentious to relieve those who employ it of the obligation to provide arguments. After all, who could oppose common sense without, by that very act, declaring himself an enemy of reason?

The rhetorical effectiveness of this expression rests precisely on its lack of definition. Nobody needs to demonstrate that a particular proposal is reasonable when it can be presented as a spontaneous manifestation of something every sensible person ought to understand. The opponent is thus placed in an uncomfortable position: if he disagrees, his disagreement ceases to be a legitimate intellectual difference and comes to be interpreted as an aberration, a display of stupidity, or a deliberate detachment from reality. Common sense thereby functions as a justificatory fallacy whose principal virtue consists in removing assertions from the realm of rational discussion.

The problem begins with the confusion between familiarity and truth. What a society considers self-evident is often the product of cultural habits, historical conventions, inherited prejudices, and particular experiences that, through repetition, eventually acquire the appearance of natural laws. The familiar is reassuring because it demands little intellectual effort. It is accepted because it has always been accepted, and collective acceptance itself becomes the proof of its validity. Under such circumstances, common sense represents less a faculty of discernment than a form of intellectual conformism, a disposition to mistake the prevailing intuitions of an age for universal principles.

A retrospective examination of history is enough to reveal just how absurd widely shared certainties can be. Numerous beliefs that seemed self-evident to entire generations were abandoned when new knowledge transformed our understanding of the world. Science, philosophy, and many of the great intellectual transformations have advanced precisely by challenging what once appeared obvious. Reality is seldom obliged to conform to human intuitions, least of all when those intuitions originate from individuals whose knowledge of the phenomena they presume to interpret is superficial. If truth depended on what the majority considers reasonable, intellectual progress would have been virtually impossible.

Yet it is in politics, and particularly in populism, that this expression reaches its most grotesque manifestations. The populist needs to establish an immediate emotional connection with his audience. His purpose is to present collective problems as fundamentally simple matters whose solutions have supposedly been obstructed by a minority of bureaucrats, intellectuals, technocrats, or malicious leaders. Confronted with the complexity of economic, cultural, and institutional processes, he offers an accessible explanation and an apparently obvious solution. Common sense is the perfect instrument for this operation because it allows ignorance to be transformed into a political virtue and simplification into a demonstration of insight.

The phrase “it’s a matter of common sense” usually appears at precisely the point where an explanation ought to begin. It marks the moment when reasoning is replaced by an appeal to the audience’s complicity (and simplicity). Listeners are invited to recognize one another as members of a community of sensible people, united by their ability to understand what the so-called experts are incapable of perceiving. The psychological gratification is immediate: the individual discovers that his impressions, however elementary, possess greater legitimacy than the knowledge he does not command. Populism thus achieves an extraordinarily profitable inversion: it transforms the intellectual limitations of its audience into a source of moral authority.

This dynamic transcends ideological boundaries. Common sense can be invoked to justify an expansion of state intervention or its elimination, economic restrictions or radical liberalization, institutional reforms or the preservation of the existing order. What today represents an obvious necessity for a political movement may tomorrow become its exact opposite without the expression losing the slightest degree of effectiveness. Its content depends entirely on the needs of whoever pronounces it. In other words, we are dealing not with a principle that guides thought, but with an empty vessel that every ideology fills with its own conclusions. This is why it is particularly irritating to observe how certain movements that present themselves as enemies of political manipulation systematically resort to this very instrument. They denounce the propaganda, indoctrination, and distortions of their adversaries while appealing to a supposed spontaneous wisdom of the masses to legitimize their own slogans. The contradiction scarcely seems to concern them. Their principal objective is to secure public allegiance, even when doing so requires reinforcing the very psychological dispositions that make manipulation possible. Criticism of prevailing thought then degenerates into a competition over who can offer the most satisfying version of prevailing prejudices.

The problem runs deeper than the mere vulgarity of political language. A society that grants intellectual authority to collective intuitions eventually weakens its capacity to distinguish knowledge from opinion. Difficult questions require time, preparation, and a willingness to accept unpleasant conclusions. Social reality consists of causal relationships that frequently escape immediate experience and whose effects may not become apparent for several generations. Pretending to resolve such problems through formulas that any passerby might consider self-evident amounts to a voluntary renunciation of intelligence.

Populism, however, requires precisely that renunciation. The masses are easier to mobilize when they are given certainties than when they are confronted with questions. Doubt hinders unconditional allegiance, while complexity introduces nuances incompatible with the speed of political agitation. A leader interested in acquiring power by inflaming collective emotions has little incentive to cultivate an intellectually demanding audience. On the contrary, it serves his interests for his followers to interpret the correspondence between their own prejudices and the movement’s slogans as confirmation of its authenticity. The less he needs to explain, the more effective his propaganda becomes.

There is also a profoundly irresponsible dimension to this procedure: those who mobilize crowds through deliberate simplifications rarely assume responsibility for the consequences of having destroyed their followers’ capacity to understand the very problems they supposedly intend to solve. A population accustomed to distrusting any explanation that exceeds its immediate intuitions becomes particularly vulnerable to new forms of demagoguery. The populist may disappear, fail, or accommodate himself to the very order he promised to destroy; the intellectual degradation he helped produce, however, may outlive him by decades.

Perhaps the most revealing manifestation of this decline is the growing conviction that every politically valuable idea must be capable of being expressed in an immediate, simple, and emotionally satisfying manner. Complex explanations are expected to be reduced to slogans, while philosophical disagreements are supposedly resolved through assertions that win the public’s instant approval. Popularity becomes confused with relevance, and accessibility with profundity. Under such conditions, thought ceases to be an activity directed toward discovery and becomes a commodity tailored to the expectations of its consumers.

An intellectually healthy civilization ought to distrust ideas that demand acceptance precisely because they appear self-evident. It should demand arguments where others offer intuitions, examine the hidden premises behind every assertion, and recognize that many important truths are uncomfortable, counterintuitive, or simply incomprehensible without prior intellectual preparation. Genuine thought begins when the individual acquires the capacity to question his own certainties, even when they are shared by everyone around him.

Common sense, transformed into an instrument of political mobilization, represents the negation of that disposition. It is a perpetual invitation to stop thinking at precisely the moment when thought becomes necessary. Its extraordinary flexibility demonstrates that it can serve any cause because, in reality, it is committed to no truth whatsoever. And so long as rival factions continue competing for the privilege of speaking on behalf of an imaginary popular wisdom, they will continue confirming the same paradox: the more common sense is invoked as the foundation of politics, the less sense politics itself seems to make.

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