Posts Tagged ‘Geopolitics and Eurasia’

The World’s Mastermind: The True Objectives of Globalization (Adrian Salbuchi)

Friday, August 30th, 2002

“Those who do not learn from history are condemned to re-live it”

– George Santayana.

More and more people are taking an increasingly critical view of the worldwide phenomenon called globalization. Not that they are against constructive cooperation among the sovereign nations of the world on common goals, but rather that they reject this present model of globalization.

As we now have it, globalization can be defined as an ideology which identifies the sovereign Nation-state as its key enemy. It thus seeks to weaken, dissolve and eventually destroy it as a social institution in order to replace it with new supranational world management structures. These structures tie in with the political objectives and economic interests of a small number of highly concentrated and very powerful groups which today drive and steer the globalization process in a very specific direction.

These power groups consist of private interests which have today achieved something unprecedented in human history and which can de describe as the privatization of power on a global scale. Globalization is an understatement of that which former US presidents Woodrow Wilson, Franklin D. Roosevelt, Harry Truman and George Bush, each at different historical times described as a “new world order”.

A New World Order! Clearly, when former president Bush indiscretely used that term a decade ago, the Establishment quickly silenced and replaced it by the more neutral and harmless sounding “globalization” which, nevertheless, today has but one meaning: Anglo-North American neoimperialism on a planetary and all-encompassing level.

Who are they? What do they want?

The process we have described is in no way anonymous or secret, because the power groups promoting and driving globalization are in full view of public opinion: multinational corporations ­ especially the Fortune 500s accounting for 80% of the US economy -; the global financial structure which includes banks, investment funds, stock exchanges and commodity markets; multimedia monopolies; major Ivy League universities; international multilateral organizations and, most important, key governmental posts in the United States and other industrialized nations.

What is not immediately obvious is the fact that all these players in this veritable wheel of global power have one thing in common: their key managers, financiers, strategists, bankers, government officers, academics and shareholders belong to the same network of think tanks. This network forms a common hub steering the wheel of world power on its course.

Among these key think tanks – which are really geopolitical planning centers –, the role of the Council on Foreign Relations, the Trilateral Commission, the Royal Institute of International Affairs, the Brookings Institution, the RAND Corporation and the Center for Strategic & International Studies, among others, are of vital importance.

A bit of history

To properly understand today’s world one needs to look back on yesterday’s, in order to see how things came about. It was back in 1919 when a small group of influential bankers, lawyers politicians and academics ­ all of whom were taking part in the Paris peace negotiations between the victorious Allies and the vanquished Central Powers of Europe ­ met in the Parisian Hotel Majestic and reached a transcendental agreement: they decided to create a “think tank”; a sort of “gentlemen’s club” or lodge from which they could design the kind of “new world order” which would properly accomodate the colonial interests of the Anglo-North American alliance.

In London, that think tank would take on the name of the Royal Institute of International Affairs (RIIA), whilst in the United States it would be known as the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), based in New York City. Both organizations had the unmistakeable seal of the social strategy of gradually imposing a socialist order as a means of mass control which was then being promoted by the Fabian Society, financed by the Round Table Group which was in turn created, controlled and financed by South African magnate Cecil Rhodes, the international financial dynasty of the Rothschilds, and the British Crown.

The CFR got its initial support from the most wealthy, powerful and influencial families in the United States which included Rockefeller, Mellon, Harriman, Morgan, Schiff, Kahn, Warburg, Loeb and Carnegie (the latter in particular through its own front organization the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace).

In order to express and thus propagate its influence among elite circles, one of the first measures of the CFR consisted in founding its own journal which to this day remains the world’s premier publication on geopolitics and political science: Foreign Affairs. Among the CFR´s first directors, we find Allan Welsh Dulles, a key figure in the US intelligence community who would later consolidate the spy structure of the CIA; journalist Walter Lippmann, director and founder of The New Republic; J.P. Mogan corporate lawyers; bankers Otto H. Kahn, and Paul Moritz Warburg, the latter a German emigrée who came to the United States and in 1913 designed and promoted legislation which led to the creation of the Federal Reserve Bank which to this very day controls the financial structure of the United States. When the Second World War ended in 1945, the Federal Reserve Bank was supplemented by the International Monetary Fund and The World Bank, both of which were masterminded, planned and designed by the CFR at the Bretton Woods Conference in 1944.

Another member of the CFR and one of its first directors was geographer and president of the American Geographical Society, Isaiah Bowman, who would re-draw the map of Central Europe after the First World War thus ushering in times of grave turmoil in that continent which would lead to the Second World War. It was CFR lawyers like Owen D. Young (president of General Electric) and Charles Dawes (J P Morgan Bank), who in the twenties designed and promoted the “refinancing” plans for Germany’s war reparations debt as imposed by the Treaty of Versailles. It was top Federal Reserve Bank directors and CFR members who would generate the monetary distortions leading to the 1929 financial crisis and ensuing Depression.. It was CFR directors who through the powerful media under their control such as the NBC and CBS radio networks and newspapers like the The Washington Post and The New York Times, would coax and press public opinion to break US isolationist neutrality and embark the nation on another European war in 1939, which they themselves had been promoting since the early thirties.

The Second World War

At the very start of this European war in which The United States would only formally take part in 1941, CFR members set up the War & Peace Studies Group which literally became a part of the State Department, and designed its major foreign policies towards Germany, Italy, Japan and its allies. Later, they began preparing for yet another “new world order” after the then forseeable Allied victory. In this manner, the CFR designed and promoted the creation of the United Nations to manage world politics and some of its key economic agencies such as the IMF and the World Bank, through its members Alger Hiss, John J. McCloy, W. Averell Harriman, Harry Dexter White and many others.

Once the war ended, US President Harry Salomon Truman would establish the far-reaching national security doctrine which was based on the doctrine of containment of Soviet expansion based on the proposal of yet another CFR member and at that time US Ambassador to Moscow, George Kennan, who described his ideas in a famous seminal Foreign Affairs article which he signed with the pseudonym “X”; as well as on national security directive NSC68 issued by the National Security Council which was drafted by CFR member Paul Nitze. The same can be said of the so-called “Marshall Plan” designed by a CFR task force and later implemented by W. Averell Harriman.

Power structures

Although it is a little known organization among public opinion, the CFR is very powerful and has grown in influence, prestige and breadth of activities. So much so that today we can say without doubt that it conforms the “world’s mastermind” silently directing the course of the many complex and highly volatile social, politicial, financial and economic processes throughout the world. There is not a people, region or aspect of human life which is not affected by the CFR’s influence ­ knowingly or unknowingly ­ and it is the fact that it has nevertheless been able to remain “behind the scenes” that makes the CFR so exceptionally powerful.

Today, the CFR is a discreet organization counting among its more than 3.600 members, the best, most capable and powerful people wielding great influence in their respective professions, corporations, institutions, governmental posts and social environments. In this way, the CFR brings together top corporate officers of financial institutions, industrial giants, the media, research organizations, academics, top military officers, governmental leaders, university deans, trade union leaders and study center investigators. Their fundamental objectives consist in identifying and assessing a wide range of political, economic, financial, social, cultural and military factors spanning every imaginable aspect of public and private life in the United States, its key allies and the rest of the world. Today, thanks to the enormous power wielded by the United States, that breadth of activities of the CFR literally spans the whole planet.

Its researches and investigations are carried out by different task forces and study groups within the CFR which identify opportunities and threats, assess strengths and weaknesses, and design far-reaching strategies to promote its interests worldwide, each with their respective tactical and operative plans. Although such intensive and far-reaching tasks are made within the CFR, the key issue to understanding its enormous success lies in the fact that the CFR per se, never actually does anything under its own name but rather it is its individual members who do so, and this they do from their formal posts as chairmen, CEO’s and directors of major corporations, financial institutions, international multilateral institutions, media, and key posts in government, univerisities, the armed forces, and trade unions.. They never invoke or even refer to the CFR as being their main seat of planning and coordination.

The CFR members are powerful indeed as today we find among them (and we only refer to but a handful of the 3600 CFR members), people like David Rockefeller, Henry Kissinger, Bill Clinton, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Samuel Huntington, Francis Fukuyama, former secretary of state Madeleine Albright, international speculator George Soros, supreme course judge Stephen Breyer, CEO of Lowes/CBS Laurence A. Tisch, present secretary of state Gral. L. Colin Powell, CEO of General Electric Co. Jack Welsh, CEO of CNN W. Thomas Johnson, chairman and CEO of The Washington Post / Newsweek / International Herald Tribune Katherine Graham, vicepresidente of the United States, former secretary of defence and former CEO of Halliburton Richard Cheney, president George Bush, former national security advisor to president Clinton Samuel “Sandy” Berger, former CIA director John M. Deutch, governor of the Federal Reserve Bank Alan Greenspan, president of the World Bank James D. Wolfensohn, CEO of CS First Boston Bank and former governor of the Federal Reserve Bank Paul Volcker, reporters Mike Wallace and Barbara Walters, former CEO of CitiGroup John Reed, economists Jeffrey Sachs and Lester Thurow, former treasury secretary, ex CEO of Goldman Sachs and present director of CitiGroup, Robert E. Rubin, former secretary of state and “mediator” during the the Malvinas Islands War between Argentina and Britain Gral. Alexander Haig, the “mediator” in the Balcan conflict Richard Holbrooke, CEO of IBM Louis V. Gerstner, democratic senator George J. Mitchell, republican representaitve Newt Gingrich, and present national security advisor Condoleeza Rice, among many other.

In the business world, the top corporations of the Fortune 500 ranking all have a senior director who is a member of the CFR. These corporations together have a combined market value alomost twice the gross domestic product of the United States, concentrate the better part of the wealth and power of the country, and control key resources and technologies throughout the world. Together they employ over 25 million people in the US alone and account for over 75% of its GDP. In short, they wield gigantic power, leverage and influence in the US and in our planet.

We thus find here the key to the CFR’s enormous effectiveness in that its decisions and plans are drafted and agreed in its meetings, conferences and task forces behind closed doors, and are then carried out by its different members from each of their formal posts in different organizations. And what powerful posts these are!

If, for example, there were a series of plans agreed regarding, say, the globalization of the economy and the financial system, or which countries shall have peace and prosperity and which war and famine, then we can suppose that the coordinated action of personalities such as the president of the United States, his secretaries of state, defense, commerce and treasury, CIA director, the main international bankers and financiers, captains of industry, media media, reporters and writers, military officers and academics, heads of the IMF, World Bank and World Trade Organization, shall be able to coordinate concrete, effective and ­ no doubt ­ almost irrestistible actions. This has been so over the past eighty years.

Real power and formal power

In order to trully understand how the world really works, we must first understand the difference between formal power and real power. What the media propagate with a very high public profile every day in their newscasts on television, radio and in the press is nothing but the concrete and visible results of the actions of formal power structures, particularly those of national governments and the technocratic and supranational financial and corporate structures. However, real power levers are far less visible and they are the ones which plan out what will occur in the world, when and where it shall take place and who shall carry it out.

Formal power is short term and has high public profile; Real power is long-term and has almost no public profile. Formal power is “public” ­ Real power is “private”. As the United States is today’s sole planetary superpower, it is reasonable to conclude that this world power structure ­ as that is what it truly is ­ provisionally manages this veritable world government from the territory and the political and economic structures of the United States. This by no means implies that the majority of the people of the United States necessarily form part of this scheme of things, but rather that their elites and ruling classes do. We are thus speaking of a power group which operates within the United States (as it also does within the United Kingdom, Germany and, Japan, and through its agents in Spain, Argentina, Brasil, Korea and many other countries), but which is not necessaily identified with the people of Unisted States (nor any of the other countries with whose peoples, their needs and interests they need not heed nor be in agreement with).

In order to better understand the true nature of the United States, we should keep in mind that ­ especially in what refers to its foreign policy ­ the US “Administration” as they themselves so aptly call their government, is based in Washington DC, which is the seat of formal power in the US, whilst its real power structures are located in New York City. I.e., the US is managed from Washington DC but governed from New York City. Once we grasp this, then many other things automatically fall into place. Additionally, the true planetary center of power sits not in New York, but in London….

That this should be so is understandable when one remembers that the exercise of real power requires compliance with a set of rules and conditions such as continuity spanning years and decades in order to achieve far-reaching goals and complex strategies which will, in turn, span the entire planet, its nations and resources. This requires long-term planning: 20, 30 and 50 years ahead. These power elites well know that there is no greater threat to political continuity and consistency in the design and execution of such worldwide strategies, than to have them subjected to the democratic process with imposes a high public profile on its leaders who must heed the voice of the public at every step they take, and the constant power interruptions which democratic electoral processes entail.

How much better it is to operate discreetly, from what one could formally describe as a mere gentlemen’s club like the CFR, of which powerful and influential men and women can be officers, directors and chairmen for decades at a time without ever having to render any explanation to anybody but their own peers. In this manner, 3.600 powerful persons can exert gigantic policital, economic, financial and media influence over countless millions throughout our entire planet. It goes without saying that the media impose “political correctness” which can only be expressed through two major political parties ­ democrats and republicans in the US, labour and conservative in the UK, CDU or SPD in Germany, radicals and justicialists in Argentina ­ which are mere variations of the same basic teners. In practice, stable Western democracies have all conformed to what is in practice a one-party system with slightly different internal factions.

What we are describing is in fact the central hub of a veritable network of powerful men and women, considering that the CFR is in turn supplemented by a myriad of similar institutions both inside and outside of the United States. Among these we can mention a handful: The Hudson Institute, The RAND Corporation , The Brookings Institution, The Trilateral Commission , The World Economic Forum, Aspen Institute, American Enterprise Institute, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtigen Politik, and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

All of these think tanks bring together the most intelligent, best prepared, creative and ambitous men and women in a wide range of fields and disciplines. They are paid and rewarded very handsomely both economically and socially, so long as they clearly and uncompromisingly align themselves with the basic tenets of the CFR’s political objectives. These are nothing less than the creation of a private world government, the sistematic erosion of the structures of all sovereign Nation-states (though, naturally, not all of them in the same way, at the same speed nor at the same time), the standardization of cultural values and social norms, the spreading of the globalized financial system on a speculative-usurary basis, and the management of a global war system in order to maintain the necessary social cohesion of its own masses through permanent coaxing and alignment against real or imagined enemies of “democracy”, “human rights”, “freedom” and “peace”.

Thus, in order to better understand the world, one needs to read and assess what the CFR ­ or rather, its individual members – says and propagates, as many of its activities are not secret but rather merely discreet. Any person visiting their headquarters on fashionable Park Avenue and 68th Street in New York City as the undersigned has done many times in recent years, will be able to obtain a free copy of their latest Annual Report which describes its main activities and the full list of its 3.600 members. So the information is readily available for all who wish to see it.

It is, however, up to us to then take the trouble of cross-checking all the information regarding the CFR’s members with what each really does in their professional, corporate, academic and government activities. We also need to look back on modern history and assess the exceptional leverage which the CFR has had throughout the twentieth century both on its own as well as in conjunction with its sister organizations, thus triggering and influencing ideologies, public events, wars, formation of alliances, political crimes, covert activities, mass psychological warfare, economic and financial crises, promotion and destruction of political and business personalities, and other high-impact events ­ many of them clearly difficult to admit or confess ­, which have all however marked the course of humanity in our stormy modern times.

It would seem that we are all kept too occupied and fascinated as pasive spectators of the whirlwind of events which take place every day in the world so as to ensure that none of us ever thinks of looking elsewhere for suitable explanations to today’s grave crises, which would thus enable us to identify not so much the effects and shocking results of many such political decisions and covert actions which are taken, but rather their real and concrete causes and sources.

In order for this gigantic mass psychological warfare ­ for that is what it is all about – to succeed, the mass media play an essential and vital role which cannot be sufficiently stressed. For they are the instruments whose goal it is to undermine and neutralise the capacity of independent thought among the world’s population. That is the role of the world’s mass media like CNN, CBS, NBC, The New York Times, The Daily Telegraph, Le Figaró, The Economist, The Wall Street Journal, Corrieri della Sera, Le Monde, Washington Post, Time, Newsweek, US News & World Report, Business Week, RTVE, all of which are directed by key people belonging to the CFR and/or its sister organizations in the US and elsewhere.

Implications for Argentina Within this context, we can say that the local media in Argentina, our educational and our mainstream politicians are all aligned to the globalization process, and are set to achieving three key objectives:

1. To hide from public opinion how the world really works, knowing that if we cannot properly understand and diagnose the origin of our problems and weaknesses, we can hardly expect to find the proper solutions to them. We are thus (mis)led into believing that we are at “peace”, when in actual fact a veritable and violent total war is being waged against Argentina since over half a century on the political, economic, financial, media, educational, technological and environmental fronts. It is primarily a psychological war.

2. To make us believe that we are in a difficult situation but that “things will improve” so long as we reach yet another agreement with the IMF, privatize even more state interests, reform our federal and provincial governments to the World Bank’s liking, reform our labour and social legislation so that “international investors” will smile on us, and do our homework implementing IMF and World Bank “recipes”. The truth is that to say we are in a “difficult situation” is an absurd understatement. Argentina is in a terminal situation and if we do not awaken to this reality in a few years more ­ a decade at most ­ we shall cease to exist as a country altogether.

3. To make us believe that, whether we like it or not, there´s nothing we can do to stop “globalization”. The truth is, however, that there are myriads of hings that can be done to neutralise the adverse effects of globalization. These basically imply recovering the Nation-state so that it will comply with its basic and fundamental functions of:

integrating internal ;conflicting social forces,

foreseeing all possible threats and opportunities from without and within, and

leading the Nation on a political course defending its national interest.

These functions imply that there exists a sovereign Nation-state which Argentina today no longer has. We have become a colony and we thus must, as a first step, promote a true Second Declaration of Independence in order to then found a Second Republic. The implications and inspiration for our region and even further afield in the world of such a revolutionary act would be truly momentous. Additionally, one must bear in mind ­ and it is beyond the scope of this brief article to go into further details ­, that the global financial infrastructure is on the brink of a controlled worldwide collapse which is something that the CFR has been carefully planning for through their so-called Financial Vulnerabilities Project and New International Financial Architecture programmes. As we become aware of these realities, the road which we need to tread becomes increasingly clear too and, in truth, things then do not appear as complex as one would have thought. It is all basically a question of thinking with our own minds and not with that of our enemies; of starting to assess and defend our national interests, which implies having our own view of world events, interests and forces, and then defending them according to our needs, true possibilities and idiosincracy. In actual fact, we need not “reinvent the wheel” because the CFR itself gives us a blueprint model for successful political, economic, financial and social planning and management for national power. Why not learn from them? Why not form our own network of think tanks bringing together a wide range of local, regional and like-minded interests, players and thinkers from different fields, putting them all to work on promoting the national interests of Argentina and its neighbours, so as to recover sovereignty and self-determination for our poeples in a consistent and coherent manner, irrespective of what the world power players may try to impose upon us? This would imply understanding what globalization really is: an immensely large range of threats and opportunities which we need to avoid and take advantage of, as the case may be. On every subject having potential impact on us, we need to begin to understand which are our relative strengths and weaknesses in order to be able to successfully confront them, if not today then certainly in the future. That requires proper planning. Medium and long-term planning. That requires trying to be always one step ahead of the Enemy, of achieving and keeping an edge and an advantage over coming events.

No doubt this would lead us to properly designing policies consistent with our national interest, which in many instances will not coincide with the interests of todays power brokers to which end we need to seek and work closely with nations and organizations in Central and South America, Africa, Asia, and Europe with a common goal of neutralising the negative effects of global domination. In truth this would imply creating a New Argentina. We have many of the necessary tools already at hand; we have millions of countrymen ready to accept the challenge if we but explain to them clearly and forcefully the odds which are at stake; and millions more beyond our borders with whom we can work arm-in-arm for a common Cause.

So it is a question of understanding that in politics there are two kinds of people: those who are actors in the political arena and those who merely look on. The Council on Foreign Relations is a key active actor in the world political arena where they make their strength felt. Is it not time that we start doing the same in our own country?

* * *

(1) Warburg belonged to a prestigious and powerful Jewish German family of bankers, closely related to the Rothschilds and the Schiff s, owners of New York-based banking house, Kühn Loeb & Co. of which Paul Warburg was a partner. When the First World War ended, eloquent circumstances found one Warburg ­ Paul ­ on the Allied side of the negotiation table in Versailles, whilst another Warburg ­ his brother Max ­ was on the side of the vanquished Germans. Jakob Schiff, Paul Warburg’s partner, had in turn financed the Japanese against the Russian Tsar during the 1905 Russian-Japanese War…..

(2) Today Kennan is 98 years old and still writes for the CFR, an eloquent symbol of his continued influence spanning more than half a century among Real Power brokers in the CFR.

(3) Notably, W. Averell Harriman was a business partner of Prescott Bush, republic senator from Connecticut, father of former president George Herbert Walker Bush and grandfather of president George W. Bush.

(4) CFR rules of conduct specifically ban its member from ever publicly invoking the CFR in any way or manner.

(5) The reader will find detailed information in the author´s Spanish language bookl El Cerebro del Mundo: la cara oculta de la Globalización (Ediciones del Copista, Córdoba, Argentina, 1999, 404 pages.).

(6) Think tank closely linked to the US Air Force which, among other things, created the Internet.

(7) Founded in 1973 by David Rockefeller and bringing together interests of the power elites of the United States / Canada, Europe and Japan. Its ideologue is Zbigniew Brzezinski, professor at Georgetown University and Columbia University and former National Security Advisor to president James Carter (also a CFR and Trilateral member as was the case with most of his cabinet).

(8) Among these “enemies” of the “free peoples of the world” over the past decades we can mention Fascism, German Nationalsocialism, the Japanese, Communism, environmental contamination, terrorism, Saddam Hussein, Slobodan Milosevic, Islamic “fundamentalism”, militarism, and “antisemitism”, among many others.

(9) This might sound a bit strong and yet at the pace things are occuring in the world, such a forecast may hold true for just about any country in the world. Just think what everydoby would have thought only twelve years ago ­ at the beginning of 1989 ­ if they had been told that only three years later the following would take place: the fall of the Berlin Wall, the reunification of Germany, the collapse of the USSR into fifteen independent republics and their abandoning Marxism for Capitalism. One would have thought such a person as being totally exagerated if not downright stupid and yet…..that is exactly what occurred. It does make one think…

(10) Elsewhere, the author of this article has written extensively on the need to found a Second Argentine Republic.

NATO and the Architects of the American Lebensraum (Nikolai von Kreitor)

Friday, August 30th, 2002

American Blueprint for World Hegemony

It was John O’Sullivan who in 1845 formulated the concept of American Lebensraum – the Manifest Destiny Doctrine. He coined the term to signify the mission of the United States “to overspread the continent allotted by Providence for the free development of our yearly multiplying millions.”(1) For Josiah Strong, the American missionary imperialist par excellence, the Manifest Destiny had geopolitical destination—the creation of a world empire. The America would be the greatest of all empires. “Other nations would bring their offerings to the cradle of the young empire of the West , as they had once taken their gifts to the cradle of Jesus.”(2) Since the destiny and its destination were preordained by God , Americans possessed supreme title to space, preempting and superseding the right of others. Combined with the Monroe Doctrine, the theological rationale of the Manifest Destiny Doctrine provided an almost evangelical explanation of the geopolitical manifest design to conquer and subjugate space, first the whole Western Hemisphere and then, beginning with the war against Spain in 1898, the whole world. As Carl Schmitt has pointed out, in 1898 USA embarked on a war against Spain and latter against the world which has not ended yet. In this context the American war against Yugoslavia is only a continuation of the one hundred years war which the United States began in 1898.

In the history of the United States the expansionist impulse has been as powerful as religion. The continuity of American expansionist war aims since the time of the Manifest Destiny Doctrine has been the most predominant feature of American foreign policy in which the three components of American expansionist Weltanschauung confluence: The Manifest Destiny Doctrine – the theological component – conquest preordained by God and Providence to carry the will of the Almighty, and subsequently, conquest to establish democracy or in the interests of democracy or mankind, The Monroe Doctrine –the geopolitical component and the Open Door Doctrine —the economical component.

It was at the end of the last century that the intellectual foundations of the American geopolitical doctrine were formulated by Frederick Jackson Turner, Brooks Adams, admiral Mahan, and its implementation begun by Theodore Roosevelt and subsequently Woodrow Wilson. The geopolitical concepts advanced by Frederick Jackson Turner, Brooks Adams and admiral Mahan “became a world view, an expansionist Weltanschauung for subsequent generation of Americans and … important to understand America’s imperial expansion in the twentieth century,” writes the noted American historian William Williams. The policies of American Lebensraum, called “Open-Door” imperialism, and the enlargement of the American empire through expansion of the perimeter of the Monroe Doctrine, is the explanation of America’s foreign policy during this century, including the present policies of NATO expansion, assertion of American preponderance of power over the whole Eurasia and the war against Yugoslavia.

The architects of the American Lebensraum provided also the rationale for NATO. NATO as a geopolitical construct is firmly anchored in the “Frontier thesis” of the American expansionist foreign policy, appearing as a function and instrument of the Atlantic Grossraum, as envisioned by Turner, Adams and Mahan. Or as Senator Tom Connally stated: “the Atlantic Pact is the logical extension of the Monroe Doctrine”. The creation of the NATO signified the extension of the Monroe doctrine to Europe – Europe would become for the United States another Latin America, points out the American historian Stephen Ambrose. (3)

Frederick Jackson Turner’s main concept was that America’s uniqueness was the product of an expanding frontier. He defined American historical existence as perpetual geopolitical expansion toward new frontiers in the West. “The existence of an area of free land , its continuous recession , and the advance of American settlement westward explains the American development”(4) The “universal disposition of the Americans”, an “expanding people, is to enlarge their dominion” and that the ongoing geopolitical enlargement “is the actual result of an expansive power which is inherent in them”(5), claimed Turner. Thus American history is a history of “continually advancing frontier line…The frontier is the line of most rapid and effective Americanization…Movement has been its dominant, and …the American energy will continually demand a wider field for its exercise”(6)

“The other idea ( in the American imperialist Weltanschauung) is the thesis of Brooks Adams that America’s uniqueness could be preserved only by a foreign policy of expansionism.”(7) Adams idea was calculated to preserve Turner’s explanation of American past and project it into the future. “Taken together, the ideas of Turner and Adams supplied American empire builders with an overview and explanation of the world, and a reasonably specific program of action from 1893 to 1953”, points out William Williams. “Expansion was the catechism by this young messiah of America’s uniqueness and omnipotence…Turner gave Americans a nationalistic world view that eased their doubts… and justified their aggressiveness.”(8) Turner, looking at the American past , saw in the final conquest of West the realization of Manifest Destiny in the Western Hemisphere. Adams saw the coming new frontier – the whole world. His mondial vision was inevitable leading to a one world empire—the American World Empire, not plurality of Grossraüme or Panregions, as envisioned by Carl Schmitt or general Haushofer.

Brooks Adams’ The Law of Civilization and Decay(9) (1895) was “a frontier thesis for the world.”(10) He propounded a policy of aggressive expansionism designed to make Asia an economic colony, allowing America to acquire a large new frontier in Asia. Essentially the conquest of Eurasia was commenced then. “One even reissued his foreign policy recommendations of the 1890’s as a guide for the United States in the Cold War,”(11) points out William Williams. In his book “American Empire”(12) (1911) Brooks Adams envisioned the coming of the American world empire and the conquest of all Eurasian geopolitical space. Theodore Roosevelt’s, and Woodrow Wilson’s interpretation of the westward movement as a civilizing conquest of Eurasia was influenced by the works of Turner and Adams. Adams” use economic and military power to expand the frontier of the United States westward”(13)

Brooks Adam’s expansionist design was the foundation of American foreign policy —expansionism first in Asia, then in Europe. “Wilson relied extensively on Turner’s frontier thesis in presenting his own interpretation of American history” ‘All I ever wrote on the subject came from him’”, pointed Woodrow Wilson.(14) Borrowing from the vocabulary of the Manifest Destiny Doctrine – Wilson’s slogan “World safe for democracy” – meant in reality world safe for policies of American Lebensraum. As William’s adds ” even more than in the case of Theodore Roosevelt, the policies of Woodrow Wilson and subsequently Franklin Delano Roosevelt were classic Turneris.(15) Turner’s frontier thesis made democracy (i.e. American dominion ) a function of an expanding frontier.” F.D. Roosevelt has always been …a Turnean in foreign policy…Roosevelt ‘s Turnerism was meanwhile blended with the realpolitik of Adams.” (16)

Woodrow Wilson was the first who gave a glimpse of the coming American world hegemony. Already conceiving Great Britain subjugated by the United States and thus John Bull transformed to an obedient servant of the overseas Atlantic Master, Adams saw the main enemy in continental Europe.

“The acceleration of movement, which is thus concentrating the strong, is so rapidly crushing the weak that the moment seems at hand when two great competing systems will be pitted against each other, and the struggle for survival will begin…Whether we like it or not , we are forced to compete for the seat of international exchange, or, in other worlds, for the seat of empire…..Our adversary (France, Germany and Russia) is deadly and determined…If we yield before him , he will stuffle us” (17)

Economic supremacy, claimed Adams, was the basis for all power (18). Free trade and economic internationalism i.e. international economy under American control, was the key to world domination. “Adams argued that the United States must take an increasingly large role in policing the world order. “Economic (and moral) power had to be translated into military power if America was to have, as Franklin D. Roosevelt (influenced by Adams) put it, its “rendezvous with destiny”.(19) Adams American Economic Supremacy (20)(1900) was the old handbook for American empire builders.

Childs writing in 1945 pointed out: “If Adams had written last year, for publication this year, he would have had to alter scarcely anything to relate his views to the world of today”(21). The same is true for the period after 1991. The father of containment George Kennan , in explaining and defending the policy of containment, mentioned Adam’s as one of the small number of American’s who had recognized the proper basis of foreign policy…Kennan’s analysis and argument was in many respects similar to that of Adams.”(22) The Truman Doctrine was a classic example of the Frontier Thesis designed to facilitate American expansionism, and in one speech Truman called it “The American Frontier”.

“By the end of W.W.II , American leaders were thinking even more explicitly within the pattern evolved in the 1890s.”(23) “Like a good many aspect of 20th century American history, the military definition of the world was a direct product of the frontier-expansionist outlook.(24)

Admiral Mahan provided the earliest rationale for NATO. “Expressing himself in a menacing and efficient attitude of physical force”, Mahan envisioned a future in which the industrial expansion led to a rivalry for markets and sources of raw materials and would ultimately result in need of power to open and conquer new markets. Sea power was the ultimate vehicle for this expansion, the new “open door’ colonialism demanded the services of American navy.

As Walter LaFeber points out, Mahan summarized his theory in a postulate : “In these three things—production , with the necessity of exchanging products, shipping , whereby the exchange is carried on, and colonies…—is to be found the key to much of the history , as well as the policy , of nations bordering on the sea”(25) Production leads to a need for shipping , which in turn creates the need for colonies.(26)

John Hay’s “Open Door Notes” – the proclamation of American Lebensraum in 1899, and 1900 signified the beginning of the American commercial invasion of the world, the future American imperialist expansionism through the policy of Open Door.(27) As I have already pointed out Woodrow Willson’s words “World safe for democracy” translated in reality “World safe for American Lebensraum”. Wilson saw overseas economic expansion as the frontier to replace the American continent that has been conquered. In a section of volume V of his “History of the American People”, which reads as a paraphrase of essays written by Brooks Adams, Wilson claimed that United States is destined to command “the economic fortunes of the world” through the “Open Door” expansionism. “Diplomacy, and if need be, power, must make an open way.” In a series of lectures at Columbia University in April of 1907, he was even more forthright:

“Since trade ignores national boundaries and the manufacturer insists on having the world as a marked, the flag of his nation must follow him, and the doors of the nations which are closed must be battered down…Concessions obtained by financiers must be safeguarded by ministers of state, even if the sovereignty of unwilling nations be outraged in the process. Colonies must be obtained or planted, in order that no useful corner of the world may be overlooked or left unused”(28).

F. D. Roosevelt conceived his New Deal in geopolitical tradition of Turner and Adams (29)— the New Deal as a New Frontier. American freedoms could not be preserved in a frontierless society. United States was again in search of new frontiers. “To expand the Open Door Policy to the world” became the leitmotiv of American foreign policy.(30) The Secretary of Commerce said: “We cannot permit the door to be closed against our trade in Eastern Europe anymore than we can in China.”(31) The Secretary of State Hughes extended the Open Door Policy to all European colonies and Eastern Europe(32). The Cold War was about the opening of the Russian and the Eastern European frontiers for American expansionism and Open Door imperialism. The policy of “containment”, i.e. the traditional blockade of the Fortress Heartland served the same purpose. Austin Bears had challenged in 1934 the New Deal (Roosevelt’s Administration) to break with the expansionist tradition. He implied that the New Deal would be involved in another war for empire. Speaking through the National Foreign Trade Council the corporation community opposed Beard resolutely: “National self-containment has no place in the economic policy of the United States.”(33)

“American leaders predicted that commercial expansion, as long as the door remained open, would provide the United States with the economic advantages of a formal empire without the political responsibilities and moral liabilities connected with colonies”(34) Nevertheless the end result of the “Open Door” expansionism was the economic colonization of new geopolitical space. As the German geopolitician Otto Maull remarked: “Complete economic penetration is the same as territorial occupation”. “Open Door” warfare inevitably leads to “Open Door ” occupation.


The British geopolitician Peter J. Taylor introduces in his book “Britain and the Cold War.1945 as Geopolitical Transition” the concept of “Geopolitical world order” which denotes a geopolitical regime of hegemony by a historical country- hegemon in the international word-system and points out that “the geopolitical order that preceded the Cold War has been termed the World Order of the British Succession.”(36) Both Nazi Germany and the United States had identical plans for Weltherschaft and both countries were involved in a struggle for world hegemony as successor of the previous geopolitical order of Pax Britannica. “…we can interpret the two world wars as contests for the British succession between Germany and USA”(37). As a result of the World War II the dominant British political empire was replaced with a new American economic empire.(38) Already prior to World War II United States began to plan for the coming American world hegemony.

The minutes of the closet meetings that were held between the State Department and the Council on Foreign Relations beginning in 1939 explicitly detail the role of the U.S. as a replacement for the British…The minutes of the Council’s Security Sub-Committee of the Advisory Committee of the Post-War Foreign Policy set the likely parameters of U.S. post-war foreign policy: ‘..the British Empire as it existed in the past will ever reappear and…the United States may have to take its place…’. The US ‘must cultivate a mental view toward world settlement after this war which will enable us to impose our own terms, amounting… to Pax Americana.’(39) . Americans could retain their vitality only by accepting the logic of endless expansionism.(40) In 1942 , the Council’s director , Isaiah Bowman , wrote, ’The measure of our victory will be the measure of our domination after victory…(The US must secure areas) strategically necessary for world control.’”(41)

The War and Peace Studies Project, initiated by the Council on Foreign Relations during the F.D. Roosevelt Administration immediately prior to the Second World War, was then the master plan and blueprint for a new global order for the postwar world, an order in which the United States would be the dominant power…The War and Peace Studies groups, in collaboration with the American government ,worked out an imperialistic conception of the national interests and war aims of the United States.” The American imperialism “involved a conscious attempt to organize and control a global empire. The ultimate success of this attempt made the United States…the number one world power , exercising domination over large sections of the world—the American empire… Such blueprinting was by its very nature determining the ‘national interest “(42) of the United States….The purpose of postwar planning was the creation of an international economic and political order dominated by the United States.(43)

Isaiah Bowman, Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s chief geopolitician, defined the foreign policy objectives of the United States as pursuit of global policy of American Lebensraum in response to Nazi Germany’s Lebensraum. Thus the war aims of United States and nazi-Germany were identical. Bowman in collaboration with H.F. Armtrong even secured an article from MacKinder on the danger of a strong Soviet Union which was published in Foreign Affairs under the title “The Round World and the Winning of the Peace”(44)

The article is remarkable because in it the old British imperialist MacKinder in essence argues for transformation of the British Empire into an American dependence and for the establishment of American hegemony in Europe: …”Britain—moated stronghold—a Malta on a grander scale (for the westward movement of the American empire) and France as a defensible bridgehead”(45)

Memorandum E-B19 concluded with a statement of the essentials for the United States foreign policy, summarizing the “component parts of an integrated policy to achieve military and economic supremacy of the United States within the non-German world.” Another main element was the “coordination and cooperation of the United States with other countries to secure the limitation of any exercise of sovereignty by foreign nations that constitutes a threat to the minimum world area essential to the security and economic prosperity of the United States and the Western Hemisphere.”(46)

At a meeting on October 19, 1940 Leo Posvolski, the Department of State’s chief postwar planer , “agreed with the Council’s initial blueprint for world power. His belief that the United States had to have more than just the Western Hemisphere as living space is indicated in his statement that ‘if you take the Western Hemisphere as the complete bloc you are assuming preparation for war’(47). Posvolski thus felt that the United States would have to go to war to gain more living space if limited to the Western Hemisphere, a conclusion clearly following from the Council’s work.”(48) American economy need an elbow room, a new extended living space in order to survive without major readjustments, claimed the planners of the Council on Foreign Relations. That elbow room was conceptualized as the Grand Area, (Grossraum) — the United States -led non German bloc which the United States during 1941 called “world economy”(sic!).

The Economic and Financial Group’s studies had shown how dangerous a unified Europe, with or without Nazi domination, would be to the United States. Hamilton Fish Armstrong pointed out in mid-June 1941 that a unified Europe could not be allowed to develop because it would be so strong that it would seriously threaten the American Grand Area. Europe, organized as a single entity, was considered fundamentally incompatible with the American economic system.”(49)


The extensive studies and discussions of the Council group determined that, as a minimum , most of the non-German world, as a new American ‘Grand Area’, was needed for elbow room.’ In its final form, it consisted of the Western Hemisphere, the United Kingdom, the remainder of the British Commonwealth and Empire, the Dutch East Indies, China and Japan itself.(50)

Noam Chomsky summarizes the concept of American Lebensraum: “The Grand Area was to include the Western Hemisphere, Western Europe, the Far East, the former British Empire (which was being dismantled), the incomparable energy resources of the Middle East (which were then passing into American hands as we pushed out our rivals France and Britain), the rest of the Third World and, if possible, the entire globe.”(51) The whole China was also included.

Unlike Carl Schmitt who in his geopolitical works used the concept of Grossraum, (and Greater Area is the exact translation of Grossraum), and who advocated a world order based on coexistence of Grossraüme, the American concept had nothing to do with a delimited geopolitical space. US deliberately rejected after the war the scenario of several Monroes (52). Instead American expansionism had to be unlimited, rejecting thus the very notion of competing national interests.

The War-Peace studies conceptually embodied the geopolitical expansionism of Turner and Adams, the Weltanschauung of the American Open Door imperialism. NSC -68 was nothing by restatement of those geopolitical objectives, coached in the heavy theology of a modernized Manifest Destiny Doctrine. (53)


“The main political objective , both in peace and war , must therefore be to prevent the unification of the Old World centers of power in a coalition hostile to her own interests”, wrote the American geopolitician Nicholas Spykman in his book Geography of Peace,(54) restating the main geopolitical objective of the United States in the post-war Europe. “Spykman simply is repeating for the United States what has been an overriding principle for British statecraft since the time of Henry VIII”, comments David Galleo (55).

To the same conclusion came also Hans J. Morgenthau : “United States European policies largely parallel those of Great Britain from Henry VIII to the end of the British Empire”. Like Great Britain in the past United States pursues one single objective in Europe— prevention of European unity, rejection of the principle of balance of power and assertion of unilateral American hegemony and preponderance of power.(56) After the war the policies of American Lebensraum resulted in the formation of the Atlantic Alliance, the new Grand Area envisioned by the planners of the Council on Foreign Relations and the War and Peace studies project. The American Grand Area was conceptualized and institutionalized as the Atlantic Alliance.

The Atlanticism—the organizing principle of American postwar policy toward Europe—was build on Europe’s political dependency. NATO— the linchpin of American post war control— was the instrument to manage American power projection in Europe, points Ronald Steel in his book “Temptations of a Superpower” (57), in which he emphasizes that for the American post-war planers a major objective was to prevent Europe from becoming in the future an economic competitor because an economic competitor is likely to become a political one too. The American national interest demanded prevention of Continental unity.

Anticipating the creation of NATO, the leading American geopolitician of US postwar expansionism Nicholas Spykman, propounded in 1943 the idea that “European power zone can be organized in a regional League of Nations with the United States as a extra-regional member.”(58) Commenting on Spykman’s proposal, a leading American political scientist Clyde Eagleton pointed out that : “This is simply incredible-either that the United States would take on such a risk , or that other states would permit such interference from outside.”(59) Acceptance of the American proposals would only mean consent to the establishment of American protectorate over those European states.

Reformulating the old Turnerian “Frontier thesis” Spykman wrote “We have seen the frontier from an international point of view as an expression of a relative power relationship, as that line where conflicting pressures became equalized. From a national point of view of the individual state, the frontier is the front trench held during the temporary armistice called peace”(60)

The Europeanist influence tended to see the Atlantic system built around American hegemony as a transitional construction, born of exceptional European weakness, bound to be transformed if not discarded once that weakness had passed. Implied was the view that Europe was not to be dominated indefinitely.

Geopolitical Atlanticism envisioned just that indefinite domination. Political Atlanticism saw NATO as a pillar for such indefinite domination and as instrument for power managing of European geopolitical space. Atlanticism is a sort of political religion of expansionism with its geopolitical catechism and doctrine of immaculate conception of American foreign policy. (Although- befitting its Anglo-Saxon origin, the Atlantic catechism appears less systematized and less doctrinaire)”(61), write David P. Galleo and Benjamin M. Rowland in their book “America and the World Political Economy. Atlantic Dreams and National Realities”.

In the frameworks of the American imperialist Weltanschauung the establishment of American protectorate over Europe could be accomplished through NATO.(62) The Atlantic imperial mantle and American grand schemes for a world military empire were epitomized in the Atlantic Alliance. David Galleo and Benjamin Rowland point out that: “Hull’s free-trade imperialism might have been expected , but not a new Roman Empire with an Atlantic Mare Nostrum. It was almost as the United States , spurning Europe’s colonies, had decided to annex the mother countries instead (63).

The Atlantic Alliance, envisioned already by Brooks Adams, “marked the hegemony of America over Europe (64). Henceforth an American general , answerable to the President , will usurp the political prerogatives of Europe. And with the Truman Doctrine a spatially alien power —the United States, asserted and gained control over Western Europe, obliterating thus the independent political existence of former Great Powers, including its own ally Great Britain.


The geopolitical concept of American Lebensraum—the Atlantic Great Area of American power preponderance —needed a direct power projection in order to guarantee American dominion. NATO became the institution of hegemony par excellence.

The architects of the American Empire envisioned for NATO the same role as admiral Mahan envisioned for the Navy – a vehicle for conquest of new markets and geopolitical space and an instrument for the implementation of the “open door ” policy and geopolitical space management. In short NATO became the military arm of the westward movement of the American Empire. The “frontier thesis” of the American foreign policy and the Monroe Doctrine did confluence in NATO. The Marshall Plan, followed by NATO, began in earnest the era of American military, political , and economic dominance over Europe, points Stephen Ambrose.(65)

Senator Henry Cabot Lodge considered NATO as one of series of regional organizations designed to hem in the Soviet Union. Thus NATO was also constructed as an instrument of the strategy of blockade of the fortress “Heartland” , identical with the Soviet Union. (Spykman’s concept of the countries of Rimland which had to be controlled by the United States must be seen as geopolitical theory of blockade).

NATO would assert American domination over Western Europe while simultaneously allowing the United States to assume a position of undisputed hegemony over Europe. What that hegemony would be “was adequately , if somewhat crudely , summed up in the frequent references to the extension of the Monroe Doctrine. Europe would become, for the American businessman, soldier and foreign policy maker, another Latin America” Senator Tom Conally declared “the Atlantic Pact is but the logical extension of the Monroe Doctrine.”(66)

NSC -68 represented the practical extension of the Truman Doctrine , which has been world-wide in its implications but limited to Europe in its application . The document provided justification for America’s assuming the role of world policeman.(67) It was designed to not only to preserving the power of USA but to extend and consolidate power by absorbing new satellites and to prevent the rise of competing system of power.

In order to understand the threat that NATO poses against the security of Russia and other European countries, it is necessary to go to the origin of the so called Atlantic Alliance. The North Atlantic Treaty, in its origin, was not an alliance at all, but an unilateral US guarantee of what US termed European security, and factually an assertion of American hegemony in Western Europe under the disguise of security. The essential condition of the original US-European relationship , formulated in 1949, was totally one-sided. Its raison d’etre allegedly was security — in reality it was hegemony, in fact an enlargement of the Monroe Doctrine, such as the announcement of the Truman Doctrine, which initially mostly effected Great Britain which had to cease—as in the case of Greece— her spheres of influence to the United States. It allowed the United States to gain supreme command over Western European armed forces and also to station American troops on European soil. An editorial in the Wall Street Journal in April of 1949 correctly characterized the North Atlantic Treaty Organization “as nullifying the principles of the United Nations.”(68)

Historically speaking the unilaterally proclaimed Truman Doctrine was an extension of the Monroe Doctrine across the Atlantic, i.e. a major enlargement of the American Grossraum— a globalization of the principles of the Western Hemisphere Grossraum, where the United States is the sole bearer of sovereignty — and thus the first direct assault on the sovereignty of European states. Although ostensibly promoted as a device of containment and a policy for global intervention, it was in reality a device of subjugation and expansionism, serving American policy of Lebensraum.. The British foreign policy scholar Kenneth Thompson called the Truman Doctrine a national and expedient act designed initially to replace British with American power in Central Europe.(69)

Charles de Gaulle, the great French statesman with a kin eye for geopolitics and propensity to dismantle American myths, rightfully asserted that NATO was a mere appendage to the United States and that NATO and (French) national sovereignty were incompatible objectives. Already in 1951 (June 12) the Paris weekly Le Monde summarized the essence of the Atlantic Alliance and its military arm NATO:

“The fundamental inequality of the alliance is turning it more and more into a hidden protectorate in which protestation of national pride are not enough to compensate for a growing enslavement. The Roman Empire had its citizens, its allies, and its foreigners. The new American Empire has its allies of the first zone (the Americans), its allies of the second zone (the British), and its continental protégés: In spite of all their haughtiness, the latter are becoming to an ever increasing extend the Filipinos of the Atlantic.”

Leopold Kohr concluded that the Atlantic Alliance is not a partnership of equality , and that there is only one nation which is truly free in this new arrangement, “the imperial nation, the American.”(70) As Walter LaFeber has pointed out with the formation of NATO United States accomplished their victory in what LaFeber calls the First Cold War which President Wilson started already at the Versailles Peace Conference after the end of the First World War and the end result of which was the establishment of American control over the Western Europe i.e. over a significant portion of Eurasia.

After the end of the Cold War the role of NATO as instrument of American expansionism, an instrument for administration, control and enlargement of the American empire, became more clear than ever. Quoting the French author J.J. Servan Schreiber Benjamin Schwarz and Christopher Layne describe the roll of the USA in the post-cold war period as a head of world empire. “Fifty years after NATO founding, as the post-cold war alliance finds itself at war, the time has come to reassess US imperial policy in Europe. The war in Yugoslavia is a watershed in NATO’s history. Today , the United States has expanded the alliance’s geographical scope and created a new role for it: intervention in the internal affairs of sovereign states whose domestic policies offend NATO’s values – even when such states pose no security threat to the alliance’s partners… Hidden by all lofty (and misleading) rhetoric about NATO and transatlantic partnership is a simple fact: US policy in Europe aims not to counter others’ bids for hegemony but to perpetuate America’s own supremacy…NATO expansion may prove to be a diplomatic blunder on a par with the 1919 Versailles Treaty…”.(71)

Schwarz and Layne point out that NATO serves the following important functions:
Defending and expanding the imperial frontiers of the United States.

Establishment of permanent US protectorate over the continent and

Undermining the emergence of independent Western Europe.

NATO was used to undermine the pre-existing world order based on the Helsinki agreement and to obliterate the independent role of the United Nations. NATO became an instrument of conquest of the Eastern Europe – “peacefully” as in the case of the Visegrad–countries (Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic ) or by resorting to outright war of aggression (Yugoslavia). Containment of Western Europe and conquest of the Eastern Europe are the two main functions of NATO.

In the verdict rendered at the concluding session of the International War Crimes Tribunal Investigating U.S. NATO War Crimes in Yugoslavia on January 23, 2000 in Kiev, Ukraine, NATO was declared a criminal institution within the purview of the Nuremberg codex.

Once again, and now after the end of the Cold War, Europe as a geopolitical entity is faced by a historical choice — either independent geopolitical existence as a Mitteleuropa or European community, or a future as dependent appendage to the American empire. An independent geopolitical existence — Europe for Europeans — translates into a Mitteleuropa as antihegemonic block facing and competing with the American Atlantic Grossraum. The most simple geopolitical axiom is that NATO is a threat to a future European independence. And above all- NATO is a threat to Russia.


(1) See Anders Stephenson Manifest Destiny. American Expansion and the Empire of Right (Hill and Wang, New York, 1995) p. XI.

(2) Josiah Strong Our Country: Its Possible Future and Its Present Crisis (New York, 1985) , p. 20. Here quoted from Walter LaFeber The New Empire (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1963) , p. 74.

(3) Ambrose, Stephen E. The Military Dimension: Berlin, NATO and NCS-68 in Paterson, Thomas G.(ed.) The Origins of the Cold War (D.C. Heath and Company, Lexington, MA, 1974) p. 178.

(4) Turner, Frederick Jackson The Significance of the Frontier in American History (Henry Holt and Co, New York, 1995) p. 1.

(5) Turner, Frederick Jackson ibid. p.33.

(6) Turner, Frederick Jackson, ibid. p.p. 33, 59.

(7) William Appleman Williams The Frontier Thesis and American Foreign Policy in Henry W. Berger (ed.) A William Appleman Williams Reader (Ivan R. Dee, Chicago, 1992) p. 90.

(8) William Appleman Williams The Frontier Thesis and American Foreign Policy p. 91.

(9) Brooks Adams, The Law of Civilization and Decay (The MacMillan Co, New York, 1896).

(10) William Appleman Williams The Frontier Thesis and American Foreign Policy p. 92.

(11) William Appleman Williams The Frontier Thesis and American Foreign Policy p. 96.

(12) Brooks Adams The New Empire (The MacMillan Co, New York, 1900).

(13) ibid. p. 96.

(14) Williams ibid. 97.

(15) ibid. p. 98.

(16) ibid. p. 99, 100.

(17) Brooks Adams America’s Economic Supremacy, p.p. 80, 104-05, David P. Calleo and Benjamin Rowland America and the World Political

Economy p. 273.

(18) Thomas J. McCormick America’s Half-Century (John Hopkins University Press , Baltimore, 1995) p. 18.

(19) McCormick ibid. p.p. 18-19.

(20) Brooks Adams America’s Economic Supremacy (The MacMillan Co, New York, 1900).

(21) Ibid. p. 100.

(22) ibid. p. 101.

(23) William Appleman Williams The Contours of American History , Norton and Company, New York, 1988, p. 474.

(24) William Appleman Williams Contours of American History p. 473.

(25) A.T. Mahan The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783 (Boston, 1890) pp.. 53, 28.

(26) Walter LaFeber The New Empire. An Interpretation of American Expansion 1860-1898 (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1963) p. 88.

(27) Williams ibid. p. 86.

(28) Williams, William Appleman The Tragedy of American Diplomacy p.p. 71, 72.

(29) Graebner p. 134.

(30) Graebner p. 134.

(31) (Charles Evans Hughes p.. 86).

(32) William Appleman Williams The Contours of American History p. 454.

(33) Lloyd C. Gardner The New Deal, New Frontiers, and the Cold War: A Re-examination of American Expansion, 1933-1945 in David Horowitz (ed) Corporations and the Cold War (Monthly Review Press, New York, 1969) p. 108.

(35) Dorpalen, Andreas The World of General Houshofer. Geopolitics in Action (New York, 1942), p.224.

(36) Peter J. Taylor “Britain and the Cold War. 1945 as Geopolitical Transition” (Guilford Publications,Inc, New York 1990) p. 17. The concept of “Geopolitical regime of hegemony” , used by Taylor, is quite similar to the concept of “Historical regime of hegemony ” in the political writings of Antonio Gramsci.

(37) Peter J. Taylor ibid. p. 17.

(38) Peter J. Taylor ibid . p. 17.

(39) Michio Kaku and Daniel Axelrod To Win a Nuclear War. The Pentagon’s Secret War Planes (South end Press, Boston, 1987) p.p. 63, 64.

(40) Those views were expressed by Reinhold Niebuhr who, like many American Cold War planners viewed the American future political destiny as Manichean interpretation of the virtually uninterrupted warfare- from the point of the revamped Manifest Destiny Doctrine. In this conjunction one may recall the view of the American foreign policy by William Appleman Williams.

In order to understand the foreign policy of expansionism of the United States Williams urged his students “to study the pirates as a protocommunity which sought in the Renaissance era and afterwards to create its own rules , and prompted widespread fear in the existing empires”. See Paul M. Buhle and Edward Rice-Maximin William Appleman Williams . The Tregedy of Empire (Routledge, New York and London, 1995) p. 236.

One may also recall that while still allies already during the World War II the United States started to prepare for war with the Soviet Union. In the summer of 1945 , at the time of the Conference in Potsdam United States adopted a policy of ‘string the first blow’ in a nuclear war against the Soviet Union. To that effect a secret document JCS 1496 was drafted on July 19, 1945. (p. 30).

The first plan for nuclear attack was drafted soon afterwards by General Dwight Eisenhower at the order of PresidentTruman. The plan. called TOTALITY (JIC 329/1) envisioned a nuclear attack on the Soviet with 20 to 30 A-bombs. The plan earmarked 20 Soviet cities for obliteration in a first strike: Moscow, Gorki, Kuibyshev, Sverdlovsk, Novosibirsk, Omsk, Saratov, Kazan, Leningrad, Baku, Tashkent, Chelyabinsk, Nizhni Tagil, Magnitogorsk, Molotov, Tbilisi, Stalinsk, Grozny, Irkutsk, and Jaroslavl Michio Kaku and Daniel Axelrod To Win a Nuclear War. The Pentagon’s Secret War Planes (South end Press, Boston, 1987) pp. 30, 31.

(41) Michio Kaku and Daniel Axelrod To Win a Nuclear War. The Pentagon’s Secret War Planes (South end Press, Boston, 1987) pp. 63,64.

(42) Lavrence H. Shoup & William Minter Imperial Brain Trust (Monthly Review Press, New York 1977, p. 117.

(43) Lawrence Shoup & William Minter ibid. p. 118.

(44) Martin Geoffrey The Life and Thought of Isaiah Bowman (Archon Books, Hamden, Connecticut, 1980) p. 177. One may also recall that Isaiah Bowman already in his in 1921 published book “The New World” envisioned the coming American world empire. Carl Haushofer published in 1934 a trilogy of books titled “Macht und Erde” which, according to Otto Maull, was written as the German response to Bowman’s “The New World”. Martin Geoffrey, ibid. p. 165.

(45) MacKinder, Halford “The Round World and the Winning of the Peace” in Democratic Ideals and Reality (W.W. Norton & Co, New York, NY 1962) p. 274. MacKinder’s article was originally published in Foreign Affairs, vol.1 (July 1943) p.p. 595-605.

(46) Memorandum E-B19, October 19, 1940, CFR, War-Peace Studies , NUL. Here quoted after Shoup & Minter, ibid. p. 130.

(47) Posvolsky’s statement is in Memorandum A-A11, October 19, 1940 War Peace Studies , Baldwin Papers, Box 117, YUL from which Shoup &

Minter quote .

(48) Shoup & Minter ibid. p. 131.

(49) Shoup & Minter, ibid. p. 137.

(50) Shoup & Minter , ibid p. 136.

(51) Noam Chomsky What Uncle Saw Really Wants p. 12 (Odonian Press, Berkeley, 1992). The policies of American Lebensraum and the geopolitical construct of the American Greater Area are discussed in dept in Joyce and Gabriel Kolko The Limits of Power. The world and United States Foreign Policy (Harper and Row, New York, 1972) .

(52) See Taylor, Peter J. Britain and the Cold War. 1945 as Geopolitical Transition (Gilfor Publications, New York, 1990. Not only Carl Schmitt but also General Haushofer advocated peaceful coexistence of several competing “Grand Areas” or “Monroes”. Carl Schmitt used the concept of Grossraum, General Haushofer of “Pan-region”.

(53) The political objectives stated in the NSC-68 were after the end (sic!) of the Cold War again restated in the Pentagons Defense Planning Guidance. With the Soviet Union gone United States embarked on a new policy of expansionism.

(54) Nicholas Spykman Geography of Peace , New York, 1944.

(55) David Galleo ibid. p. 30.

(56) Hans J. Morgenthau The Mainsprings of American Foreign Policy Robert A. Goldwin (ed) Readings in American Foreign Policy (Oxford University Press, New York, 1971) p. 642.

(57) Ronald Steel Temptations of a Superpower ( Harvard University Press, 1995) p. 70.

(58) N. Spykman America’s Strategy in World Politics p. 468.

(59) Clyde Eagleton, Review of America’s Strategy in World Politics , 222 Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science (July 1942), 189-190, P. 190. here quoted in David Willkinson Spykman and Geopolitics in C. Zoppo and C. Zorgbibe (eds) On Geopolitics: Classical and Nuclear (Martinus Nijhoff, Dortrecht, 1985), p. 82.

(60) Nickolas J. Spykman and A.A. Rollins “Geographical Objectives in Foreign Policy I, American Political Science Review , vol. 33 , 1939 , p.394

(61) David P. Galleo and Benjamin M. Rowland America and the World Political Economy. Atlantic Dreams and National Realities (Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1973) p. 18.

(62) Ibid. p. 44.

(63) Ibid. p. 46.

(64) Ibid. p. 61.

(65) Stephen E. Ambrose, The Military Dimension : Berlin, NATO and NSC-68 in Thomas G. Paterson The Origins of the Cold War (D.C. Heath and Company, Lexington, 1974) p. 178.

(66) Stephen E. Ambrose The Military Dimension : Berlin, NATO and NSC-68 in Thomas G. Paterson The Origins of the Cold War (D.C. Heath and Company, Lexington, 1974) p. 117.

(67) Stephen E. Ambrose , ibid. p. 182.

(68) The Wall Street Journal, April 5, 1949.

(69) Kenneth Thompson -Political Realism and the Crisis of World Politics- An American Approach (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1960) – at p. 124.

(70) Leopold Kohr -The Breakdown of Nations -ibid., at p. 203.

(71) Benjamin Schwarz and Christopher Layne “NATO: At 50, It’s Time to Quit” (The NATION Magazine, May 10, 1999 pp.17, 18.

Mackinders World (Francis P. Sempa)

Friday, August 30th, 2002

“No mere scraps of paper, even though they be the written constitution of a League of Nations, are, under the conditions of today, a sufficient guarantee that the Heartland will not again become the centre of a world war.”

Mackinder’s proposed solution to the problem of Eastern Europe, which he derived from “a consideration of the realities presented by the geography of our globe,” was the formation of a “tier of independent states between Germany and Russia,” which would form “a broad wedge of independence, extending from the Adriatic and Black Seas to the Baltic.” This territorial buffer between Germany and Russia,” wrote Mackinder, must have access to the ocean, and must be supported by the “outer nations” (i.e., Britain and the United States).11 Otherwise, the East European power vacuum would again serve as the spark to ignite yet another struggle for Eurasian hegemony.

During the 1920s and 1930s, unfortunately, Mackinder’s ideas had little influence in Britain or the United States. That was not the case, however, in Germany where Mackinder’s global view attracted the attention and praise of Karl Haushofer and his associates at Munich’s Institute of Geopolitics. The German geopoliticians, influenced by the writings of Oswald Spengler, Friedrich Ratzel and Rudolf Kjellen, adapted Mackinder’s theories and concepts to promote German expansion. Haushofer in the 1920s and 1930s was close to Rudolf Hess, a close adviser to Hitler. But it is unclear to what extent the German geopoliticians influenced the Führer’s global strategy. Haushofer considered Mackinder the author of “the greatest of all geographical world views.” “Never,” exclaimed Haushofer referring to “The Geographical Pivot of History,” “have I seen anything greater than these few pages of a geopolitical masterwork.” The German geopoliticians divided the world into “Pan Regions” each of which was dominated by a great power. Haushofer advocated the formation of a “Eurasiatic great continental bloc”; in essence, an alliance between Germany, Japan and Russia that would eventually overwhelm the British Empire.12

During the inter-war period, Mackinder was knighted (1920), lost his seat in Parliament (1922), chaired the Imperial Shipping Committee (1920-1939), sat on the Imperial Economic Committee (1925-1931), was made a Privy Councilor (1926), and continued to write and lecture on geography and related topics. His inter-war writings included: “Geography as a Pivotal Subject in Education” (1921); “The Sub-Continent of India”(1922); The Nations of the Modern World: An Elementary Study in Geography and History After 1914 (1924); and “The Human Habitat”(1931).13

The Nazi-Soviet Pact of August 1939, the beginning of the Second World War and Germany’s subsequent invasion of the Soviet Union drew attention in the United States to Mackinder’s works. In 1941 and 1942, Newsweek, Reader’s Digest and Life published articles which prominently mentioned Mackinder and his writings. Democratic Ideals and Reality was reprinted in 1942. That same year, Hamilton Fish Armstrong, the editor of Foreign Affairs, asked Mackinder to write an article to update his Heartland theory. That article, entitled “The Round World and the Winning of the Peace,” appeared in July 1943, and was Mackinder’s last significant statement of his global views.

“[M]y concept of the Heartland,” wrote Mackinder, “is more valid and useful today than it was either twenty or forty years ago.”14 He described the Heartland in geographical terms as “the northern part and the interior of Euro-Asia,” extending “from the Arctic coast down to the central deserts,” flowing westward to “the broad isthmus between the Baltic and Black Seas.” The Heartland concept, he explained, is based on “three separate aspects of physical geography.”

First, “the widest lowland plain on the face of the globe.” Second, “great navigable rivers [that] flow across that plain [but have] no access to the ocean.” And third, “a grassland zone which . . . presented ideal conditions for the development of high mobility” by land transportation.

The Heartland, in essence, wrote Mackinder, was equivalent to the territory of the Soviet Union, minus the land east of the Yenisei River.

If the Soviet Union defeated Germany in the war, opined Mackinder, “she must rank as the greatest land Power on the globe.” “The Heartland is the greatest natural fortress on earth,” he explained, and “[f]or the first time in history it is manned by a garrison sufficient both in number and quality.”

A second geographical feature which Mackinder estimated to be “of almost equal significance” to the Heartland was the “Midland Ocean,” consisting of the eastern half of Canada and the United States, the North Atlantic basin and its “four subsidiaries (Mediterranean, Baltic, Arctic and Caribbean Seas),” Britain and France (a remarkable description of the NATO alliance that was formed six years after Mackinder wrote his article).

Completing his updated global sketch, Mackinder identified three additional geographic features. The first was “a girdle of deserts and wildernesses” extending from the Sahara Desert eastward to Arabia, Tibet, and Mongolia to eastern Siberia, Alaska, part of Canada, and the western United States. The second consisted of South America, the South Atlantic Ocean, and Africa. And the third encompassed the “Monsoon lands” of China and India. He expressed the hope that those lands would prosper and, thereby, balance the other regions of the globe. “A balanced globe of human beings,” he wrote, “[a]nd happy, because balanced and thus free.”15

Mackinder expressed the hope that Heartland Russia would cooperate with the Midland Ocean powers in the postwar world and, thereby, prevent future German aggression. But his theories and concepts proved readily adaptable to the emerging Cold War struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union. American strategists during and after the Second World War borrowed aspects of Mackinder’s world view in formulating and implementing the policy of “containment” of Soviet Russia.16 Anthony J. Pierce, in his introduction to the 1962 edition of Democratic Ideals and Reality, could confidently assert that “[i]n America and in England, since 1942, most studies of global strategy or political geography have been based, in whole or in part, upon [Mackinder’s] theories.17 “Mackinder, of course, had his share of critics,18 but as Colin Gray has pointed out, “Mackinder’s interpretations of historically shifting power relationships in their geographical setting have stood the test of time much better than have the slings and arrows of his legion of critics.”19

More recent and current political observers and strategists attest to the continuing influence of Mackinder’s ideas. In 1974, R.E. Walters wrote that “the Heartland theory stands as the first premise in Western military thought.”20 In 1975, Saul B. Cohen noted that “most Western strategists continue to view the world as initially described by Mackinder.”21 Zbigniew Brzezinski’s Game Plan (1986) and The Grand Chessboard (1997) present global views almost wholly based on Mackinder’s concepts. In 1980, Robert Nisbet claimed that “[e]very geopolitical apprehension that Sir Halford Mackinder expressed some six decades ago in his Democratic Ideals and Reality has been fulfilled.”22 The influential journals, Strategic Review and The National Interest, published several articles in the 1980s and 1990s wherein the authors applied Mackinder’s theories and concepts to contemporary global issues.23 In 1988, the respected strategist Colin Gray asserted that “[t]he geopolitical ideas of the British geographer Sir Halford Mackinder … provide an intellectual architecture, far superior to rival conceptions, for understanding the principal international security issues.”24 In 1992, Eugene Rostow remarked that “Mackinder’s map remains an indispensable tool of analysis” of global politics.25 In 1994, the former State Department Geographer, George J. Demko, wrote that “the geographic ideas of … Mackinder, still provide important insights into international political processes.”26 Henry Kissinger in his book, Diplomacy (1994), concludes with a warning that “Russia, regardless of who governs it, sits astride territory Halford Mackinder called the geopolitical heartland….”27 Paul Kennedy, Robert Chase, and Emily Hill invoked Mackinder’s theories in a 1996 Foreign Affairs article on post-Cold War “pivot states.”28 Finally, in 1996 the National Defense University issued a reprint of Democratic Ideals and Reality.

Twentieth century global politics were shaped, in part, by Mackinder’s geopolitical vision. Following his concepts, the continuing struggle for Eurasian mastery was the geopolitical essence of the First World War, the Second World War, and the Cold War. First Great Britain, then the United States, organized great coalitions to oppose successive bids for Eurasian hegemony launched by Wilhelmine Germany, Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. The Great Power struggles of the twenty-first century will likely repeat this pattern.

The People’s Republic of China, situated at the gates of Mackinder’s “pivot region” or Heartland, and with access to the sea, possesses sufficient human and natural resources to make a bid for Eurasian mastery sometime in this new century. Russia, though currently undergoing a new time of troubles, still occupies the Heartland and possesses vast human and natural resources, as well as thousands of nuclear weapons. The nations of Western, Central and Eastern Europe are moving toward economic unity and, perhaps, political unity, with Germany playing a leading role. Whatever specific power constellation emerges, however, U.S. foreign policy will continue to be shaped by Mackinder’s geopolitical vision of a Eurasian-based world hegemony.

In 1944, the American Geographical Society awarded Mackinder the Charles P. Daley Medal, which was presented to him at the American Embassy in London on March 31, 1944. Ambassador John Winant remarked that Mackinder was the first scholar who fully enlisted geography as an aid to statecraft and strategy. A year later, the Royal Geographical Society awarded Mackinder the Patron’s Medal, and its president noted that ”[a]s a political geographer his reputation is . . . world wide.”29 Mackinder died on March 6, 1947, at the age of eighty-six. More than fifty years later, as we enter a new century, statesmen and strategists still operate in Mackinder’s world.

Dreams of the Eurasian Heartland (Charles Clover)

Friday, August 30th, 2002

Popularized at the beginning of the twentieth century by an eccentric British geographer, Sir Halford Mackinder, geopolitics posits that the earth will forever be divided into two naturally antagonistic spheres: land and sea. In this model, the natural repository for global land power is the Eurasian heartland – the territory of the former Russian empire. Whoever controls the heartland, wrote Mackinder, will forever seek to dominate the Eurasian landmass and ultimately the world. This theory of geopolitics has not gone unnoticed in the heartland itself. A geopolitical theory called Eurasianism has become the common focus of Russia’s red-brown coalition – the alliance of ultra-left and ultra-right politicians who together control close to half of the Duma. In its hard-line version, the movement envisions the Eurasian heartland as the geographic launch pad for a global anti-Western movement.

Today, in the shadow of the Kremlin’s spires, geopolitical theory has a fastgrowing set of devotees. Many Russian intellectuals, who once thought their homeland’s victory over the world would be the inevitable result of history, now pin their hope for Russia’s return to greatness on a theory that is, in a way, the opposite of dialectical materialism. Victory is now to be found in geography, rather than history; in space, rather than time.
A geopolitical theory called Eurasianism has become the common focus of Russia’s “red-brown” coalition-the alliance of ultra-left and ultra-right politicians who together control close to half of the Duma (Russia’s lower house of parliament) and who grow stronger each day, as Russia’s economic crisis radicalizes the country’s long-suffering population.
In its milder form, Eurasianism simply stresses Russia’s uniqueness and argues that Russia need not Westernize in order to modernize. But in its hard-line version, the movement envisions the Eurasian heartland as the geographic launch pad for a global anti-Western movement whose goal is the ultimate expulsion of “Atlantic” (read: “American”) influence from Eurasia.
Followers of this hard-line strain include the leaders of the Communist Party, which is by far the largest political organization in Russia today. Gennadi Zyuganov, its chairman, has just published a geopolitical manifesto, The Geography of Victory, in which he abandons anything resembling traditional communist doctrine. “We live in an era where geopolitics is literally knocking at the door, and ignoring it would be not just a mistake, but a crime,” writes Zyuganov. The only time Marx surfaces in the book is in quotations meant to reveal that he too was a geopolitician.
Other radical political parties, such as Vladimir Zhirinovsky’s Liberal Democratic Party (the LDPR, which is neither liberal nor democratic), have also climbed aboard the geopolitics bandwagon. Their rantings cannot be ignored; the LDPR dominates the geopolitics committee in the Duma and competes with the more liberal international affairs committee to be the house’s voice on Russian foreign policy.
Outside the legislature, Russia’s Defense Ministry and military elite have also caught Eurasian fever. Some commentators even find geopolitical sympathies in the policies of Russia’s enigmatic new prime minister, Yevgeni Primakov. His policies fit the Eurasianist doctrine so neatly that it is hard not to view Primakov as one of the movement’s backers-although he has never publicly stated his position on the theory.

The widespread success of Eurasianism is thanks in part to its all-encompassing, hybrid character. In the skilled hands of its careful ideologues, Eurasianism has succeeded in reconciling the often contradictory philosophies of communism, religious orthodoxy, and nationalist fundamentalism. Eurasianism therefore manages to be imperial without being nationalistic, messianic without being overtly chauvinistic. It has become an umbrella philosophy, absorbing all that is radical in the bubbling cauldron of post-Soviet political thought. Eurasianism, then, may be Russia’s fabled “third way,” a compromise between left- and rightwing extremes-and yet far from the center in its own right.
If Eurasianism seems familiar, it is no coincidence. The theory is a direct descendant of the Slavophile movement of the nineteenth century, now retooled for the 21st. Cribbed from Mackinder and born in 1921 with the publication of historian Peter Savitsky’s Exodus to the East, Eurasianism seeks to establish Russia’s unique identity as distinct from the West. Rather than emphasizing the cultural union of all Slavs (as the Slavophiles did until the idea fell apart amid the Polish uprisings of the 186os), Eurasianism looks south and east and dreams of fusing Eurasia’s Orthodox and Muslim populations into one.
Eurasianism entered the post-Soviet world through the pages of the opposition newspaper Den’ (Day), which was created in 1990 and changed its name to Zavtra (Tomorrow) after being closed by the authorities in 1993. In the eight years since, the editor, Aleksandr Prokhanov, and his former deputy, Aleksandr Dugin, have turned Eurasianism into a rallying point for Russia’s right- and left-wing malcontents.
“The Eurasianists transformed the contradictions between white [ultraconservative] and red on the basis of a broad civilizational project,” said Dugin in his office across from Moscow’s Novodevechy monastery. “Nobody else except the Eurasianists presented such a project, which dates from the 1920s but is just as operative in the 199os. The other tendendes-the Slavophiles, the Westerners, the left and right, red and white-these are all exhausted, they are for nostalgists, like collecting stamps or old cars.”
Since leaving Zavtra, Dugin has become the editor of a journal called Elements: Eurasian Survey and works as an adviser to the Communist speaker of the Russian Duma, Gennadi Seleznev. He took center stage in the Eurasianist movement with his 1997 book, The Basics of Geopolitics: Russia’s Geopolitical Future, which he wrote with the help of Russia’s Military Academy of the General Staff. The Basics of Geopolitics takes Mackinder’s idea of the geopolitical opposition between land powers and sea powers one step further, positing that the two worlds are not just governed by competing strategic imperatives but are fundamentally opposed to each other culturally. The antagonism between land and sea, for Dugin, parallels the East-West divide. Land-based societies, he theorizes, are attracted to absolute value systems and tradition, while maritime societies are inherently liberal.
On the strategic front, Dugin suggests that an anti-Western alliance of Russia, Japan, Germany, and Iran, based on their shared rejection of the West (ignoring the fact that they are not all land-based), would be capable of expelling American influence from the continent. Notwithstanding the fact that such an alliance will seem utterly implausible to Western readers-as will the counterfactual claim that Germany and Japan are not “Western” countries-some of Dugin’s suggestions appear to have anticipated actual Russian policy vectors. For instance, he recommends turning over the disputed Kuril Islands to Japan as a step toward building an alliance. It turns out that during the autumn of i998 just such an idea was mooted to the Japanese. Dugin’s ideas have also foreshadowed Yeltsin’s calls for a Moscow-Berlin-Paris axis and Primakov’s initiatives toward Iran and Iraq (which began while he was foreign minister). The correlation between Dugin’s ideas and those of the Russian establishment is too stark to be ignored.

While Dugin and Prokhanov have emerged as Eurasianism’s main ideologues, the movement’s greatest practitioner is Gennadi Zyuganov. Zyuganov has used Eurasianism to reinvent the Communist Party, and he has been fantastically successful in doing so. By combining nationalism, religious orthodoxy, and Marxism, Zyuganov has outflanked nationalists to win the radical vote on both sides of the political spectrum. And his Communists’ strength in the Duma is likely to grow in the next elections as popular disgust with mainstream politics drives voters toward the extremes, both of which, thanks to Zyuganov’s strategy, now lead back to the Communists.
Zyuganov has bridged the gap between white and red in Russian society, first by linking Russia’s “national idea” to popular traditions and Russian Orthodox Christianity and then by folding these back into communism. In his 1995 book, Za Gorizontom (Beyond the Horizon), Zyuganov argues that the traditional Russian idea of obshina (community) and the Orthodox doctrine of sobornost (communitarianism)-both of which endorse collective property ownership and communal decision-making-reveal that communism has actually been a theme in Russian society throughout history.
Zyuganov the Eurasianist is not just a Russian nationalist. He also models himself a Bashkir nationalist, a Tatar nationalist, and a fierce defender of Kalmykian Buddhism. Zyuganov’s big idea is that all traditional societies are profoundly socialist ones. He has skillfully connected ethnic nationalism with communist notions of friendship between nationalities to sew all Eurasian ethnic groups together into an antiliberal, anti-Western patchwork of traditionalism and collectivism.
This strategy paid off in Zyuganov’s 1996 presidential campaign. He won handily in non-Russian districts, thanks to his perceived support for self-determination and his opposition to the more exclusionary Russian nationalism of candidates such as Aleksandr Lebed.
If Za Gorizontom was Zyuganov’s attempt to link communism with RussianEurasian traditions, his latest book, The Geography of Victory, is an even more ambitious attempt to correlate class struggle with East-West conflict. In this book, Zyuganov spells out the incompatibility of Western civilization and Russia. “Russia will never be bourgeois,” argues Zyuganov. He goes on to claim that Russia has been subordinated by the West and has become a mere source of raw material-an unhappy predicament he considers analogous to the fate of the postcolonial East.
The root of the conflict, for Zyuganov, lies in the very character of Western civilization. He accepts that the political philosophy of the West is founded on the Athenian notion of democracy but argues that buried in this historical legacy is the Athenian division of society into citizens and slaves-a notion to which few Western democrats will admit. This split, according to Zyuganov, is a fundamental tenet of the Western world-view: the “Golden Billion” of the world’s inhabitants living in the West “are free from obligation toward the rest of humanity, and [the] remainder usefully and justly play their role of resource-supplying appendages, reservoirs of toxic waste, and spaces for placing ecologically harmful production.”

To fight the global class struggle, Zyuganov warns, Russia must first consolidate the Orthodox world into a single bloc and forge close ties with radical Islam. “At the end of the twentieth century it is becoming more and more obvious that the Islamic way is becoming the real alternative to the hegemony of Western civilization,” he writes. “Fundamentalism is understood as a return to the centuriesold national spiritual traditions, and can lead to very positive results. It is the return to moral norms of relationships between people. . . keeping intact society’s morals.”
This fixation on Russia’s relationship with the East is typical of the Eurasianists. While they are imperialists, they are not traditional nationalists; in fact, most Eurasianists try to distinguish themselves from Russian nationalists by advocating alliances with Russia’s Asian neighbors, especially its Islamic ones. As Prokhanov puts it, “The Eurasian idea is an idea of integration. Russian nationalism is the opposite of Eurasianism; the two ideologies are entirely incompatible. A purely ethnic [Russian] conception doesn’t take into account Tatarstan or the Caucasus.”
Talk of the East inevitably brings one back to Primakov, Russia’s ranking Arabist and Asia hand turned prime minister. Orientalism-Primakov’s speciality-is, of course, a Western science, the study, classification, and objectification of the East, and its very existence in Russia has, since the nineteenth century, helped to convince many Russians of their essential Westernness. But Orientalism, as practiced in Russia, has always betrayed an ambivalent relationship toward its subject and an inherent tension with the West. Many of Primakov’s policies epitomize this ambiguity and neatly fit the Eurasianist program. Since the early 199os, Primakov has been the driving force behind Russia’s deepening relations with the pariah states of the Middle East, notably Iran and Iraq. Indeed, much of Zyuganov’s The Geography of Victory could have been taken verbatim from Primakov’s 1983 book, The Eastlfter the Collapse of the Colonial System. In it, Primakov describes how the imperialist West tries to control the postcolonial East through “asymmetrical independence,” and he affirms the Soviet Union’s historical role as the guardian of the East. Sixteen years after its publication, meanwhile,many in Russia now clearly view the country as an honorary member of the oppressed East.
“Today, Eurasianism is coming softly,” Dugin relates. “Primakov’s policy is Eurasianist policy. This is left-wing economic policies at home, helping Arab states abroad, orientation toward the East, helping traditional friends like Serbia, strengthening the integration of the former Soviet Union. This is Eurasianism, the policy of the heartland.” This is the third way, and may well represent the future of Russian foreign policy.

Sir Halford Mackinder, Geopolitics and Policymaking in the 21st Century (Christopher J. Fettweis)

Friday, August 30th, 2002

From Parameters, Summer 2000, pp. 58-71 by Christopher J. Fettweis

“A victorious Roman general, when he entered the city, amid all the head-turning splendor of a `Triumph,’ had behind him on the chariot a slave who whispered into his ear that he was mortal. When our statesmen are in conversation with the defeated enemy, some airy cherub should whisper to them from time to time this saying: Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland; Who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island; Who rules the World-Island commands the World.”

– Sir Halford Mackinder, 1919[1]

“Few modern ideologies are as whimsically all-encompassing, as romantically obscure, as intellectually sloppy, and as likely to start a third world war as the theory of `geopolitics.'”

-Charles Clover, 1999[2]

The world today hardly resembles the one that Sir Halford Mackinder examined in 1904, when he first wrote about the advantages of central positioning on the Eurasian landmass. His theories would have influence throughout the century, informing and shaping US containment policy throughout the Cold War. Today, almost a century after his “Heartland” theory came into being, there is renewed interest in the region that Mackinder considered the key to world dominance. The Heartland of the Eurasian landmass may well play an important role in the next century, and the policy of today’s lone superpower toward that region will have a tremendous influence upon the character of the entire international system. Eurasia, the “World Island” to Mackinder, is still central to American foreign policy and will likely to continue to be so for some time. Conventional wisdom holds that only a power dominating the resources of Eurasia would have the potential to threaten the interests of the United States. Yet that conventional wisdom, as well as many of the other assumptions that traditionally inform our policy, has not been subjected to enough scrutiny in light of the changed international realities. Many geopolitical “truths” that have passed into the canon of security intellectuals rarely get a proper reexamination to determine their relevance to the constantly evolving nature of the system. Were the world system static, no further theorizing would be necessary. Since it is not, we must constantly reevaluate our fundamental assumptions to see whether or not any “eternal” rules of the game, geopolitical and otherwise, truly exist. Geopolitics is traditionally defined as the study of “the influence of geographical factors on political action,”[3] but this oft-cited definition fails to capture the many meanings that have evolved for the term over the years. Dr. Gearoid Ó Tuathail, an Irish geographer and associate professor at Virginia Tech, has identified three main uses of “geopolitics” since the end of World War II. First, it is sometimes used to describe a survey of a particular region or problem, to “read the manifest features of that which was held to be `external reality.'”[4] Geopolitics, according to this usage, is a lens through which to survey a problem: “The Geopolitics of X, where X is oil, energy, resources, information, the Middle East, Central America, Europe, etc.” Second, geopolitics can be synonymous with realpolitik, which according to Ó Tuathail is “almost exclusively the legacy of Henry Kissinger.”[5] Kissinger used the term to describe his attempts to maintain a “favorable equilibrium” in world politics, and his singular ability to see the proper course and set sail for it. His Machiavellian approach was infamously devoid of ideology (or “sentimentality”), and as such caused the term geopolitics to fall out of favor with many of the foreign policy practitioners who followed. Last, and most important for our purposes, geopolitics has become synonymous with grand strategy, “not, as in Kissinger, about the everyday tactical conduct of statecraft.”[6] Theorists like Colin Gray place geography in the center of international relations and attempt to decipher the fundamental, eternal factors that drive state action. This belief traces its roots directly back to Sir Halford Mackinder and his theories of the Heartland.

A Brief History of Geopolitics in Theory and Policy To the early 20th-century British geographer Sir Halford Mackinder, world history was a story of constant conflict between land and sea powers. In the past, during what he described as the Columbian Epoch, increased mobility that the sea provided put naval powers at a distinct advantage over their territorial adversaries. The classic example of this advantage was the Crimean War, in which Russia could not project power to the south as effectively as the sea-supplied French and British, despite the fact that the battlefields were far closer to Moscow than to London. But the Columbian Epoch was coming to a conclusion at the turn of the 20th century when Mackinder was first writing, as evolving technology, especially the system of railroads, allowed land powers to be nearly as mobile as those of the sea. Because land powers on the World Island had a smaller distance to travel than the sea powers operating on its periphery, any increase in their mobility would tip the balance of power in their favor. These “interior lines” gave the power with the “central position” on the World Island the ability to project power anywhere more rapidly than the sea powers could defend. Thus, who ruled the Heartland would have the possibility of commanding the entire World Island.

Mackinder believed that the world had evolved into what he called a “closed system.” There was no more room for expansion by the end of the 19th century, for colonialism had brought the entire world under the sway of Europe. Power politics of the future, Mackinder speculated, would be marked by a competition over the old territories rather than a quest for new ones. His Heartland concept recalled the 18th-century strategists’ notion of the “key position” on the battlefield,[7] the recognition of which was crucial to victory. Traditional military strategists thought that control of the key position on the map was crucial to winning the war, and since Mackinder recognized that the round world was now one big battlefield, identification and control of the key position would lead to global supremacy.

Mackinder’s theories might have faded into irrelevance were it not for their apparent influence on the foreign policy of Nazi Germany. A German geopolitician and devotee of Mackinder, Karl Haushofer, spent the interwar period writing extensively about the Heartland and the need for Lebensraum (additional territory deemed essential for continued national well-being) for the German people. One of Haushofer’s pupils was Rudolph Hess, who brought his teacher into the inner intellectual circles of the Reich. Haushofer was appointed by Hitler to run the German Academy in Berlin, which was “more a propagandic institution than a true academy in the continental European sense,”[8] according to one observer. The actual effect of his teachings upon German policy is open to debate – Haushofer may have had an enormous effect on Hitler through his pupil,[9] or he may have been “a neglected and slighted man who would certainly enjoy learning about the hullabaloo raised by his doctrine” in the United States.[10] It cannot be proven that the Drang nach Osten (eastward push) was affected by a desire to control the Heartland. Here policy may just overlap with, rather than be dictated by, geotheory. But the possibility that there was a secret master plan at work in Berlin created a whole new interest in geopolitics and what Mackinder and geopolitics had to say. Haushofer’s ideas probably had a larger influence upon American strategic studies during the war than they did on German policy. Wartime paranoia fed an image of a secret German science of geopolitik that was driving Nazi action, bringing Mackinder and Haushofer onto the American intellectual radar screen. In 1942 Life magazine ran an article titled “Geopolitics: The Lurid Career of a Scientific System which a Briton Invented, the Germans Used, and the Americans Need to Study,”[11] which captured the mood of the period, imagining a cabal of foreign policy “scientists” dictating policy for the dictator. Opinions differed between those who prescribed rapid acceptance of geopolitik and those who dismissed it as pseudoscience. The latter opinion was strengthened, of course, by Germany’s eventual defeat.

From Hot War to Cold

The most influential American geopolitician to emerge out of the furor created by Haushofer and the quest for Lebensraum was Yale University professor Nicholas Spykman. Spykman, considered one of the leading intellectual forefathers of containment, speculated about power projection into and out of the Heartland. Whereas Mackinder assumed that geographical formations made for easiest access from the east, Spykman argued that the littoral areas of the Heartland, or what he called the “Rimland,” was key to controlling the center. He updated Mackinder, positing, “Who controls the Rimland rules Eurasia; Who rules Eurasia controls the destinies of the world.”[12] Spykman put an American twist on geopolitical theory, and laid the intellectual foundation for Kennan and those who argued that the Western powers ought to strengthen the Rimland to contain the Soviet Union, lest it use its control of the Heartland to command the World Island.[13] Geopolitics as grand strategy was one of the important intellectual foundations for the West’s Cold War containment policy. Canadian geographer Simon Dalby recognizes it as one of the “four security discourses (the others being sovietology, strategy, and the realist approach to international relations) which American `security intellectuals’ have drawn on in constructing the `Soviet threat.'”[14] According to one of the preeminent historians of the Cold War, John Lewis Gaddis, in the late 1940s “there developed a line of reasoning reminiscent of Sir Halford Mackinder’s geopolitics, with its assumption that none of the world’s `rimlands’ could be secure if the Eurasian `heartland’ was under the domination of a single hostile power.”[15] Gaddis describes how the containment policy evolved from countering Soviet expansion at every point in the rimlands to concentration of defense on a few key points, especially Western Europe and Japan.

While Mackinder’s warnings of the advantages inherent in central positioning on the Eurasian landmass certainly became incorporated into Cold War American strategic thought and policy, some observers seem to believe that the principle architects of US foreign policy throughout the Cold War era must have been carrying Mackinder in their briefcases. Colin Gray wrote: “By far the most influential geopolitical concept for Anglo-American statecraft has been the idea of a Eurasian `heartland,’ and then the complementary idea-as-policy of containing the heartland power of the day within, not to, Eurasia. From Harry S Truman to George Bush, the overarching vision of US national security was explicitly geopolitical and directly traceable to the heartland theory of Mackinder. . . . Mackinder’s relevance to the containment of a heartland-occupying Soviet Union in the cold war was so apparent as to approach the status of a cliché.”[16] Indeed, many policymakers came from the world of academia, where they were certainly exposed to Mackinder’s geopolitical theories. As was described above, Henry Kissinger used the term geopolitics to denote any policy dependent upon power principles at the expense of ideology and “sentimentality.” Kissinger’s worldview was less dependent upon geographical realities than some of the other Cold Warriors, especially Zbigniew Brzezinski, who was President Carter’s National Security Advisor and a graduate-school mentor of Madeleine Albright. Brzezinski has made Eurasia the focus for US foreign policy in all of his writing, consistently warning of the dangerous advantages that the Heartland power had over the West.[17]

It is of course very difficult to trace the progression of ideas into policy. But theories and assumptions, whether articulated or not, provide the frameworks which guide decision-making. Without those frameworks, the proper course for the nation, or the national interest itself, cannot be identified or pursued. So while it is possible that geopolitics and containment simply coincided, it is highly unlikely that Western policymakers could look at a map of the world, see the red zone in the Heartland, and not remember the warning from Mackinder’s cherub.[18]

After the Cold War

One might expect that geopolitics would have faded into the intellectual background with the end of the Cold War and the defeat of the Heartland power. Strangely, though, Mackinder received a fresh look by some scholars in the 1990s, both in the United States and abroad, and especially in the Heartland itself.[19] In a recent issue of Foreign Affairs, Charles Clover identified the growing discussion of geopolitics among some circles in Russia today: ” Many Russian intellectuals, who once thought their homeland’s victory over the world would be the inevitable result of history, now pin their hope for Russia’s return to greatness on a theory that is, in a way, the opposite of dialectical materialism. Victory is now to be found in geography, rather than history; in space, rather than time. . . . The movement envisions the Eurasian heartland as the geographic launching pad for a global anti-Western movement whose goal is the ultimate expulsion of “Atlantic” (read: “American”) influence from Eurasia.”[20]

Clover argues that the modern Russian geopolitik is being used as the glue to form bonds between the ultra-left and ultra-right, hinting at a “red-brown” coalition that could become dominant in Russian politics in the years ahead, with ominous implications for international stability. This eventuality would of course be quite problematic for an America that still views Eurasia as the chessboard upon which the game of global control will be played. The World Island is still the central focus of US policy, and the Russians are still considered to have the most fortunate position on the map. Yet is there now, or was there ever, any reason to believe that the Heartland of Eurasia bestows any sort of geopolitical advantage to the power that controls it?

Examining Mackinder

Mackinder’s theories have been attacked from many directions over the years, but their remnants persist in our intellectual memory. Mackinder (and the geopoliticians who have followed) thought that geography favored the heartland power for five key reasons: the Heartland was virtually impenetrable to foreign invasion; technological changes offered increased mobility which favored land powers; the Heartland was in the central position on the World Island, giving it shorter, interior lines of transportation and communication than a power defending the Rimland; the Heartland was loaded with natural resources waiting to be exploited that could give the area the highest productivity on earth; and, last, the Eurasian World Island, being the home to the majority of the world’s land, people, and resources, was the springboard for global hegemony. Every one of these assumptions collapses under even the most cursory scrutiny. Impregnability “The Heartland is the greatest natural fortress on earth,” Mackinder wrote. He envisioned it being guarded by natural geographical formations that make it almost impregnable to attack, specifically the “ice-clad Polar Sea, forested and rugged Lenaland [Siberia east of the Yenisei River], and the Central Asiatic mountain and arid tableland.”[21] The fortress had one weakness, Mackinder concluded: there was an opening in the west, between the Baltic and Black Seas, which was not blocked geographically. This gap in the natural defenses led to the famous conclusion that whoever ruled Eastern Europe would be in an advantageous position to rule the Heartland, and therefore the World Island, and therefore the world. Mackinder seemed to ignore the fact that to the extent these geographical formations protected a Heartland power, they also prevented it from projecting outward. Walls tend to keep residents in as effectively as they keep invaders out. The geographical boundaries of the Heartland, to the extent that they were ever obstacles, would have hampered any attempt to use it as a springboard for hemispheric dominance. But more important, the Heartland can be considered a fortress only by standards of 19th-century technology. A modern army, should it want to attack the Heartland, would have little trouble bypassing “Lenaland,” or slicing right through Central Asia. Even its most seemingly impenetrable boundary, the Polar Sea, offers little protection from attack from the sky by planes and missiles. The greatest natural fortress on earth is certainly vulnerable to 21st-century weaponry, offering little inherent advantage to the power within.

The essential irrelevance of the “natural defenses” of the Heartland was pointed out during the first stages of debate on Mackinder during World War II. In debunking geopolitics as a “pseudoscience,” Ralph Turner made the seemingly obvious point in 1943 that “the high mobility of land power on the steppes . . . is now amplified or offset by the far greater mobility of air power.”[22] Yet many geopoliticians remain unconvinced. Colin Gray, perhaps the leading geopolitician of our time, has responded to this argument by saying, “That technology has canceled geography contains just enough merit to be called a plausible fallacy.”[23] He then argues from a tactical standpoint, pointing out that logistical factors make geography’s influence permanent. Surely he is correct when he points out that “it mattered enormously” that the Falklands were islands and Kuwait a desert, and geography still has a great impact upon military tactics and how battles are fought. But it has a decreasing impact upon determinations of when states choose to fight or who prevails. Gray does not make the case for the permanence of geographical factors upon grand strategy. The experiences in the disparate conditions of the Falklands and Kuwait show that technology can indeed overcome the geographical boundaries of any natural fortress, including those of the Heartland. Perhaps the projection of power out of the Heartland was not crucial to Mackinder’s concept. Perhaps the important point was that geographical defenses would allow the Heartland power to exploit its resources and consolidate its power, uninterrupted by conquest and devastation. But even by this conception, the Heartland falls far short. Russia has been devastated time and again throughout history. Mongols, Turks, Arabs, Persians, Swedes, French, Germans, and many other groups have penetrated the walls of the fortress, repeatedly laying waste to the area and inhibiting long-term, steady growth. The Heartland was not impenetrable to the technologies of the last two millennia, much less those of the next.


To Mackinder, the Heartland power had a distinct geopolitical advantage at the end of the Columbian Epoch because changes in technology allowed for rapid troop movement and power projection. The railroad put land powers on equal footing with those of the sea, and the vast flat steppes put the Heartland in the best position to exploit that new technology and mobility, especially since the Heartland afforded shorter, interior lines of movement.

But, as was discussed above, technological advancement did not stop with the railroad. The mobility that air power brings changes all the calculations of Mackinder. There is no longer an advantage to being able to choose the point of attack, for armed forces can be airlifted between any two points on the globe in a matter of hours. Rail mobility offered a tremendous advantage before the advent of air travel, but not nearly so much since. Gray and others argue that planes have to land, and therefore geographical positioning is still vital. But this too is rapidly becoming obsolete. Mackinder clearly did not anticipate, and Gray does not take into account, the implications of bombers that can take off from Missouri, drop their bombload on Kosovo, and land back in Missouri. In our rapidly shrinking world, where air power can now be projected around the world from any position, the geographical location of bases (and indeed geography itself) is becoming increasingly irrelevant.

Central Position

Mackinder would have us believe that central positioning is an advantage to a Heartland power, for it allows shorter, internal lines of transportation with which the Heartland power can choose the point of attack. To Cold War strategists, this central positioning made containment a nightmare, for it necessitated defense of the enormous littoral rimlands. Mackinder might have been the first strategist in history to suggest that the surrounded have the advantage. When has central positioning ever been advantageous to any nation? No one spoke of the “interior lines of communication” of the Third Reich, for instance. Germany has always been at a disadvantage because of her position in the heart of Europe. Similarly, the central positioning of the Heartland of Eurasia has never been geopolitically advantageous to its inhabitants. Rather than providing a springboard to attack in any direction, central positioning has rendered the Heartland power vulnerable on all sides. Rather than providing a heightened security, this position actually heightens the Heartland’s insecurity. Indeed, Russian history is filled with attacks from the east, west, and south, feeding an insecurity and a paranoia to which Americans, historically protected by vast oceans, cannot relate. Central positioning is an advantage only to a Heartland power bent of expansion. Realpolitik and geopolitik informed the West that while their intentions in the Rimland were benign (or at least not offensive in nature), the Soviets had imperial designs on every region of the world. To the West, the Soviets were not threatened from all directions, but rather were threatening to all directions. This assumption of the eternality of Russian imperialism continues to affect our policy today, and we continue to see the Russian littoral as threatened by its vast neighbor. The inability to understand the other’s view is one of the great historical features of US foreign policy. We still are not able to understand that the quest for empire in Russian history is at least in part an attempt to bolster the insecurity that its position has always entailed. Russia’s imperial outposts in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and elsewhere provided buffer zones against the attacks that have periodically devastated Russian land. Central positioning has led to a state of permanent insecurity, which has poisoned Russia’s relations with its neighbors. The West clumsily heightens that sense of insecurity with every new foray into the Rimlands.


Ironically, the real reason behind the ability of the Heartland to resist attack also guarantees that it will never be able to live up to Mackinder’s forecast. In order to dominate the World Island, a Heartland power would have to exploit its vast resources. But since virtually all of the pivot area lies latitudinally above the continental United States, the harsh climate makes mining difficult, growing seasons brief, and successful attack nearly impossible. Large sections of the Heartland are not and will never be productive. So it is hard to imagine that the productivity of the region will ever match Sir Halford’s key condition for dominance of the World Island.

“Who rules the World Island commands the World”

Using Mackinder’s own qualifications, it appears that he has placed the key geographical position in the wrong part of the world. It does not appear true that the Eastern Hemisphere bestows any strategic advantage over the Western. In fact, control over the Western Hemisphere has allowed the United States to rise to an unprecedented position of power, for many of the very reasons Mackinder identified with the Heartland. The oceans provide it with heretofore virtually impregnable boundaries, and it has command over a collection of resources far greater than any Eurasian power could effectively exploit, given climatic realities. It seems hard to argue that geographical factors favor Mackinder’s Heartland over the American, or to see why so many strategists continue to put Eurasia as the center of the world. Heterogeneity alone seems to predestine the Eastern Hemisphere to infighting, and to disadvantages when compared to the Western. The point here is not to reinvent the Heartland, however, or to argue that “who rules North America commands the world.” Rather it is to show that even by the terms he used, Mackinder’s Heartland never was capable of bestowing any extraordinary advantages upon its inhabitants. If anything, it was and is a disadvantage, especially when compared to other, more manageable, geographical positions. Implications for Policy and Theory One of the reasons that Mackinder is being resurrected yet again is because policymakers are searching for ways to conceptualize and deal with the heart of his Heartland–Central Asia and the Caspian Sea–which is a region that has the potential to become a major source of great-power contention in the next century. Some analysts estimate that the fossil fuels in the region will transform it into a “new Saudi Arabia” in the coming decades.[24] Its vast deposits made the Soviet Union one of the largest exporters of oil during the last decades of the Cold War, and new reserves have been discovered through intensive exploration since. An apparent power vacuum within the region is once again the subject of rivalry from without, and a new “great game” (an analogy to which we will return) seems to be unfolding, with Russia, China, Iran, Turkey, and the United States as the players. Desire for fossil fuels and the wealth they create has the potential to damage relations between the global and regional powers, if diplomacy is mishandled. Russian behavior toward the states of Central Asia, and indeed toward all the other former Soviet nations, is often seen to be a bellwether of its new nature. Some observers assume that Russian meddling in the affairs of the states on its periphery is an inevitable sign of neo-imperialism, which is a permanent characteristic of its eternal national character. To head off any return to empire, many feel that the West must be firm in discouraging a growth in Russian influence in the new states. Thus the United States is interested in projecting power into Central Asia in the belief that filling power vacuums is necessary to prevent the Russians from doing so, and to keep the Cold War from recurring. Russia and China today are regional powers that seek influence only in their littoral; the United States projects power everywhere. The three overlap in Central Asia, which is the only region where the Cold War tradition of “triangular diplomacy” may well become a reality again if geopolitical concerns dominate our strategy. The heart of the Heartland is floating on top of a sea of oil. Before we decide on the nature of our policy toward the region, we must examine some of the assumptions that we bring into the debate. The theories of Mackinder and the geopoliticians still linger, affecting the ways that our policy is made, despite the fact that the foundations upon which those theories are built are intellectually shaky at best. Geopolitics and Eternal Realities Geopoliticians, by all uses of that term, seem to claim to understand the eternal and fundamental geographical realities in a way that automatically places their analyses above those of ordinary strategists. Mackinder, Kissinger, Brzezinski, Gray, and the rest all would have us believe that they can see the proper course for policy because they understand the “eternal” realities that the earth provides, despite the fact that their assumptions are often baseless or archaic.

Ó Tuathail has described this phenomenon, and his remarks are worth quoting at some length: “To understand the appeal of formal geopolitics to certain intellectuals, institutions, and would-be strategists, one has to appreciate the mythic qualities of geopolitics. Geopolitics is mythic because it promises uncanny clarity and insight in a complex world. It actively closes down an openness to the geographical diversity of the world and represses questioning and difference. The plurality of the world is reduced to certain “transcendent truths” about strategy. Geopolitics is a narrow instrumental form of reason that is also a form of faith, a belief that there is a secret substratum and/or a permanent set of conflicts and interests that accounts for the course of world politics. It is fetishistically concerned with “insight,” and “prophecy.” Formal geopolitics appeals to those who yearn for the apparent certitude of “timeless truths.” Historically, it is produced by and appeals to right-wing countermoderns because it imposes a constructed certitude upon the unruly complexity of world politics, uncovering transcendent struggles between seemingly permanent opposites (“landpower” versus “seapower,” “oceanic” versus “continental,” “East” versus “West”) and folding geographical difference into depluralized geopolitical categories like “heartland,” “rimland,” shatterbelt,” and the like. Foreign policy complexity becomes simple(minded) strategic gaming. [Ó Tuathail makes reference to Brzezinski here] Such formal geopolitical reasoning is . . . a flawed foundation upon which to construct a foreign policy that needs to be sensitive to the particularity and diversity of the world’s states, and to global processes and challenges that transcend state-centric reasoning.”[25]

As unsettling as it may be, there are no “timeless truths” in world politics. The international system changes as fast as we can understand its functions, and often much faster. It seems to be natural for the human mind to use analogies and slogans to comprehend situations that are difficult to grasp. If policymakers indeed simplify the world into frameworks to make it comprehensible, then they must beware not to base those frameworks on outdated and intellectually sloppy assumptions of geopolitics.

Analogies and Policy

Policy is driven by analogy, both historical and theoretical. One common, and dangerous, analogy that drives US Eurasian policy is “the game.” Brzezinski speaks of chess; Central Asian policy is the “new great game”; Kissinger and Nixon used game analogies throughout their reign and in their writings afterward.[26] Impenetrably complex problems are simplified to games, which was problematic enough during the Cold War but is acutely poisonous today. Take Brzezinski’s chess analogy. Chess has two players, and one opponent; it is zero-sum, and to the finish; there is a winner and a loser, with no middle ground. The opponent of the United States to Brzezinski is, and has always been, Russia. If we approach Eurasia as if it were a chessboard, then we will be met by opponents, and cooperation and mutual benefit would be removed from our calculations. If the leaders of the most powerful nation on earth were to conceptualize foreign policy as a chess game, it would virtually ensure that other nations would as well. A Eurasian alliance to counteract growing US influence would be virtually inevitable. Mackinder’s Heartland theory is a another example of inappropriately applied analogy. Sir Halford took Britain’s traditional fear of the dominance of the resources of continental Europe by one power and extended it to encompass the entire world. To many geopoliticians, the United States is an island power, peripheral to the crucial and decisive land of Eurasia. The only way America can be safe is if the continent does not unify against her. England’s fear of a united European continent in the 19th century was understandable, because only a continental power unconcerned with land enemies would be able to concentrate its resources to challenge the Royal Navy. The analogy with the World Island and the United States falls apart, for no nation that dominates that continent would ever be able to threaten our hemisphere. Even if it were conceivable that one power could dominate Eurasia (which of course it is not), such an imbalance would not necessarily threaten American interests, and the dominant power presumably would not be able to project power over the oceans. Any imaginable alliance of Eurasian powers would be too unwieldy and disparate to operate effectively. Some fear that a Eurasian alliance would be capable of shutting off trade with the United States, ruining our economy and standard of living. While this may have had some relevance when there was the potential for the rest of the world to be dominated by the communists, as long as the great powers of the World Island continue to be wedded to the free market (and do not perceive US power to be threatening), then there is little danger of their voluntarily shutting their doors to the American market and investment structure. Paradoxically, our attempts to prevent a Eurasian anti-American alliance may make that outcome more likely. As Steven Walt has persuasively shown, imbalances of threat, not imbalances of power, drive alliances together.[27] Our attempts to project power into the Heartland, if done clumsily, can heighten threat perceptions in its capitals, making such counterproductive alliances more attractive. British uneasiness with the European Union is reflective of this fear of continental alliances. But is there really any threat of a state marshaling forces against the British Isles? Analogies, and their accompanying “eternal interests,” tend to persist long after their useful life is over. Sometimes we fail to perceive the end of that intellectual shelf life. Frameworks for Grand Strategies The Clinton Administration has been criticized from the beginning for running a foreign policy that is at best reactive and at worst rudderless and confused. While this characterization may not be entirely accurate or even fair, it is apparent that running a foreign policy without the framework provided by a global rival can appear to be unfocused and ad hoc. Without a vision of what the next century ought to look like, no policies can be formulated to bring it about. During the Cold War, foreign policy decisions were never easy, but at least the Soviet Union provided an enemy to be opposed. Conventional wisdom recommended countering every Soviet move, no matter how trivial. Today the United States is at a unipolar position in every possible sense – militarily, economically, culturally, politically, and on and on. The world looked to the United States at the end of the Cold War to lead a new century, to redefine the rules by which the system operates. As Fareed Zakaria has noted, after the last two world wars, “America wanted to change the world, and the world was reluctant. But in 1999, the world is eager to change–along the lines being defined by America–but now America is reluctant.”[28] American policymakers have continuously underestimated the impact that a hegemon can have on the “rules of the game” because they are wedded to the archaic realist and geopolitical notion that those rules do not change. Yet as disconcerting as it may seem, the rules evolve as quickly as “the game” itself, and policymakers must have the vision to anticipate that evolution and adjust accordingly. The end of the Cold War has provided the United States an unprecedented opportunity to shape the nature of the system. In order to do so it is necessary to jettison antiquated and baseless concepts like geopolitics once and for all.


“Eternal” geopolitical realities and national interests are mirages. The idea that a Heartland power has any advantages due to its position on the map cannot be historically or theoretically justified; the notion that an imbalance of power in Eurasia (even if it were conceivable) would somehow threaten the interests of the United States is not tenable; and the idea that geographic “realities” of power can operate outside of the context of ideology, nationalism, and culture is pure fantasy. Worse than mirages, these ideas can cripple the way we run our foreign policy in the new century. Debunking the fundamental assumptions of geopolitics is an important task when one considers how policy is made. Policymakers operate with a set of assumptions and frameworks through which they interpret international events. As Richard Neustadt and Ernest May have persuasively argued, historical (and often wildly inappropriate) analogies, banal slogans, and outdated theories often become the driving forces in policymaking.[29] One of these outdated theories that persists in our intellectual memory is Sir Halford Mackinder’s geopolitics. Policymakers in the United States vastly underestimate the hegemon’s potential to shape the nature of the international system. Intellectuals wedded to old ideas about the unchanging nature of power have so far failed to lead the world in the new directions that it expected. The unparalleled unipolar position that the United States found itself in when the Cold War abruptly ended is being wasted by politicians with no vision for shaping the future. The debate that occasionally resurfaces over the “isolationist” nature of the United States misses a key dimension: if nothing else, America has certainly been intellectually isolationist in the post-Cold War era, hiding behind walls and refusing to lead the world in new directions that its unprecedented power has made possible. The rules that govern international relations evolve. No so-called permanent interests, or eternal geographical realities, exist. The only way that the next century can be better than the one we are leaving is with a reevaluation of the assumptions and attitudes that underlie our actions. A prolonged investigation into the utility of all geopolitical theory would be a good place to start.


1. Halford Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality (New York: W. W. Norton, 1962 [original publication 1919]), p 150.

2. Charles Clover, “Dreams of the Eurasian Heartland,” Foreign Affairs, 78 (March/April 1999), 9.

3. From Jean Gottman, “The Background of Geopolitics,” Military Affairs, 6 (Winter 1942), 197.

4. Gearoid Ó Tuathail, “Problematizing Geopolitics: Survey, Statesmanship and Strategy,” Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, 19 (1994), 261.

5. Ibid., p. 263.

6. Ibid., p. 267.

7. For more on this, see Alfred Vagts, “Geography in War and Geopolitics,” Military Affairs, 7 (Summer 1943), 85-86.

8. Ibid., p. 87.

9. For this perspective, and summation of Haushofer’s writings, see Hans W. Weigert, Generals and Geopolitics (Oxford, Eng.: Oxford Univ. Press, 1942).

10. Vagts, p. 87.

11. J. Thorndike, “Geopolitics: The Lurid Career of a scientific System which a Briton Invented, the Germans Used, and the Americans Need to Study,” Life, 21 December 1942.

12. Nicholas J. Spykman, The Geography of Peace (New York: Harcourt & Brace, 1944), p. 43.

13. For more on Spykman, and his links to Mackinder and Kennan, see Michael P. Gerace, “Between Mackinder and Spykman: Geopolitics, Containment, and After,” Comparative Strategy, 10 (October-December 1991), 347-64.

14. Simon Dalby, “American Security Discourse: the Persistence of Geopolitics,” Political Geography Quarterly, 9 (April 1990), 171.

15. John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment (Oxford, Eng.: Oxford Univ. Press, 1982), p. 57.

16. Colin S. Gray, “The Continued Primacy of Geography,” Orbis, 40 (Spring 1996), 258.

17. See, for instance, Brzezinski’s Cold War writings like Game Plan: A Geostrategic Framework for the Conduct of the U.S.-Soviet Contest (Boston: the Atlantic Monthly Press, 1986) and The Grand Chessboard (New York: Basic Books, 1997) from after it was over.

18. For an analysis of the effect of geopolitics, Mackinder, and the Heartland on US Cold War foreign policy, see G. R. Sloan, Geopolitics in United States Strategic Policy, 1890-1987 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1988), esp. pp. 127-239; and Colin S. Gray, The Geopolitics of Superpower (Lexington: Univ. of Kentucky Press, 1988).

19. See, in addition to those works already cited, reviews of the current literature in Colin S. Gray, “Geography and Grand Strategy,” Comparative Strategy, 10 (October-December 1991) 311-29; David Hansen, “The Immutable Importance of Geography,” Parameters, 27 (Spring 1997), 55-64; John Hillen and Michael P. Noonan, “The Geopolitics of NATO Enlargement,” Parameters, 28 (Autumn 1998), 21-34; and Gerald Robbins, “The Post-Soviet Heartland: Reconsidering Mackinder,” Global Affairs, 8 (Fall 1993), 95-108.

20. Charles Clover, “Dreams of the Eurasian Heartland,” Foreign Affairs, 78 (March/April 1999), 9.

21. Halford J. Mackinder, “The Round World and the Winning of the Peace,” Foreign Affairs, 21 (July 1943), 603.

22. Ralph Turner, “Technology and Geopolitics,” Military Affairs, 7 (Spring 1943), 14.

23. Colin S. Gray, “The Continued Primacy of Geography,” Orbis, 40 (Spring 1996), 251.

24. Carl Goldstein, “Final Frontier,” Far Eastern Economic Review, 10 June 1993, p. 54.

25. Geraoid Ó Tauthail, “Understanding Critical Geopolitics: Geopolitics and Risk Society,” Internet,

26. Ó Tuathail documents Kissinger’s usage of the game metaphor in “Problematizing Geopolitics,” pp. 266-67.

27. See Steven M. Walt, The Origin of Alliances (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Press, 1987).

28. Quoted in Thomas Freidman, “The War Over Peace,” The New York Times, 17 October 1999, op-ed.

29. Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest R. May, Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision-Makers (New York: Free Press, 1986).

Christopher J. Fettweis is a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Government and Politics at the University of Maryland, College Park. His fields are international relations and comparative politics, and his dissertation addresses US foreign policy toward Central Asia and the Caspian Sea.

The Concept of Großraum in Carl Schmitts Jurisprudence (Nikolai von Kreitor)

Friday, August 30th, 2002

The Historical Necessity of a New Russian Grossraum
by Nikolai von Kreitor

The most fundamental principle in geopolitics is the principle of Grossraum (=Great Area) formulated by the prominent German jurist Carl Schmitt in his book Völkerrechtlishe Grossraumordnung mit Interventionsverbot für Raumfremde Mächte (1) and seen by him as a foundation for the science of international law and international relations.

A Grossraum is an area dominated by a power representing a distinct political idea. This idea was always formulated with a specific opponent in mind; in essence ,the distinction between friend and enemy would be determined by this particular political idea. As an example Carl Schmitt cited the American Monroe Doctrine and its concept of non-intervention by foreign powers in the American Raum. “This is the core of the original Monroe Doctrine, a genuine Grossraum principle, namely the union of politically awakened people, a political idea and, on the basis of this idea, a politically dominant Grossraum excluding foreign intervention.”

Carl Schmitt’s knowledge and sense of history were equaled by his ability to define core issues. That ability enabled Schmitt to quickly grasp the essence of national foreign policy , articulate it in his book, relate the idea and implementation of the American Monroe Doctrine to the concept of Grossraum , subject Grossraum to analysis, incorporate it into the framework of international law and contrapose American Grossraum to a new German Grossraum, opposed to and competing with the American. By subjecting Grossraum to scholarly investigation and by placing it in the context of global politics, Schmitt had hoped to enlarge the horizon of learning and to update the state-centered system of international law to include relations between Grossräume (Different Great Areas).(2)

In so doing he subjected the political theology of American expansionism, the American state-policy and objectives of world domination formulated and codified in the Monroe Doctrine and its various extension, to a demystifying and critical analysis showing that the essence of Wilsonian universalism before, during and after the World War II was in fact an insidious ideology to equate American national interest, American expansionism and the principles of the Monroe Doctrine with the interest of mankind(3). Discussing emerging political realities , Schmitt noted that Germany needed to formulate her own Grossraum and to conceptualize the nature of international law as a relationship between different Grossräume, rejecting thereby the universalistic claims of the United States.

The center of Carl Schmitt’s discussion was the geopolitical and the ideological substance of the Monroe Doctrine, especially the series of ideas articulated prior to Theodore Roosevelt’s reinterpretation of it justifying a “capitalist imperialism”(4) and Woodrow Wilson’s reinterpretation that sough to justify a “kind of pan-interventionist world ideology”(5) , i.e. to justify the principles of the Monroe Doctrine and the new international law it created in the Western Hemisphere to principles valid for the whole world. The substance of the new American international law, created by the Monroe Doctrine, was in fact an absence of international law, understood traditionally as law of nations created by mutual consent of those nations, in the Western Hemisphere, since the Monroe Doctrine postulated that the only source of the new international law was the will of the United States. According to Schmitt the Monroe Doctrine, historically seen, was the vehicle of American subjugation of the Latin American countries and transformation of those countries into virtual American protectorates.

President Woodrow Wilson’s objectives at the end of the W.W. I to elevate the principles of the Monroe Doctrine to universally valid principles for the whole world was in fact America’s first bid for world domination. On April 12, 1919, at the Paris Peace Conference , President Wilson assured the delegates that the Monroe Doctrine was “the real forerunner of the League of Nations” and asked rhetorically ,”Indeed are we not assembled here to consecrate and extend the horizon of this document as a perpetual charter for all the world.”(6)

The Monroe Doctrine, that nineteenth-century formulation of American foreign policy, has according to Schmitt a profound relevance for the Germany of his day. Though Schmitt recognized that the realities of power politics in the Western Hemisphere of the nineteenth century were different from those on the European continent of the twentieth century , he realized that the Monroe Doctrine had extended the parameters of international relations. As far as Schmitt was concerned, the Monroe Doctrine was “the first and until now the most successful example of a Grossraum principle”(7) that had over a period of time acquired validity, for it was referred to in every important text and dictionary of international law and was defended by the United States as “an expression of the inalienable right to self-defense”(8) Calling the Monroe Doctrine, i.e. the American expansionism, a “right to self-defense”, clearly showed the substance of American political theology-the ideological justification of U.S. imperialism as well as the equation in the ideology of expansionism with self-defense: an important ideological component that will became a center-peace of American mystification of U.S. expansionism.

Carl Schmitt points out that at the end of the W.W. I, at the Paris Peace-conference which resulted in the Treaty of Versailles and the creation of the League of Nations , United States succeeded to include the Monroe Doctrine in the Article 21 of the League’s Covenant. Inclusion of the Monroe Doctrine in the Article 21 in the League of Nation’s Covenant, which reads “Nothing in this Covenant shall be deemed to affect the validity of international engagements, such as treaties of arbitration or regional understandings like the Monroe Doctrine, for securing the maintenance of peace.” symbolized for Carl Schmitt Europe’s defeat by the United States and the end of the old Jus Publicum European, which had been the foundation for all preexisting international relations. For one thing , the League of Nations, purportedly an universal international organization and predecessor of the United Nations, was excluded from asserting any jurisdictional claims in the American Grossraum, i.e. the Western Hemisphere. Western Hemisphere was excluded from the purview of the League. Thus the United States asserted the pre-eminence of its will and the ordering principles of her Grossraum, i.e. her unrestricted hegemony in the Western Hemisphere, over the League of Nations.

Schmitt emphasizes that before Grossraum could be anchored in international law it had to be legitimized by a political idea. The geopolitical and ideological conviction behind the original Monroe Doctrine, proclaimed in 1823 – the belief that the Americas had to be defended from the “status quo powers of legitimacy”(9) , the Holly Alliance, the European Con-cert formed after the defeat of Napoleon – justified its proclamation and gave it credibility. President James Monroe announced the doctrine in response to rumored intervention in America of the Holy Alliance. The United States justified its policy on the basis of its inalienable right of self-defense , a principle on which international law is found. Hence the declaration warning the members of the Holy Alliance that the United States “would consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety” and that the U.S. government would “view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European power in no other light than as manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States”. As a corollary of the principle of nonintervention, Monroe declared that the United States was committing itself to a policy of non-intervention “in the internal concerns of any European powers.”(10)

Carl Schmitt notes that the Monroe Doctrine , originally proclaimed as a vehicle of defense against interventionism and European colonialism, transformed itself into it’s opposite, becoming the main legal and ideological instrument of American interventionism, expansionism, economic imperialism and colonization of the Western Hemisphere.(11) The language of the Monroe Doctrine lended itself to a political-semantic corruption of the English language: American interventionist policies were still presented as defense, American colonialism was heralded as establishment of democracy, installation of puppet regimes in Latin-America serving their American masters was called a preservation of civilized forms of government, the many repeated American military interventions to keep the puppet regimes in power and to expand American economic penetration – a peace-keeping operations and, quite consistent with what George Orwell would latter call a New Talk, the enslavement of Latin-American countries, their transformation into protectorates was heralded as enlargement of the frontiers of freedom.

The interventionist substance of the Monroe Doctrine was clearly emphasized in 1904, in the so called Roosevelt Corollary pronounced by President Theodore Roosevelt shortly after the Hague Peace Conference the same year. Roosevelt proposed to make an exception to general international law in favor of the Western Hemisphere and this exception were to be made by ” a unilateral American pronouncement , not through a universally agreed amendment to international law.”(12) Roosevelt explicitly rejected the notion that the new international law in the Western Hemisphere could be created through multilateral, inter-American action, instead, Roosevelt asserted, its creation was only through unilateral action by the United States, i.e. the source of the new international law was solely the will of the United States.

“Instead of abolishing intervention in the Western Hemisphere, Roosevelt explicitly sanctioned this practice and claimed for the United States a monopoly of the right to engage in it… Finally the Roosevelt corollary applied to American intervention of all kind and for whatever purpose.”(13) The new international law in the Western Hemisphere, as formulated by Theodore Roosevelt, was in fact an absence of international law, or, to put it in another way, the foreign expansionist policy of the United States was elevated into a quasi international law. Thus the Roosevelt corollary defined the principle of organization and control of geopolitical space under American domination. That principle of domination suspended the operation of general norms of international law and elevated the imperialist will of the United States into the sole normative source. Or, as Secretary of State Olney had earlier expressed it: “United States is the sole sovereign in the Western Hemi-sphere and its will is a fiat.” Carl Schmitt also emphasized the territorial criterion of the Monroe Doctrine for the international law. He noted that the doctrine introduced territorial lines of delineation and demarcation into the body of international law, infused the international law with the concept and substance of geopolitics.


Based on the perception that the Monroe Doctrine provided the precedent for justification for both German and Japanese Grossraum, Schmitt observed that the traditional Eurocentric order underlying international law- relations between and among sovereign states- had been superseded by relations between and among sovereign Grossräume(14) As far as Germany was concerned , her Grossraum consisted, according to Schmitt’s view during the 30-ties, predominantly of Central and Eastern Europe. Though Schmitt failed to define the precise territorial dimensions of Germany’s Grossraum, he cited the Monroe Doctrine as the basis for maintaining that Grossraum in not something abstract and diffuse but contains “recognizable territorial limits”(15).

According to the Monroe Doctrine, Schmitt argued, the leading or hegemonial power is the one that determines the governing political idea for its realm. United States asserted the political idea that it had the hegemonial right to exclude from the Western Hemisphere any foreign power, or any foreign influence. After the end of the Word War I United States also asserted that the newly formed international organization , the League of Nations , was also excluded from asserting any jurisdiction in the Western Hemisphere. Schmitt emphasized that the new German Grossraum , seen by him as analogous to the American Grossraum, should also exclude any foreign interference, and above all American influence, and argued for the proclamation of a Ger-man Monroe Doctrine. Schmitt rejected the false universalist claims of the United States and noted that as a matter of principle non-interference by European states in the affairs of the American continent cannot be justified unless the United States likewise refrains from interference in the affairs of the European continent. In Carl Schmitt’s view geopolitics and international law have been joined in the Germanic Monroe Doctrine underlying the German Grossraum.

Carl Schmitt defined also the concept of a national Grossraum principle by extending his analysis to encompass the Reich . Though “the concept of Grossraum belongs to the concept of Reich (Empire, Realm) , the two are not identical because “not every state or every people within the German Grossraum is part of the Reich”. A Reich, according to Schmitt, “is the leading and sustaining power whose political idea radiates over a specific Grossraum”. And the code that governs relations between Grossräume is that of nonintervention.(16) Schmitt asserted that in the middle of Europe the German Reich faces the interventionist claims of the Anglo-Saxon pseudo-universalism. Against those claims it contraposes the principle of national life style “based on the principle of national respect.”(17)

Whereas relations between Grossräume were to be governed by the principle of nonintervention , intra-Grossraum relations in Schmitt’s construct were to be based on respect for every nation and nationality. Although in Schmitt’s configuration this connoted a policy of domination exercised without the need to resort to the extraordinary means of intervention , decision about whether to intervene, reflecting power-political realities, would not be made in any capital of the German Grossraum other than Berlin. One possible justification for intervention in a nation in the Reich was that it pursued foreign policy goals inimical to the security interests of Germany. In another work Carl Schmitt defines the Reich as “the leading and supporting powers whose political idea is radiated over a specified major territory and which fundamentally exclude the intervention of extra-territorial powers with regard to this territory.”(18)

It should be noted that Carl Schmitt, while recognizing that the historically changing world order and nature of international relations necessitated the reformulation of the international law in terms of equal relationship between competing Grossräume, he nevertheless never advocated an unrestricted expansion of a singular Grossraum i.e. geopolitical objectives of total world hegemony by for example Germany. Quite to the contrary : the substance of his work Grossraum gegen Universalismus is a strong criticism of the American ideology of universalism and from that ideology derived foreign policy on which U.S. embarked in a limited scope during the presidency of Theodore Roosevelt, and which became the ideological hallmark of the Wilsonianism during and after the World War I.

American universalism , emphasized Schmitt, globalized the principles of the Monroe Doctrine to principles valid for the whole world i.e. to universal principles and thus , ideologically and politically, laid claims for extension of American hegemony in the Western Hemisphere to a hegemony over the whole world. American objectives for world conquest and domination used the ideology of universalism to revise the geographical limitations of the Monroe Doctrine- the very principle of geographical delimitation and demarcation of the concept of Grossraum- and to justify American interventionism in the European continent. While American universalism was a rejection of the idea of co-existence of different Grossräume and thus not only a rejection of the concept of Grossraum with its principles of geographic delimitation but also a claim for global world hegemony, so was also Hitler’s concept of Lebensraum which served as an ideological device for foreign policy objectives of establishment first of German continental hegemony and latter of global world hegemony . In other words there were ideological and geopolitical similarities between Wilson’s universalism and Hitler’s Lebensraum. Both Wilsonian universalism and Nazi-Germany’s Lebensraum were falsification of a genuine Grossraum principle and both universalism and Lebensraum rejected the very notion of international pluralism, of co-existence of Grossräume.

Both universalism and Lebensraum as concepts were antithetical to Schmitt’s concept of territorial limits of Grossraum and both universalism and Lebensraum encompassed no territorial limits serving as ideological justification for global world domination.(19)

In formulating the concept of Grossraum Carl Schmitt wanted to broad the framework of international law to include relations between Grossräume. His concept allowed for the rational conduct of international relations and provided a compelling principle for the international law that would correspondent to new historical realities.


Prior to the dissolution or , I would rather say, subversion of the Soviet Union in 1991, in the bipolar world of two superpowers , there existed two competing Grossräume ( Great Areas) or two opposing political blocks, each with its sphere of influence and thus geographical delimitation and demarcation: the Atlantic Grossraum, dominated by the United States, and the Eurasian Grossraum, dominated by the Soviet Union. The political competition between the two blocks gave a substantial latitude for autonomy and independence for countries included in the sphere of influence of the two blocks. However after 1991 a completely new world order has been created. The bipolar world landscape of two superpowers has been transformed into a mono landscape of one superpower imposing its will on the rest of the world. The concept of a New World Order, propounded first by President Bush and now implemented by the neo-Wilsonian foreign policies of President Clinton, must be seen as a realization and assertion of the principles on the Monroe Doctrine to principles valid for the whole world, or, in other words, as a Roosevelt corollary for the whole world, with a new international law equated with the U.S.’s will. The globalization of the Monroe Doctrine , the pronouncement of the Bush/Clinton corollary is the assertion of the legitimacy of American intervention in the world for whatever purposes United States deem necessary, in other words , it is the equation of the United States will with grounds for intervention, an equation which is not only a radical repudiation of the priciples of non-intervention contained in the United Nations Charter, and thus a repudiation of the essence and substance of the United Nations, but is also the substance of the new international law of the New World Order. In the post-Cold War political landscape , United States, invoking and asserting her principles of legitimacy of American world-wide hegemony , is in a position visavi Europe similar to the position of the former Holy Alliance visavi America in the past. American intrusion into the Eurasian geopolitical vacuum after the demise of the Soviet Union, has necessitated a formulation and implementation of a global policy of pseudo-universalism and intervention. Therefore an absolute geopolitical necessity for Russia now, tantamount to her national survival, is the re-establishment of her Grossraum, which is a prerequisite not only for the future independence of Russia but also for the independence of other European countries as well. Re-establishment of the Russian Grossraum and a necessary new geopolitical alliance, which one my symbolically call “a second Treaty of Rappalo”, will be the beginning of disintegration of the global system of American universalism and interventionism and thus a necessary prerequisite for the rebirth of America-free Europe. During the interwar years, in the Europe after the Treaty of Versailles , Carl Schmitt, observing the universalist claims of international law of American and British imperialism, asserted that “behind the facade of general norms of international law lies, in reality, the system of Anglo-Saxon world imperialism”(20)

Today, observing the new American expansionism, the American invasion in the geopolitical vacuum of the Eurasian Grossraum, the decline and fall of the United Nations and the perversion of this international body into a legitimacy facade for the United States bid for world conquest and hegemony in the New World Order , one may say, as it was said once before by Carl Schmitt , that behind the facade of general norms of international law , lies now in reality the system of American world imperialism and expansionism. For the substance of the New World Order is the globalization of the American hegemony without any geographical limitations, the triumph of the old Wilsonian universalism or the neo-Wilsonian policies of President Clinton, a universalism that is a radical rejection of the notion of peaceful co-existence of Grossräume, of a pluralistic world order build on respect for existing state sovereignties.

The primary foreign policy objective of Russia must be the formulation of her own Monroe Doctrine, geographically delimiting Russian Grossraum, which would exclude the intervention on foreign powers and above all the United States.

A formulation of a Russian Monroe Doctrine implies by necessity a rejection of the pseudo-universalist claims of the American New World Order and the validity of a new international law that legitimizes that order. It also implies a firm rejection of American legal nihilism and revisionism, it mandates a restoration of a world order codified by the Helsinki Accord. Thus a Russian Monroe Doctrine will be an expression of a genuine and inalienable right to self-defense against American expansionism and it’s new territorial ambitions. Integral to the purpose of self-defense must be a Russian claim for respect for Russian minorities in any state where they are to be found as well as prevention of foreign policy inimical to the security interest of Russia , such as membership in NATO , prevention of coming into power of governments serving as agents of foreign power , in short , of governments of American Quislings.

The geographical delimitation of the Russian Grossraum is the territory of the former Soviet Union, countries belonging to the former socialist block , including Yugoslavia, now subjected to a war of aggression by the United States.

A Russian Grossraum can only be a genuine, geographically delimited Grand Area and the international law it would create will be, according to Carl Schmitt’s visions, an international law encompassing the co-existence of Grossräume and thus a rejection of the international law of the New World Order- the universalization of American principles of legitimization of global and unlimited American expansionism and domination. A peaceful co-existence of Grossräume can hardly be achieved without the geopolitical expulsion of the United States from Eurasia.

In the past the United States has been successful in theologization of American geopolitical objectives of world domination – the ideology of Wilsonian pseudo universalism-and demonization of geopolitical competitors and thus rejection of the very notion of geopolitical pluralism. The restoration of the Russian Grossraum is therefore the only guaranty for international peace and renewed respect for international law, constructed not as the will of the United States but as the collective will of sovereign countries and geopolitical blocks. Russian Grossraum is the only guaranty against the future anti-utopia of a Monroe Doctrine for the whole world.

The historical necessity and actuality of a new Russian Grossraum, excluding American interference in Eurasia, confluence with Charles de Gaulle’s vision of a free Europe from Atlantic to Urals and beyond to Vladivostok, which could only exist as America-free Europe. Without a reconstitution of a Russian Grossraum, the future not only of Russia but also of other European countries, will be the present of Latin America. In other worlds, the historical necessity of a Russian Grossraum is a decision for a future of freedom and national and cultural authenticity, a decision against the future as American protectorate. And again, the Russian choice is also the choice of Europe.


(1) Carl Schmitt -Völkerrechtliche Grossraumordnung mit Interventionsverbot für Raumfremde Mächte- Ein Bitrag zum Reichsbegriff im Völkerrecht (Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, 1991)

(2) some authors trace the concept of Grossraum in earlier writings of Friedrich Naumann and others. “According to their concept of Mitteleuropa , modern political, economic, and technological considerations necessitated the creation of a German empire in the center of Europe that would allow Germany to survive in a world dominated by political units larger than a typical European nation-state, namely Russia, the British Empire , and the United States..Raumtheorie was first established as a specialized field of study in the twenties , when it became an integral part of the developing sciene of geopolitics” -see Joseph W. Bendersky-Carl Schmitt (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1983) – at p. 251

(3) Carl Schmitt – Grossraum gegen Universalism in Positionen und Begriffe im Kampf mit Weimar- Genf- Versailles 1923-1939 (Duncker & Humblot , Berlin , 1988)

(4) Carl Scmitt -Völkerrechtlische Grossraumordnung – ibid. p. 37

(5) Carl Schmitt- Völkerrechtlische Grossraumordnung- ibid. pp 38-39

(6) Stephen Bonsal -Unfinished Business (New York, 1944) pp. 184-185; also Arthur P. Whitaker-The Western Hemisphere Idea (Cornell University Press, New York, 1954) at p. 125

(7) Carl Schmitt- Völkerrechtlische Grossraumordnung- ibid. p. 23

(8) Carl Schmitt- Völkerrechtlische Grossraumordnung- ibid. pp. 17, 19, 27-30

(9) Carl Schmitt- Völkerrechtlische Grossraumordnung- ibid. p. 34

(10) see Thomas A. Bailey – A Diplomatic Hisstory of the American People (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1980), pp. 183-184

(11) see Carl Schmitt -Völkerrechtliche Formen des modernen Imperialismus in Schmitt Positionen und Begriffe

(12) Arthur P. Whitaker- The Western Hemisphere Idea -ibid. – p. 100

(13) Arthur P. Whitaker- The Western Hemisphere Idea -ibid. – p. 100

(14) Carl Schmitt – Volkerrechtliche Grossraumordnung- ibid. p. 76, 77, 81

(15) Carl Schmitt – Volkerrechtliche Grossraumordnung- ibid. p. 16

(16) Carl Schmitt – Volkerrechtliche Grossraumordnung- ibid. p. 66

(17) Carl Schmitt – Volkerrechtliche Grossraumordnung- ibid. p.71

(18) Carl Schmitt – Der Reichbegrif in Völkerrecht in Positionen und Begriffe – ibid. at p. 303

(19)in fact American universalism can be seen as Lebenraum for American economic imperialism

(20)Carl Schmitt – Völkerrechtliche Formen des modernen Imperialismus ibid. p.43

The Secret of Eurasia (Mehmet Sabaheddin)

Friday, August 30th, 2002

The Key to Hidden History and World Events

Beneath the broad tide of human history there flow the stealthy undercurrents of the secret societies, which frequently determine in the depths the changes that take place upon the surface.
— A.E. Waite1

Have secret societies and occult brotherhoods been active behind the scenes of world events for thousands of years? Do these guardians of secret wisdom shape the growth of human consciousness and influence the destiny of nations? Are hidden masters of occult knowledge empowering and infiltrating certain political, cultural, spiritual and economic movements, in fulfillment of an ancient plan? Could it be that man’s great upheavals, wars, and revolutions, as well as his pioneering discoveries in science, literature, philosophy and the arts, are the result of a ‘hidden hand’? Can we decode history and find the mysterious interface between politics and occultism, thereby uncovering the real movers and shakers in our modern world?
The German philosopher Oswald Spengler warned of a “mighty contest” between groups of men of “immense intellect” who the “simple citizen neither observes nor comprehends.” Back in 1930 Ralph Shirley, the editor of the London Occult Review, Britain’s leading journal of esoteric sciences, endorsed “the suspicion that the ranks of occultism are secretly working for disintegration and revolution. Positive proof in the shape of a group of occultists working with this objective in view recently came under the notice of the present writer.”
Major-General Fuller, a former disciple of Aleister Crowley, who had links to British military intelligence, wrote about an insidious force using “Magic and Gold” striving “to gain world domination under an avenging Messiah as foretold by Talmud and Qabalah.” Fuller’s former chief Crowley worked as a secret agent for both Britain and Germany, although his British handlers noted his ‘unreliability’ warning he should only be used in espionage operations with the utmost care. During the First World War the German Foreign Office secretly requested the occultist Gustav Meyrink to write a novel blaming the Freemasons of France and Italy for the outbreak of war.

Madame Blavatsky believed the Catholic society of Jesuits had transferred their headquarters from the continent to England where they plotted to plunge man into passive ignorance and institute “Universal Despotism”. The founder of the Theosophical Society, a woman of immense intellect and first hand experience of secret societies, warned:
Students of Occultism should know that while the Jesuits have by their devices contrived to make the world in general, and Englishmen in particular think there is no such thing as Magic and laugh at Black Magic, these astute and wily schemers themselves hold magnetic circles and form magnetic chains by the concentration of their collective WILL, and when they have any special object to effect or any particular and important person to influence.2

The French Revolution, one of Europe’s most important political upheavals, was largely the work of Masonic lodges dedicated to the overturning of the monarchy and an end of the established Catholic religion. In Proofs of a Conspiracy (1798), John Robison showed that the political clubs and correspondence committees during the revolution, including the famous Jacobin Club, sprang from these Masonic lodges.
The influence on history of mysticism, the occult and secret societies is generally dismissed by Western academics. Mainstream historians choose to ignore this aspect because they believe it has no real significance to world politics. In fact it is only through acknowledging the role and influence of the ‘occult underground’ that important world events can be fully understood and placed in their real historical perspective.

Atlantism Verses Eurasianism
Secret societies and the teachers of occult wisdom consistently trace their origins back to the very dawn of civilisation. Within Judeo-Christian culture, the secret schools speak of Adam, Seth, Moses and the Patriarchs as initiates of a divine wisdom carefully passed from one generation to the next. Other occult groups look back beyond ancient Egypt and the Mystery schools of Greece, to the lost continent of Atlantis. Still others trace their lineage to Sumeria or Babylon and the mysterious plains of Tartary.
Examining mankind’s myths, legends and arcane stories we encounter countless references to a vanished primordial civilisation. The brilliant French metaphysician Rene Guenon wrote of a great Hyperborean culture that flourished around the Arctic Circle and of its outposts Shambhala in the East and Atlantis in the West. Plato wrote of Atlantis, describing it as the heart of a great and powerful empire which, due to the indiscriminate mixing of “the sons of God” with “the children of men,” suffered “violent earthquakes and floods” and “disappeared beneath the sea”. According to occult tradition, Atlantis came to an end after a lengthy period of chaos and disaster brought about, in the words of Madame Blavatsky, because the “Atlantis-race became a nation of wicked magicians.” Atlantis was destroyed by a conspiracy of evil magicians who had seized control of the mighty continent.

Long before the final end of Atlantis, great migrations took place to different centres of the earth. In one legend we are told of a righteous remnant journeying from the Arctic Circle to Shambhala, in the remote fastness of Central Asia. Other legends suggest Atlantean survivors established the ancient Egyptian civilisation.

Victoria LePage, the author of one of the most comprehensive studies of Shambhala explains how Atlantis and Shambhala are more than mere geographic locations:
In folklore Atlantis and Shambhala are implicitly linked together as charismatic images of heart’s desire, two shining mirages that lie on the farthest horizon of human longing, unattainable, always receding as we reach for them; at best no more than ideal states of consciousness never realized. But their association seems to have a far more real and historically concrete basis than that. Initiatic tradition affirms they have both genuinely existed, one in the western sea, the other in the eastern mountains, as lynchpins of what was once a network of Wisdom centers located on a great power-grid extending around the globe. Further, Shambhala still exists within a framework that awaits reactivation.3

In order to identify the historical activities of secret societies we need to appreciate the origin of a most powerful idea. Occult lore speaks of Shambhala as the positive centre of the Brotherhood of Light, and Atlantis the negative centre of the evil magicians, the Brothers of the Shadow. Wherever we look we see the division of secret societies and occult endeavours into these two opposing ‘Orders’. All occult movements and teachings inevitably serve either the “Order of Eurasia” or the “Order of Atlantism”, with their respective symbolic centres of Shambhala and Atlantis. Concealed behind a multitude of different forms and represented by an array of unsuspecting agents of influence, these two centres – Shambhala and Atlantis – represent two different impulses in human evolution.

Viewed from the perspective of sacred geography, in our present historical cycle, Atlantism is the triumph of the most destructive and diabolical elements in the civilisation of the West. One modern authority on sacred geography and geopolitics observes:
Sacred geography on the basis of “space symbolism” traditionally considers the East as “the land of Spirit”, the paradise land, the land of a completeness, abundance, the Sacred “native land” in its fullest and most perfect kind. In particular, this idea is mirrored in the Bible text, where the eastern disposition of “Eden” is treated.

Precisely such understanding is peculiar also to other Abrahamic traditions (Islam and Judaism), and also to many non-Abrahamic traditions – Chinese, Hindu and Iranian. “East is the mansion of the gods”, states the sacred formula of the ancient Egyptians, and the same word “east” (“neter” in Egyptian) meant at the same time “god”. From the point of view of natural symbolism, East is the place where the sun rises, Light of the World, material symbol of Divinity and Spirit.

The West has the opposite symbolical meaning. It is the “country of death”, the “lifeless world”, the “green country” (as the ancient Egyptians called it). West is “the empire of exile”, “the pit of the rejected”, according to the expression of Islamic mystics. West is “anti-East”, the country of decay, degradation transition from the manifest to the non-manifest, from life to death, from completeness to need, etc. West is the place where the sun goes, where it “sinks down”.4

Russia & the Magical Universe
Russia, geographically the largest country on earth, occupies a unique position in the study of human history furnishing us with a window into the world of secret societies, occult teachers, and subterranean political currents.

Ideas and practices drawn from magic and the occult have always been a part of Russian life. In the sixteenth century Tsar Ivan IV consulted magicians and was aware of the occult significance of the precious stones set in his staff. His reign was the culmination of the dream of building a prophetic, religious civilisation in the Eastern Christian tradition of Byzantium. Surrounded by secret orders of apocalyptical monks, Ivan saw himself as heir to the Israelite kings and attempted to transform Russian life in accord with his magical view of reality. Ivan was convinced the Russian nation had a special mission to accomplish, nothing short of the redemption of the world.

In 1586, Tsar Boris Godunov offered the huge salary of 2000 English pounds a year, with a house and all provisions free, to John Dee, the English magus and spy master, to enter his service. Dee’s son Dr. Arthur Dee, who like his father was an alchemist and Rosicrucian, went to Moscow to work as a physician. Mikhail Romanov, the first Tsar of the Romanov dynasty, allegedly ascended the throne with the help of Dr. Arthur Dee and the British Secret Service. Before their rise to power the Romanovs were accused by their enemies of practising magic and possessing occult powers.

The legendary Count of Saint Germain, described as an alchemist, spy, industrialist, diplomat and Rosicrucian, became involved in several political intrigues in Russia and was, according Nicholas Roerich, “a member of the Himalayan brotherhood.” In 1755 he traveled throughout Eurasia to study occult teachings, and may even have visited Tibet. It is said that while studying occultism in Central Asia the Count was introduced to the secret rites of Tantric sex magic which provided him with a technique to prolong his youth. He also engaged in spying operations against the notorious British India Company. Saint Germain founded two secret societies called the Asiatic Brethren and the Knights of Light. As early as 1780 he warned Marie Antoinette that the French throne was in danger from an international conspiracy of ‘Brothers of the Shadow’. Rumours continued to circulate for many years after his alleged death that Saint Germain was still alive working behind the scenes in European politics or studying occult doctrines in Central Asia.

West Meets East
Occult powers seem to be a matter of national temperament… Russia tends to produce mages – men or women who impress by their spiritual authority; no other nation has a spiritual equivalent of Tolstoy and Dostoevsky, or even of Rozanov, Merezhkovsky, Soloviev, Fedorov, Berdaev, Shestov. Certainly no other nation has come near to producing anyone like Madame Blavatsky, Gregory Rasputin or George Gurdjieff. Each is completely unique.
— Colin Wilson, The Occult

The process of synthesis of the occult traditions of East and West is seen in the work of Helena Petrovna
Blavatsky, founder of the Theosophical Society and the author of the magnus opus The Secret Doctrine. Born Helena von Hahn, the daughter of a Russian military family and cousin to the future Russian Prime Minister Count Witte, she is a true emissary of the Eurasian Order. Nevill Drury says of the Russian occultist:
Her main contribution to mystical thought was the manner in which she sought to synthesise Eastern and Western philosophy and religion, thereby providing a framework for understanding universal occult teaching.5
Madame Blavatsky traveled throughout Asia and Europe, joined Garibaldi’s national revolutionary militia, fighting in the battle of Mentana, in which she was severely wounded. In the late 1870s, shortly after the publication of her first book Isis Unveiled, a compelling indictment of contemporary Western religion as spiritually bankrupt, she moved from the United States to India where the headquarters of the Theosophical Society remains until this day.

In 1891 the future Tsar Nicholas II, in the company of the mystic Eurasian scholar Prince Ukhtomsky, visited the headquarters of the Theosophical headquarters at Adyar. Prince Ukhtomsky’s description of the society is revealing:
At the insistence of H.P. Blavatsky, a Russian lady who knew and had seen much, the idea sprang up of the possibility, and even the necessity, of founding a society of theosophists, of searchers for the truth in the broadest sense of the word, for the purpose of enlisting adepts of all creeds and races, of penetrating deeper into the most secret doctrines of oriental religions, of drawing Asiatics into true spiritual communion with educated foreigners in the West, of keeping up secret relations with different high priests, ascetics, magicians, and so on.6

Madame Blavatsky wanted to unite Central Asia, India, Mongolia, Tibet and China, in order – with the involvement of Russia – to create a grand Eurasian power able to oppose British ambitions. Traveling across India Blavatsky agitated against British rule and found herself accused by the colonial authorities of being a Russian spy. Prince Ukhtomsky saw support for Eurasia in the “readiness of the Indians to group themselves under the banner of the strange northern woman.” He believed Madame Blavatsky had been forced to leave India by “the suspiciousness of the English.”

As early as 1887 H.P. Blavatsky had become a topic of debate in “mystic Petersburg” and received the prestigious support of Ukhtomsky’s friend the mysterious Tibetan Dr. Badmaev, soon to become notorious for the favour he received at the Russian imperial court and his relationship with Rasputin. Madame Blavatsky’s sister insisted that the Russian Orthodox Metropolitan of Kiev had recognised the young Helena’s psychic gift, and admonished her to use her powers with discretion, as he felt sure they were given her for some higher purpose.

Dr. Stephan A. Hoeller, a scholar of comparative religion and a Gnostic Bishop, reminds us that Blavatsky,
was a true daughter of Mother Russia. Some feel that her life and character correspond strongly to the archetype of the traditional Russian wandering holy person, known as the staretz (literally ‘old one’), denoting a wandering, non-clerical ascetic, or pilgrim, who travels about the countryside, exhorting people concerning spiritual matters, sometimes in a decidedly unorthodox manner.7

After H.P. Blavatsky’s death in London in 1891, the Theosophical Society came under the firm control of the English occultists Annie Besant and C.W. Leadbeater, a confirmed British imperialist. The Eurasian orientation given to early Theosophy by H.P. Blavatsky was compromised by the influence of British Masonry and Leadbeater’s esoteric High Anglicanism. In the great struggle of the magicians the Eurasian impulse found new historical agents in the West, among them the celebrated French magus Papus.

Grand Battle of the Magicians
When the 19th century will have come to an end, one of the Brothers of Hermes will come from Asia to unite humanity again.
— Nostradamus

Papus, together with Oswald Wirth and De Guaita, dreamed of uniting occultists everywhere into a revived Rosicrucian brotherhood, an international occult order in which they hoped the Russian Empire would play a leading role as the bridge between East and West.

Papus was the pseudonym of Dr. Gerard Encausse (1865-1916), a disciple of Joseph Saint-Yves d’Alveydre (1842-1910), an initiate of the French Gnostic Church and often the instigator of many of the occult groups of his time. One of the most famous turn-of-the century occultists, he was the founder of the Hermetic School in Paris, which attracted many Russian students, and directed the leading French occult review, L’Initiation. Papus was also the head of two secret societies, the L’Ordre du Martinisme and the L’Ordre Kabbalistique de la Rose-Croix.

When the Russian Tsar and Tsaritsa visited France in 1896, it was Papus who sent them a greeting on behalf of “the French Spiritualists,” hoping that the Tsar would “immortalise his Empire by its total union with Divine Providence.” This greeting was reminiscent of the hopes of mystics at the time of Tsar Alexander I’s Holy Alliance.

Papus made his first visit to Russia in 1901 and was introduced to the Tsar. He quickly set up a lodge of his Martinist Order in St. Petersburg with the Tsar as the president of the “Unknown Superiors” who controlled it. The historian James Webb says Papus “was merely reviving a devotion to a philosophy that had flourished in Russia at the turn of the 18th and 19th centuries before being suppressed.”
As the foremost student of Saint-Yves d’Alveydre, Papus knew of the key role to be played by Russia in unifying Eurasia and her occult destiny as the Empire of the End, the outward manifestation of the enigmatic power of ‘Northern Shambhala’.

Through Papus the Imperial family became acquainted with his friend and spiritual mentor Master Philippe (Nizier Anthelme Philippe). A sincere Christian mystic, he was given rank and honours by the Russian Tsar, and maintained contact with the imperial court until his death in 1905.
Papus returned to St. Petersburg in 1905 where it was rumoured he, in the presence of the Imperial couple, evoked the spirit of the Tsar’s father, Alexander III, who offered practical advise on handling a political crisis.

Both Master Philippe and Papus played an important political role at the Russian court. They not only advised the Tsar on affairs of state but maintained contact with influential Russian initiates of the Martinist Order, among them two of the Tsar’s uncles and numerous relatives. The German occultist Rudolf Steiner, who had his own disciples among the German General Staff, followed the mission of the two Frenchmen, disturbed by Papus’ “extensive influence in Russia”. A strong advocate of the alliance between France and Russia, Papus warned the Tsar of an international conspiracy aimed at world domination.
He believed that the vast Russian Empire was the only power capable of thwarting the conspiracy of the ‘Shadow Brothers’. He also urged the Tsar to prepare for the coming war with Germany, then being engineered by sinister forces in Berlin. According to one account, he promised the imperial family that,
the Romanov monarchy would be protected as long as he, Papus, was alive. When the news of his death reached Alexandra in 1916, she sent a note to her husband (at the time commanding the Russian armies at the front in World War I) containing the words ‘Papus is dead, we are doomed!’8

Papus promoted his Martinist Order as a counter to the Masonic lodges which, he believed, were in the service of British imperialism and the international financial syndicates. From his papers it is known that he furnished documentation to the Russian authorities about Masonic activities in Russia and Europe. Papus condemned Freemasonry as atheistic in contrast to the esoteric Christianity of the Martinist Order. He castigated “our epoch of scepticism, adoration of material forms, so vitally in need of a frankly Christian reaction, independent of all priesthoods.” Shortly after returning from his first visit to Russia in 1901, a series of articles appeared in the French press for which Papus was largely responsible. They warned of a “hidden conspiracy” the existence of which the public was totally unaware and of the machinations of a sinister financial syndicate trying to disrupt the Franco-Russian alliance. The public is blind to the real forces of history:
It does not see that in all conflicts whether arising within or between nations, there are at the side of the apparent actors hidden movers who by their self-interested calculations make these conflicts inevitable….
Everything which happens in the confused evolution of nations is thus prepared in secret with the goal of securing the supremacy of a few men; and it is these few men, sometimes famous, sometimes unknown, who must be sought behind all public events.

Now, today, supremacy is ensured by the possession of gold. It is the financial syndicates who hold at this moment the secret threads of European politics…
A few years ago there was thus founded in Europe a financial syndicate, today all-powerful, whose supreme aim is to monopolise all the markets of the world, and which in order to facilitate its activities has to acquire political influence.

The Papus inspired articles in Echo de Paris revealed the role of the British Secret Service, which was exposed as being behind British Freemasonry, to isolate and weaken Russia. In France British agents concentrated on anti-Russian propaganda, while in Russia they used “financial trickery” to infiltrate all levels of society. Every effort was required “to preserve the Russian Emperor – so loyal and so generous – from the evils… [of ] the syndicate of financiers… which at present controls the destinies of Europe and the world.”

The Mysterious Tibetan
St. Petersburg… in 1905 was probably the mystical centre of the world.
— Colin Wilson, The Occult

Shamzaran (Pyotr) Badmaev was a Buriat Mongol who had grown up in Siberia and converted to Russian Orthodoxy with Alexander III acting as his godfather. He gained considerable influence at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Tsar granted him the title of Privy Councillor. Badmaev was renowned as a doctor of Tibetan medicine, herbalist, and healer, who treated high society patients at his fashionable ‘Oriental Medicine’ clinic in St. Petersburg. Described by a Russian historian as “one of the most mysteries personalities of the day,” and a “master of intrigue”, Badmaev enjoyed a close association with the mystic healer Rasputin.

Known as ‘the Tibetan’, Badmaev dreamed of the unification of Russia with Mongolia and Tibet. He involved himself in endless projects aimed at the creation of a great Eurasian empire. Russia’s historic mission, he believed, lay in the East, where she was destined to unite the Buddhist and Muslim peoples, as a counter to Western colonialism. Badmaev outlined his vision in a 1893 report to Tsar Alexander III entitled ‘The Tasks of Russia in the Asiatic East’. His considerable political expertise secured the support of the Mongol tribes in the Russo-Japanese War.

In a letter of 19 December 1896, Badmaev wrote to Tsar Nicholas II: “…my activities have the aim that Russia should have greater influence than other powers upon the Mongolian-Tibetan-Chinese East.” Badmaev expressed particular concern over the influence of England in the East, stating in a special memorandum:
Tibet, which – as the highest plateau of Asia – rules over the Asiatic continent, must without doubt be in the hands of Russia. By commanding this point, Russia will surely be able to make England more compliant.
Badmaev knew of the legend, popular in Mongolia, China and Tibet, about the ‘White Tsar’ who would come from the North (from ‘Northern Shambhala’) and restore the now decadent traditions of true Buddhism. He reported to Tsar Nicholas II how “Buryats, Mongols and especially lamas… were always repeating that the time had come to extend the frontiers of the White Tsar in the east….”

Badmaev had a close association with a highly placed Tibetan, the lama Agvan Dordzhiyev, the tutor and confidant of the 13th Dalai Lama. Dordzhiyev equated Russia with the coming Kingdom of Shambhala anticipated in the Kalachakra texts of Tibetan Buddhism. The lama opened the first Buddhist temple in Europe, in St. Petersburg, significantly dedicated to the Kalachakra teaching. One of the Russian artists who worked on the St. Petersburg temple was Nicholas Roerich, who had been introduced to the legend of Shambhala and Eastern thought by lama Dordzhiyev. George Gurdjieff, another man of mystery who had a tremendous impact on Western esotericism, knew Prince Ukhtomsky, Badmaev, and lama Dordzhiyev. Was Gurdjieff, accused by the British of being a Russian spy in Central Asia, a pupil of the mysterious Tibetans?
“I am training young men in two capitals – Peking and Petersburg – for further activities,” Dr. Badmaev had written to Tsar Nicholas II.

Mystical Anarchism
The sway of ‘the Tibetan’ reached beyond the Imperial court into the Russian intelligentsia and further still to the subterranean world of espionage and revolutionary politics. One of the intellectual movements at the time of the 1905 political upheavals was called “Mystical Anarchism”. Two of its leading exponents were the poet and writer Viacheslav Ivanov and George Chulkov, both associates of Dr. Badmaev. Chulkov, like ‘the Tibetan’, is described as an unconscious medium transmitting mysterious forces.
A radical political doctrine aimed at reconciling individual freedom and social harmony, Mystical Anarchism drew on the ideas of Friedrick Nietzsche. This is not surprising when we consider Nietzsche’s positive view of Russia as the antithesis of the decadent West, and the German philosopher’s appreciation of Buddhism and Oriental culture.

According to the historian Bernice Glatzer Rosenthal, Mystical Anarchists, convinced “that unseen forces are guiding events here on earth, believed that political revolution reflected realignments in the cosmic sphere, and that a new world of freedom, beauty, and love was imminent.”
Advocating the abolition of all external authorities and all constraints on the individual – government, law, morality, social custom – they were indifferent to legal rights as merely “formal freedoms” and opposed constitutions and parliaments in favor of sobornost’. By sobornost’ they meant a free community united by love and faith whose members retain their individuality (as distinct from individualism, self-affirmation apart from or against the community)….

They grounded this ideal in their notion of the “mystical person,” the soul or the psyche, which seeks union with others and recognizes itself as a microcosm of the macrocosm, as distinct from the “empirical person,” the I or the ego, which asserts itself apart from or against others. Evoking and developing this “mystical person” would make feasible a “new organic society” united by invisible inner ties of love (eros, not agape), “mystical experience,” and sacrifice – the very opposite of liberal society, based on the social contract and mutual self-interest and characterized by rational discourse.9

Mystical Anarchism is a thoroughly Eurasian sociopolitical idea. Here we have a most arcane motif in a modern form: The great struggle of the empirical, plutocratic Western civilisation, against the mystical, sacrificial culture of Eurasia. In occult terms it is the conflict of the impulse of ‘Shambhala’ with the renegades of ‘Atlantean civilisation’. The Brotherhood of the Northern Light battling it out with the Brothers of the Shadow, external manifestation of the long war between the agents of Being and Non-Being.
Nicholas Berdyaev, Dmitri Merezhkovsky, Zenaida Hippius, Valerri Briusov, Mikhail Kuzmin, Alexandre Blok, Vasili Rozanov, along with a host of other Russian poets, writers and artists, transmitted different aspects of Mystical Anarchism and the Eurasian vision. When in the years before the Revolution the Sufi Master Inayat Khan visited Russia, he found much to commend in “the Eastern type of discipleship which is natural to the nation.”

Merezhkovsky saw the possibility of evolving a “new religious consciousness” from the two peculiarly Russian types represented by Tolstoy and Dostoievsky. Tolstoy stood for a pantheistic mysticism of the flesh, and Dostoievsky for the more ascetic spiritual values. “In this Russia the ‘Man-God’ shall be manifested to the Western world, and the ‘God-man’ for the first time to the Eastern, and shall be, for those whose thinking already reconciles both hemispheres the ‘One in Two.’”

After the Bolshevic Revolution, Blok contrasted the new Russia with the West. He called Russia the “Scythian,” i.e., the young, fresh nation whose destiny it was to challenge the decaying West:
We are the Scythians, we are the Asians… Centuries of your days are but an hour to us, Yet like obedient slaves, We’ve held a shield between two hostile races – Europe, and the Mongol hordes… From war and horror come to our open arms, The embrace of kin, Put the old sword away while there’s time, Hail us brothers… Ah, Old World, before you have perished, join our fraternal banquet.
The poet Nikolai Kliuev and his young friend Sergei Esenin featured occult images and Eurasian themes in their work. At the end of 1917 Kliuev (1887-1937), a prophet and emissary of Eurasia, wrote:

We are the host of sunbearers.
On the hub of the universe
we will erect a hundred-story, fiery house.
China and Europe, the North and the South
Will come to the chamber in a round-dance of playmates
to match together Abyss and Zenith.
Their godfather is God Himself and their Mother
is Russia.

Kliuev’s protege, Esenin (1895-1925), longed for the end of the old world and its replacement by a new one, and even proclaimed a new religious trend called “Aggelism,” with clear roots in Russian Gnosticism. He hailed both Christ and Gautama the Buddha as geniuses because they were men of “word and deed”. In a letter to a friend, Esenin wrote:
People, look at yourselves, did not Christs emerge from you, and can you not be Christs? Can I with will-power not be a Christ…? How absurd all our life is. It distorts us from the cradle, and instead of truly real people some kind of monster emerges.

He warned the United States, to him the symbol of all non-Russian and rationalist sources, not to commit the mistake of “unbelief” and ignore the new “message” from Russia, as the way to the new life is only through Russia. A friend wrote how Esenin and his fellow ‘Scythian’ poets wanted a “deepening of the political revolution to the social” and came to regard Russian Marxism as “coarse”. Before his death Esenin became convinced ‘evil forces’ had usurped the Revolution and the Bolshevics betrayed Russia’s mission.
The famed poet Nikolai Kliuev knew both Dr. Badmaev and Grigory Rasputin, and like the latter had been initiated into a secret school of Christian sexual mysticism with similarities to Tibetan Tantra and Indian Shivaism. “They called me a Rasputin,” Kliuev wrote in a 1918 poem. Kliuev’s spirituality was deeply rooted in the tradition of the Russian religious dissidents like the Old Believers, the Khlysty and Skoptsy, who formed a veritable subterranean river among the common people. Kliuev admitted how challenged by a Khlyst elder to “become a Christ,” he was introduced to the secret community of “Dove brethren”. With the help of “various people of secret identity”, Kliuev traveled all over Russia participating in secret rituals and imbibing the occult traditions of the Russian East.

In his poems Kliuev sought to convey the mystic spirit of Eurasia. He was a prophet of Belovodia, the name given by Russian Old Believers to the awaited earthly paradise similar to Shambhala. Kliuev envisioned a radical transformation of Russia that would bring about a classless society where peasant culture would triumph over industrialism, capitalism, and the general mechanisation of life. He expressed his concern about the dangers of soulless Western civilisation in a 1914 letter to a friend:
Every day I go into the grove – and sit there by a little chapel – and the age-old pine tree, but an inch to the sky, I think about you… I kiss your eyes and your dear heart… O, mother wilderness! Paradise of the spirit… How hateful and black seems all the so-called civilised world and what I would give, what Golgotha I would bear – so that America should not encroach upon the blue-feathered dawn… upon the fairy tale hut.
The Russian philosopher Nicholas Berdyaev articulated the vision shared by pre-revolution Russian thinkers as well as the cultural elite, when he wrote of the end of Western rationalism and the birth of a new era of the spirit which would witness the struggle of Christ and Antichrist. He saw the popularity of mystical and occult doctrines as proof of the approach of this New Era, and called for a “new knighthood”. “Man is not a unit in the universe, forming part of an unrational machine, but a living member of an organic hierarchy, belonging to a real and living whole.” Berdyaev’s attacks on Western materialist values only reflected a view widely held by Russian society. Writing in exile in the early 1930s he observed:
Individualism, the ‘atomisation’ of society, the inordinate acquisitiveness of the world, indefinite over-population and the endlessness of people’s needs, the lack of faith, the weakening of the spiritual life, these and other are the causes which have contributed to build up that industrial capitalist system which has changed the face of human life and broken its rhythm with nature.

Journey to Shambhala
Nicholas Roerich was a man who brought glory to our [Russian] people; he is a representative of our civilisation and of its culture, one of its pillars.
— Mikhail Gorbachev

Nikolai Konstantinovitch Roerich (1874-1947) had been introduced to the idea of Shambhala while working on the construction of the first Buddhist temple ever to be built in Europe. Personally acquainted with Russia’s pre-revolution intelligentsia, Roerich became a highly respected and prolific artist. A student of Madame Blavatsky’s works, Roerich believed in the transcendent unity of religions – in the notion that one day the Buddhist, the Muslim, and the Christian would realise their separate dogmas were husks concealing the truth within. Between 1925 and 1928, Roerich undertook five remarkable expeditions through Central Asia, focusing on the mysterious region between the Urals and the Himalayas, the area regarded as the heart of Eurasia. The traditions and legends encountered by Roerich in his travels are described in the books Altai-Himalaya, Heart of Asia and Shambhala.

In the tradition of Tibetan Buddhism, Shambhala is the hidden land in which the teachings of the Kalachakra (‘Wheel of Time’) Tantric school are kept in their purest form. Roerich discovered that the Shambhala of Tibetan Buddhism is not too different from the legend of Belovodia preserved by Russian Christian mystics. An elder of the Old Believer sect confided to Roerich:
In distant lands, beyond the great lakes, beyond the highest mountains, is a sacred place where all truth flourishes. There one may find the supreme knowledge and the future salvation of mankind. And this place is called Belovodia, meaning the white waters.10
Nicholas Roerich wrote how on a visit to the Mongolian capital Ulan-Bator in the 1920s, he heard soldier-revolutionaries singing:

The war of Northern Shambhala.
Let us die in this war
To be reborn again
As Knights of the Ruler of Shambhala.

By ‘Northern Shambhala’ is meant Russia-Eurasia. In his book Heart of Asia, Roerich defined Shambhala not so much as a coming kingdom but an event – a new epoch for humanity of which Shambhala and Belovodia are timeless symbols:
You have noted the concept of Shambhala corresponds to the aspirations of our most serious Western scientific research…. In their striving, the Eastern disciplines of Shambhala and the best minds of the West, which do not fear to look beyond the outworn methods, are uniting.

Roerich never doubted the crucial role Russia would play in bringing together the noblest wisdom of both the East and the West. In Russia a new synthesis would emerge and a new day dawn for humanity, neither exclusively Western nor wholly Eastern, but truly Eurasian. In 1940, as the world found itself plunged into war, Roerich discerned the first glimpses of a New Era and wrote:
The Russian people have piled together great stones. To the admiration of everyone they have built no tower of Babel but a Russian tower. A Kremlin of Sun-bearers with a hundred towers!… Listen – that is the future, and how radiant it is!”

A year later in 1941 he commented:
The whole world is rushing towards Armageddon. Everyone is confused. Everyone is unsure about the future. But the Russian people have found their course and with a mighty flood are streaming towards their radiant future.

‘You Must Pay Attention to Me, In Order to See Me’

Humanity’s radiant future, like Shambhala, stands at the threshold. An invisible college of men and women in every age and nation have glimpsed it and responded to the impulse. Living in the first years of a new millennium we are witnessing the unfolding of an ancient plan. Just as there is no day without night, so too there is no authentic New Era without its counterfeit. And as the darkness must give way to the new dawn, so our present Dark Era will pass away in the great light of ‘Northern Shambhala’.

Freemasonic Atlantism
Behind the tangle of present day events the ancient battle is being concluded. “In wartime,” said the emissary of Atlantism Winston Churchill, “truth is so precious that she should always be attended by a bodyguard of lies.” Empowered by the wicked Magicians of Atlantis, Western secret societies are in a state of occult warfare with the Order of Eurasia.

We await the arrival of the New Era of Shambhala, the casting out of the Brothers of the Shadow from the governmental and financial centres of the earth, and the end of the evil karma inherited from the darkness of Atlantis.

Alice Bailey, who described Shambhala as “the vital centre in the planetary consciousness” and related it to the Second Coming of the Christ, also prophesied Russia’s special role in bringing in the true New Era:
Out of Russia… will emerge that new and magical religion about which I have so often told you. It will be the product of the great and imminent Approach which will take place between Humanity and the Hierarchy. From these two centres of spiritual force, in which the light which ever shineth in and from the East will irradiate the West; the whole world will be flooded with the radiance of the Sun of Righteousness. I am not here referring, in connection with Russia, to the imposition of any political ideology, but to the appearance of a great and spiritual religion, which will justify the crucifixion of a great nation and which will demonstrate itself and be focused in a great and spiritual Light which will be held aloft by a vital Russian exponent of true religion – that man for whom many Russians have been looking, and who will be the justification of a most ancient prophecy.11


1. Arthur Waite, The Real History of the Rosicrucians
2. Letters of H. P. Blavatsky as quoted in The Occult Establishment by James Webb
3. Victoria Le Page, Shambhala: The Fascinating Truth Behind the Myth of Shangri-la
4. Alexander Dugin
5. Nevill Drury, Dictionary Of Mysticism And The Esoteric Traditions, 1992
6. As quoted in The Harmonious Circle by James Webb
7. Stephan A. Hoeller, “H.P. Blavatsky: Woman of Mystery and Hero of Consciousness,” The Quest, Autumn 1991
8. Stephan A. Hoeller, “Esoteric Russia”, Gnosis Magazine, No.31, Spring 1994
9. The Occult in Russian And Soviet Culture, edited by Bernice Glatzer Rosenthal
10. Nicholas Roerich, Heart of Asia
Alice Bailey, Prophecies by D.K.
The above article appeared in New Dawn No. 68 (September-October 2001),
© Copyright New Dawn Magazine, . Permission to re-send, post and place on web sites for non-commercial purposes, and if shown only in its entirety with no changes or additions. This notice must accompany all re-posting.

The Eurasists and the State (Nikolay Alekseev)

Friday, August 30th, 2002

Original title: Evrazitsii i Gosudarstvo. (~ 1929)

Trans. from the russian original by M.Conserva

The live and deeply vivid character of the Eurasist doctrine is shown first of all in that gradual process of self-clarification, which spontaneously attracts us to the knowledge of our own essence, as some special ideological group. In the first phases of this process a set of problems was pointed out, but there was no system yet; in the subsequent phases problems began to emerge in some regular order. So, spontaneously and at the same time regularly, political, social and economic problems are now being elaborated by us. It is possible to say that in this area we have already established a lot, however not everything. From the set of yet not quite solved questions it is necessary first of all to recall the question about our own essence, as an organized group, and about our place in the state. General ideas about this issue have already been expressed, however they have no definitive character or established formula. Do we represent ourselves as a party or not? Should we aim at forming a united party? And if not, who are we? And what is our place in the state? And do we consider the normal eurasist state to be the same as the modern state, in the present political conditions?

In the following pages, a solution to the mentioned questions will be found, an experience which could have the sense of a “debate”, and also could and serve as material for the final decision. It is a multi-layer theme – the separate layers ought to be distinguished, and depending on the different planes to be differently formulated. Then, maybe, both those who affirm that we are party and those who deny to us this party character will appear to be equally right


A political party in the modern sense of this word is defined as a freely arisen (instead of resulting from the statal entity) group of persons, which is united by general purposes and community in understanding the means leading to the accomplishment of the defined purposes (unity of means). Most significant to a party may be the unity of purposes, but sometimes also the unity of means. All the difference between bolsheviks and mensheviks, for instance, is reduced to the dissent concerning tactics, instead of final purposes; but the difference of purposes distinguishes socialist from bourgeois parties. An immediate task of any political party is the occupation of the apparatus of state power, so that it shall put into practice the basic purposes (we shall call it “political action”). However many modern political parties do not aspire at all to the immediate accomplishment of this last purpose. Tactical reasons often induce a party in every possible way to abstain not only from seizing power, but also from direct involvement in the government. Modern European political regimes especially favour similar tactics of abstention, by virtue of which one very powerful modern political party, for example, the socialists, performs in the parliament an eternal opposition to all other political parties and to any government. Such a condition is very convenient, since “outsiders” eternally criticize and do not take any responsibility, creating the belief that any government is bad, except for the socialists, for which the opportunity has not come yet.

Since modern European political parties are essentially free to unite, the party regime to some extent reputes the multiparty spirit as an expression of the individual right of involvement in politics, as the result of freedom of political opinion. These different opinions can stand in a competition and struggle process, since the relations between parties are also built during the struggle. The normal way of party struggle aims at acquiring the majority, which would ensure party domination. Acquiring the majority means that all the other parties should subordinate to the winner and refuse to prevail, pending the change of political regime. A different, not considered as normal path, is dictatorship, through which one of the parties, not possessing the majority, seizes power and pursues its program by force, contrary to the will of the majority. Dictatorship can be either “soft”, when the party who seizes the power does not suppress the others, allowing within given limits their activity; or “rigid”, when the party who seizes the power simply suppresses the remaining ones and becomes the only dominant group in the state (for instance, fascism in its first and last phases of development).

The historically democratic regime of the western states has worked out two kinds of party formations, whose borders sometimes overlap, though in their ideal forms can be quite definitely expressed. The first of them is characterized by the fact that at the basis of party integration does not stand any social or political doctrine (“ideology”), nor dogma, nor sum of tenets, but some practical issue of current politics or a sum of such questions (for example, issues of customs politics, the question of the elective franchises, the agrarian question in its present pattern etc.). These are “platform” league parties. A huge role they have played in the life of the anglo-american states. In effect, basic political parties in England are essentially similar to platform “parties”, instead of being ideological unions based on a “program “. The other kind of modern party formations are the purely ideological unions, whose brightest modern example are the socialists. The basis of modern socialist parties is a known public doctrine, a known concept of social and political life, even some philosophy – for instance, such is Marxism. If for platform parties politics is like a purpose in itself, for program parties it is only one of the means for achieving their basic ideological purposes. There was a time when the socialists did not admit political struggle and did not participate in it (especially in parliamentary struggle), but Lassalle and Marx set them on the path of politics. As a feature of this sort of “program parties” it is necessary to consider that, though their basic tasks are not reduced to “politics”, nevertheless the modern party is always a product of a given social and political ideology. The modern parties in the end aim at the transformation of social life, have some social doctrine as their basis and, if they are linked to a general world-view, this is some social philosophy. These parties are a product of that “religion of a society”, according to which many contemporary people in the western civilization live – believing that transforming the society is the basic problem of life, and that together with this trasformation the supreme vital task facing man will be fulfilled.

The modern political party only partially coincide with the historically arisen social groups and public social strata. So, for example, the working party of english type generally coincides with that social stratum of Great Britain bearing the name of working class. Many national parties in the various states lay on historical-anthropological and racial foundations. But the majority of modern parties not only does not coincide with real social groups, but even more – normally to each definite social group there correspond some different political parties. So the various socialist parties consider themselves as the representatives of “proletariat”. The well-known Russian socialist party, whose base is composed from declassed urban intelligentsia, considered itself for some reason the elected representative of the peasantry, whereas the peasants in it were less than 10 %. However, the diffusion of its slogans managed him to attract a significant amount of peasant votes during the revolution. Thus, the political party in modern sense is a union which does not serve to the mere representation of real interests of social strata and groups, but aims to use some given real interests to given political ends This feature distinguishes the political party from real unions as labor unions, syndicates, trade-unions etc.

From the political parties in the described sense it is necessary to distinguish those modern, also ideological unions, which, though aiming at achieving some known political ends, however do not consider this at all as their last problem, and sometimes simply do not expose it openly as their purpose. It is impossible to undervalue the roles of such unions in the life of the modern western states. To them, for example, roman catholic orders belong; in particular, here we must recall the Jesuits, whose political role was huge, though they never were political party like the socialists or communists. If the Jesuits also set before themselves, and sometimes and directly put into practice purposes similar to those of the modern communists (entity of the communist state in Southern America), nevertheless those for them were not the ultimate and highest task, but only a series of means for the accomplishment of highest, religious plans. Similarly, roman catholics and their orders participated and participate to modern political life, but on this subject they organized everywhere a special political party, as it is, for instance, the centre party in Germany. To the same sort of ideological union belongs the masonry, which is not a political party, but whose ideas, organization and activities ara capable of achieving of some political ends. The primary goals of masonry are not at all addressed to the solution of social problems. The masons have both religious and moral tasks inherited from their rather old historical traditions, and politics is only one of the particular plans of their general activity.

Let’s now put the question – to which of the stated kinds of unions are closer the eurasiststs? It is self evident that eurasists are not a platform or league party. We are an ideological union and we shall always identify ourselves as such union. We have not only a program, we are consolidated by a doctrine, an aggregate of dogmas, a whole vision of the world, a whole philosophy. In this sense we formally stand closer to the socialists and communists, especially to marxists. But from socialism we are resolutely separated by all our comprehension of the world. Besides we plan an absolutely different social system than socialism, and we uphold absolutely different moral, social, philosophical and religious doctrines. We do not profess western social religion, we do not consider that the solution of the social question is the ultimate human problem, we deny the theory of an earthly paradise. Political action for us, as well as for the socialists, is not an end in itself: we too aim to political action for special, supreme purposes, but these purposes are not for us the achievement of definitive social welfare on this planet. Because our problems do not consist of politics or plans for a new social formations, as it is for the socialists. In this sense our union – from the point of view of its goal – is closer to the union of a religious order. We must with special emphasis acknowledge that from the formal (not essential) point of view we stand closer not to political parties, but to such associations like the roman catholic orders or the masons. But both the former and the latter are essentially products of the western civilization, western christianity, while we are eastern and, obviously, we cannnot inspire ourselves neither to the ideals of the Jesuits, nor to the ideals of their western antipodes – “free thinkers “, reformers and protesters, disciples of Jacob Boehme, Weigel and the Kabbalah, united by the antidogmatical opposition against orthodox catholicism and orthodox judaism. On spirit, we are perhaps, the first kind of Russian order. Whether we had forerunners or not – this question is not yet clear. I personally think that the oldest tradition is looking at us. Among prototypes it is especially important to indicate that “party” – I put this word into quotation marks, – which acted in ancient Moscow under the name of beyond Volga startsevi.(1) Starchestvo, by virtue of special conditions, lefta the political stage and turned into a life-doctrine without any special pretense to political action (2). Now the moment has come again to call this political action back to life. We are called to start the building of Russia – Eurasia according to the precepts of the startsevi, charging these precepts through a new historical content.

Thus, the definition of “party” is too narrow for us; according to our ideal purposes, we are much more than any political party, including the socialists and communists. We, the organized eurasism, are a sort of special eastern order. The title “party” does not cover our internal essence, does not coincide with it. Therefore only with some disclaimers, only conditionally, we can call ourselves a “party”. We must understand that for the sake of purposes, in many situations we should act more as an order, as a spiritual association, instead of as a party. In this sense we should realize all the advantages of roman catholic or masonic tactics and to use them. There might be such constellation, when it will be much more convenient for the eurasists to act through another party, even to create a factotum known to them, to accept such or such legal form, while the eurasian core will not keep a party character. This does not contradict the possibility, under different conditions, to form a self-supporting eurasian party acting alongside with other political parties. Eventually all these are tactical problems, which are not subject to decision without taking into consideration concrete living conditions. The centre of the question is summarized in the following principle: our essence does not coincide with the nature of a political party (in the usual sense of this word) and being a party is only one of the possible forms of our activity.


In order to define those conditions, at which organized eurasism should accept the external form of political party, it is necessary to distinguish two questions:

1) the question of our position and our role in a state that is not built on our image and which we, therefore, do not consider as quite answering to our ideals, and

2) the question of our place in a state which we have built by our own plan.

These questions do not quite completely differ, and from their similarity stems the vagueness of our attitude to the party principle and the possibility of dissent in our ranks. These questions we shall keep apart in the following analyisis.

As to the first question, practically it is reduced to clarify our position in the living conditions of modern Russia-Eurasia. As our starting point we consider the Soviet political system. In its present conditions we do not belong to the number of legally acting political groups. We can become such only with the change of the present political situation. We try to further define what can be the attitude of eurasism to the question of the party in the case of more or less decisive changes in the present political regime in Soviet Russia.

We might suppose the following possibilities of such change :

a) Through gradual evolution, as it is wished and supposed by the democrats, the one-party communist regime will be substituted by a multiparty regime in the western or semi-western sense of this word. The opposition will break away, this split will be legalized, then mensheviks and SR, and finally RD. will be legalized. The Soviet state will turn into something that from time to time it was possible to see in “second grade” Europe – in Bulgaria or Serbia. Is is asked, what should be our attitude to the party principle in case of some more or less long-term stabilization of such regime? It is obvious that in case of evolution by the Soviet state in the mentioned direction, we, eurasists, would not accept any conscious involvement: this is not our affair, the new regime has arisen besides our intentions as organized group. For us – were it to be – it would be a mere fact, which we assiologically disapprove, but to which we are forced to adjust to. It is thought that in the skill of adjusting to it we should learn much both from the roman catholics and from the socialists. And both of them are not the admirers of bourgeois democracy, which, however, they rather skilfully use to their purposes. In other words, with the consolidation of the mentioned regime, the moment will come for us when we shall be forced to enter the political struggle, as a definite political group among other political groups. Then the question of the transformation of eurasism in a political party becomes serious. We should not forget that the chance that is given to us might not belong to the number of those which we aspire to. This possibility is founded on the assumption of gradual fading of that reserve of energy which was created by the revolution. The progress of the Soviet state on the mentioned path would mean that the creativity of the new political forms was terminated, the revolution has died away, there appears an empire in the courtyard of Europe – which, in fact, is the wish of all our, from permission to say, “progressists”. However it does not follow that the approaching of that possibility should frighten us. We plan our life not just for the coming ten years, and we know that such a revolution, like it was in Russia, in the end can bring to the establishing of some new forms of life, even if this revolution has probably ended in a temporary reaction. The possible period of development of Russia as “second grade” Europe will be more or less short-lived. During this period we shall be forced to act as a political party alongside with other political parties. And we act as a party which aims to building a new state and to destroy the party regime. In semi-european democracy we sit not on the right side, but on extreme left side. And we are sure that we shall win. If it will be democracy in Kerensky style, we shall be the first force to overthrow it; if this democracy will be seduced by the new forms in the style of fascism, Pilsudsky regimeetc., we again shall be that major pillar, around which will sediment and crystallize the new democratic forces, and whose growth will overcome the limits common to the above mentioned european phenomena.

b) It is possible to suppose that the change of the presente Soviet regime will happen as a result of violent revolution, which will be made by one of the actual real forces playing a role in the Soviet state. And this force will be extraneous to eurasism. Eurasists will not accept neither ideological, nor actual involvement in the revolution. In Russia will ascend to the throne, say, an individual or collective Bonaparte, which will substantially accept the inheritance of the revolution, save its phraseology and absorb in himself many of its legally established and organizational forces, having however rejected communism, first of all as a social and economic system, and then, maybe, also as an ideology. Similar revolutions are known to history. They are usually made by people born out of the revolution, vigorous and strong-willed men of action, dispossessed at the same time of any principles. There was no own doctrine and ideology in Napoleon, nor there is in Mussolini, as fascists themselves understand. Such revolution would be rather favourable to our position, but only at the condition the we shall not present ourselves as a special, united political party. Those who have seized power, having stabilized the situation being poorly entitled to do this, will not suffer any intrusion into their sphere of activity from an extraneous party; but they will deeply require ideas, political principles, true titles proving their authority. Eurasists should therefore use their best efforts to gradually become the brains of this new regime, charging with new contents the decayed forms it inherited from the revolution, interpreting and recovering them. The eurasists should by all means penetrate in this new regime and with the arms of the new power build the new state.

c) At last, it is possible to suppose that the revolution will be accomplished either by a group close to eurasism, or by the same eurasists. This puts us before the necessity of immediate construction according to our own project. What would be then our attitude towards the party principle? Shall we be a “party” during the construction of the state, and shall we save the form of the party once the state will be built?


Our oppositors reproach us that once in state power we are going to abolish the free regime of parties and, similarly to the communists, to declare the power of one single party, the eurasist, which would take the place of the communists. This rebuke comes not only from the “left” but, very curiously, even from the “right”. Among those that address it to us, that constitutes a genuine preoccupation of all russian emigration “parties”. Let us assume that P.N. Milyukov comes to power. Can we suppose that he would legalize in the republic the party of Markov? We doubt that he would also legalize the nikolaevtsi. And, certainly, nikolaevtsi will make same with RD. (3) We even suspect that Kerensky too would not be very generous in terms of “party freedom”, remembering the lessons of the past. In other words, everyone has idyllic dreams of recovering that order which prevailed during tsarism, when some parties were legal and other forbidden; the difference lies only in what group of parties are going to be granted “freedom” and which ones they would like to push underground. We eurasists believe that no such political tendency would be less favourable to a restoration than ours. We perfectly know that the politics of prohibition is the least and least wise of all political expedients. Only the worst political regime aims to cut under one bracket the ideological dissent of the people. The freedom in expressing opinions in all the reas of life, and in politics too, is an indispensable condition of life in any normal state. The same must also be said of the people’s self-organizing, about the so-called “union freedoms”. Our policy does not pursue the purpose of negative “prohibition” and “suppression””; it will emanate from our new, well pondered state conception, which constitutes the alpha and the omega of our state system and resolutely distinguishes it both from democratic and communist systems.

a) The eurasian state is a political formation, as we say, of demotic nature. We mean that our state is built on a deep national base and corresponds to the “national will”. If the concept of people’s sovereignty was not so worn out and any its internal sense and external charm were not lost, we would be ready to say that our state project is based on the sovereignty of the people – but not on that disorganized, anarchist sovereignty, on which western democracies (where “people’s sovereignty” = the mechanical aggregate of opinions of the separately achieved political maturity of the citizens), but on an organized and organic sovereignty. We consider as “people” or “nation” not any casual sample of citizens satisfying to the conditions of the universal electoral right, but the aggregate of historical generations, past, present and future, forming a cultural unity, realized by the state. We realize that a “nation” in such understanding is unfit to any political action, that it is unable, that it should act through any deputies, that its will should receive expression through definite real carriers However we cannot admit that order where expression of such will is considered the informal mass of all resident people nowadays having reached the age of, say, 18 or 20 years. Honest democrats know that, firstly, such “heap” is also inept, and secondly, that there is no warranty that through its lips the true nation speaks.

Modern western democracy has the features of a special, unjustifyied egocentrism of the voting body of adult citizens, which, being unorganized, is not capable to conduct any election in itself. Modern democracy is an oligarchy of resident nowadays adult generation over the nation, as a whole, an oligarchy which at the same time can not govern itself and searches for itself a deputy, a real politician. Such a figure also is the political party organizing a voting body and substituting the imaginary will with the will of a voting body. We eurasists do not recognize such system as normal. We declare: the end has come for oligarchies of disorganized masses; all ties to a self-empowered system in the issue of peoples’ representation should be resolutely abrogated. The state can not consider as the spokesmen of national will all adults in general, adult in themselves, abstracting from the real adult citizen, from any relation to who he is, where he lives and what he makes. The state should wake up from silent passivity; it should define that objective and real principle, on the basis of which the true people’s “representation” can be built – that is the real bearers of organizational state functions, valid spokesmen of national will. We want, in other words, to substitute the artificial-anarchist system of the representation of separate individuals and parties with the organic order of the representation of demands, knowledge and ideas. Therefore the political party is not necessary to us, as it is necessary to western style democracy.

The question of substituting the organic to the mechanical system of national “representation” since a long time already has arisen in western democracy. Now it is an urging issue of domestic policy in the western states, though the conservatism peculiar to democracy, the original democratic inertness and regressism in every possible way hinders the real advance of this issue in political life. We are in more favourable condition, as we are less contrained by prejudices, more free and more mobile. Besides, the idea laying at the basis of the Soviet system (though not of the Soviet practice) rather successfully solved the problem of organic “representation”. In the Soviet system the basic point is not the separate man, not the artificial union of the people, but the organic territorial member in its fullness – council, district, area, city etc., or professional association of people within the limits of these territorial units, with the national parts of the state. Such principles also are subject to further reinforcing, development and improvement in the eurasian state.

b) The European democracy is proud of founding its power on the “free” public opinion expressing the will of the majority of the “nation”. Public opinion apparently plays a considerable role in the life of the European democracies, it overthrows governments, influences the composition of parliaments, defines reference directions of politics. But what does the democratic regime define by such “public opinion”? “Public opinion” in West is the unstable, strong and very fastly changing sedicent national mood, which has taken deep roots in the people’s belief not spontaneously, but being artificially inculcated by political parties. The political party in the democratic state inspire such “public opinion” on any political issues. Parties call and awake political moods, fuel passions and cultivate them. Generally such “public opinion” is artificialy created, is inflated and does not answer neither to the interests of the different national strata, nor to the interests of the state as a whole. There are special methods for such excitable “public opinion” – it is political agitation, armed nowadays by all methods of the newest advertising technique. Because “public opinion” in democratic Europe varies as much as the weather. Today it is seduced by the side of conservatives, tomorrow – by the side of the socialists. We perfectly realize that “public opinion” cannot be something completely unmovable. Public life varies, so “public opinion” should vary too. However, the true dynamics of national belief cannot be expressed in that nervous jump of political moods, which characterizes the political life of modern democracies. Democratic “dynamics” of the public opinion is a kind of public neurasthenia, being a correct index of the disorder of modern man and of all his life. It is possible to affirm that, if the system of disorganized and unstable “public opinion” could unlimitedly dominate the life of the state, any state would dissolve and cease to exist. If western democracies are not exposed to such dissolving, it means that there is in them some corrective to the boundless dynamics of the unorganized public opinion. The textbooks of constitutional law do not speak about this corrective, but it really exists – and its existence explains why, for instance, despite of constant shift of governments, Great Britain led the same foreign policy; or, why, disregarding ups and downs of ministries in France, the foundations of the French Republic remained rather conservative, that is the same bureaucracy rules, the same administrative structure exists, etc. We want to say that in every state, even the most democratic state, there is some political constant, though its substance is shielded by nowadays magnificent scenery of the democratic regime and parliamentarist phraseology. Our eurasian state will proceed from the requirement that this constant should be validated and clearly formulated. We consciously aspire to fix in the political life of our state what western democracies diligently hide: the guiding idea of the state as a whole, its fundamental vocation, its goal. In this sense it is possible to define our state as ideocratic, or in other words, the state of the stable public opinion. We consider that in the concept of people is like embodied the aggregate of the historical generations and the true national will, the united organism which by no means cannot be recognized in the casual voting of the numerical majority of the adult citizens. This is why we also do not attribute to people’s elections any final, crucial importance, though we consider with its organism very relevant for definition of dynamics of public life. The state is a constant principle, which requires concreteness. People’s elections also is called to give the stable national will its concrete applications to the particular cases of state life.

We consider that – again, in its idea, though not in its practice – the Soviet system enables to successfully combine the substance of a stable public opinion with its dynamics. The Soviet system is composed by a dictatorship of a united party and a number of “representative” entities. The former embodies the constant principle, the latter the mobile one. The correct combination of these two principles also constitutes the primary goal of eurasist policies.

c) Our opponents accuse us to copy the communist dictatorship regime and to aim to its conversion only by transformation of the party in power in a new nobility which, like the old one, will stand above the state and govern it. A similar reproach shows all the misery and inertness of the democratic idea, which has got used to established clichés and outside of them, on the whole, has nothing to exhibit. Our new state concept considers past and present experiences, but does not make of them any kind of untouchable rule. The substance of the ruling stratum is especially characteristic of the history of Russia: it was earlier personified in nobility, and it is nowadays personified in the communist party. But neither the institute of nobility, nor the living essence of the communist party is a solution to the problems of the organization of the ruling group in a normal type of state. Nobility was based on inheritable privileges, bestowed to those who especially distinguished themselves serving the state. Nobility was not, therefore, an ideological organization, so it is doomed to spiritual obsolescence, to ideological death. Our nobility could have been saved from this destiny only in the event that it would be organized on the basis of a soil, national idea. Our nobility has not found such idea, on the contrary, it went through officialization, masonization, and has been the most active factor of our europeanization. The noblemen were our first preachers of the European revolution which, once accomplished, has exterminated its fathers up to last root. The new ruling stratum, born out of the revolution, has the advantage of the ideological integration, however to him the vast oversights are peculiar also. Its ideology is essentially false and, moreover, it is extraneous to us, borrowed from West. And, what is most important, according to its condition in the state the new ruling stratum has character of a western party, that is a private association pursuing some political ends. In the sense of legal status the communist party has not consolidated itself in any way: in the Soviet state it exists actually, but officially, in the Soviet constitution, nothing is said about it. Therefore the whole construction of the Soviet state as though bifurcates between the official institution of the soviets and the informal entities of the communist party. There are two governments – palese and secret: the soviet congress and its bodies, and the party congress and its. Such condition cannot be recognized as normal. It is necessary to push either to the ransformation of the Soviet regime in multi-party regime, or to the constitutional validation of the “party”, as the republic’s official organ. The present leaders of the republic should understand that before us there are only these two paths: taking the first means transforming Russia in similarity to a second grade Europe, taking the second is trying of to build a new kind of state.

The new kind of state demands that that public stratum – which should be the bearer of the stabilization of the public opinion from the political parties in the European sense of this word – should turn into an organic part of the state. We already saw that such parts are the territorial elements of the republic, its professional and national cells. The party in power should be collocated alongside with them as a carrier of the organic state idea. Then the above stated issue of combining the statal constant with statal dynamics is solved by organizing a proper correlation, within the soviets, between delegates from territorial and national parts and from professional organizations, and delegates from the ruling stratum (4).

Thus, in our state we substitute the parties with real social strata, thus creating the conditions at which for us parties become even technically superfluous. Our oppositors say that we want to veto the other parties and to dominate through dictatorship. But if we take the normal state in our conception, the question is not the mechanical prohibition of parties, but the complex policies directed on destroying the party regime. We shall not veto the parties, but, of course, we shall struggle at the elections aganinst that forceful unity of party programs, with that ugly party advertising, with those thoughtless receptions of promises and engagements to which the modern political party resorts. Yes, at soviet elections all these receptions will not be necessary, and besides, not any one of the present Russian insignificant parties will be able to use them. These receptions are suitable when the voters are but an amorphous mass going to the urns and voting those lists of people unfamiliar to them, which were put forward by party committees. But when the elections take place in each village, the choice will be made under the sign of concrete deals, according to the programs, instead of on promises (5). This principle of concrete deals especially dominates in the subsequent phases, when the most capable and skilled shall be selected among the delegates. The modern representatives of Russian political parties therefore are against the Soviet system, since they perfectly understand its repugnancy to the party regime. “In the Soviet system the parties have nothing to do – so down with the Soviet system”… However, if elections in the Soviet system do not need parties, they at all do not abolish the reedom of showing opinions and the struggle of different currents among the voters. At soviet elections we quite concede the possibility of differentiations and groupings. But we do not want that the voter to fix his imaginary interest to a party, we should aim so that the voter himself has understood these interests and selected the people which will appear truly capable to express the will of the nation as an organic whole.


1) Starchestvo: political-religious current which developed at the end of the XV – first half of the XVI century, taking its denomination (zavolgzhiskie startsy) from its gathering in the territory beyond Volga. It favoured ascetism, departing from the profane world, refusal of the land property of the Church. Among its ideologists were Nil Sorskij and Vassian Kosoj [translator’s note].

2) If we do not consider Dostoevsky’s attempts to detect the political program of the starchestco in his conversations with Sosum [anachoret, follower of Starchestvo].

3) Nikolaevtsi, members of the monarchist party led by Nikolay Nikolaevic(1856-1929), grandson of the czar Nikolay I..

Nikolay Evgeneevic Markov (1866-1945). Among the founders of the “Union of the Russian People” in 1911, then head of a far-right fraction in the 3rd a 4th Duma. Member of the White emigration. [translator’s note].

4) The concept of “ruling stratum” in Alekseev is identical with the concept of party, marking by itself a “cardinal point” (partem mundi) in its aim, in other words the «active part of a nation (or group of nations), its accomplished embodying ». Such party (ruling stratum) needs to be strictly distinguished from the parties of a multi-party system.

5) From what is above stated, it is possible to say that the eurasists aim to the accomplishment of such a regime, in which there would be a defined functional unnecessity of parties in the sense of a multi-party system.

Europe a Nation (Oswald Mosley)

Friday, August 30th, 2002

By Oswald Mosley in “Europe: Faith and Plan”

EUROPE a Nation is an idea which anyone can understand. It is simple but should not on that account be rejected; most decisive, root ideas are simple. Ask any child what is a nation? He will probably reply, a nation has a government. And in fact this is the right answer, for the first thing to note about a nation is that it is a country consisting of a people with their own government. Many deeper reflections naturally follow; questions of geography, race, history, which contributed to the evolution of this fact, a people with a government which is a nation. But the simple, decisive point which defines a nation, is that it has a government. That is why the dividing question of modern Europe is whether or not we desire a European government. It is the purpose of this book to answer, yes. And in the end all will find it necessary to make up their minds on which side of this question they stand.

In the end the only way to get great things done is to do things in a great way. If we meet a vital necessity with a clear decisive idea which everyone can understand and which evokes a high ideal, the people will respond directly they see the necessity, understand the plan, and feel the appeal of a moving cause. That is why in life it is often easier to get great things done than to get small things managed. In a supreme moment, like the wars of the past, the peoples of Europe were capable of every exertion and of every sacrifice. There is now a real need to evoke the same fervent spirit for a decisive act, not of destruction but of construction, for a work not of division and death, but of union and life. This can only be done by an idea which is clear, and an idea which is great. Europe a Nation alone can awaken the vital response of the peoples.

If the countries of the West are certain to be confronted on world markets with a competition they cannot face, what is the remedy? The only possible answer is to withdraw from world markets into a viable economy, which is large enough to contain its own essential supplies and to provide its own markets. The only one available is Europe-Africa. South America is a conceivable economic alternative to Africa, but no one in the West can afford to leave a vacuum in Africa to be filled by communism, and a too close economic tie-up between Europe and South America can create political difficulties with North America which it is in the interests of the whole West to avoid. South America would appear to be rather a meeting ground for both the economics and the cultures of Europe and America. So the creation of a Europe-African economy with considerable speed is now vital to the life of Europe.

The civilisation we intend to create must be durable and humane. This means that the Blacks cannot be subjected to the Whites in Africa, and exploited as a pool of cheap, inferior labour. There is plenty of room for both White and Black in Africa, which is still relatively an empty continent. There is ample room for two nations, each with access to the necessary wealth for a full life and a high standard. But they must be separate nations if we are not to revert to the sweating and exploitation of the old colonialism. Whatever illusory guarantees of political liberty are given to backward peoples – even if the resistance of the White population to being in a numerical minority could be overcome, and it cannot be surmounted without the force which none are prepared to use – the less advanced peoples will in practical experience again become the bondsmen of the more advanced, if they live among them. An endless heritage of racial hatred will be the result, culminating in an explosion which will be repressed with bloodshed. So it is necessary to create two nations in Africa, and no one can claim that the necessary space or wealth of potential foodstuffs and raw material are not there. Again, this is a task which is out of the question for the weak individual nations of Europe, but by no means beyond the strength and power of a united Europe.

From every sphere of enquiry we return to our original questions: how can something so big as Europe-Africa be made at all without European Government; how can it be done without European Government in the short time available which is certainly much less than the fifteen years now believed to be necessary to make even the common European market; and what hope is there of anything short of a united Europe with a Europe-African economy providing a solution for the economic problems now facing the nations of Western Europe? Something so big cannot be done with such speed without real unity. And real unity now means the European Government of Europe a Nation. We must now think, feel, act as Europeans.

Europe as far as Vladivostok (Jean Thiriart)

Friday, August 30th, 2002

History and geopolitics

History knows about state-cities: Thebes, Sparta, Athens, later Venice, Florence, Milan, Genoa.
Today it knows about territorial states: France, Spain, England, Russia.
Finally it discovers continental states, such as the United States of America, present China and yesterday’s USSR (1).
Today’s Europe undergoes a stage of transformations.
She has to proceed from the more or less stable stage of territorial states to the stage of the continental state.

For the majority of the people, this transition is hindered by mental inertia, not to mention laziness of thinking.
Though no larger than a piece of yarn, Sparta had a strong vitality, from an hiostorical point of view, being first of all vital in her military aspect. Her dimensions and her resources were enough to contain an army capable of gaining respect from all her neighbours.

Here we approach the basic problem of vitality of states. The historical state-city was superseded by the territorial state. The Roman Empire superseded Athens, Sparta, Thebes. And with no strong effort (2).
Today the historical vitality of the state depends on its military vitality, which in turn depends on its economic vitality; which leads us to the following alternative.
First hypothesis: territorial states are compelled to become satellites of continental states. France, Italy, Spain, Germany, England represent but a fiction of independent states. Since a long time ago, since 1945, all these countries have become satellites of the United States of America.
Second hypothesis: these territorial states are turned into a single continental state – Europe.

The historical failure of one continental state: the USSR

The regretful disintegration of the USSR is explained, in particular, by the insufficient theoretical understanding of the state by Marx, Engels, Lenin, and in some way Stalin. Already in in 1984 my disciple and collaborator, José Cuadrado Costa, based on works by Ortega y Gasset and myself, published a brilliant and prophetical essay under the title “Inadequacy and Obsolescence of Marxist-Leninist Theory of Nationality” (3).
As far as the understanding of the essence of the state is concerned, Jacobins were obviously far ahead of Marxists. In this area Marx ever remained bound to the romantic era of Revolution of 1848. Already at the end of the XVIII century Sieyes wrote about the way to obtain an “homogeneous” nation-state. The nation-state is a fruit of political will.
Another example of Marxist idiocy, ascending to XIX century romanticism, is the idea of the withering away of the state. It is difficult to think of a bigger nonsense. It is an old anarchists’ dream (4).

So Lenin did preserve the formal existence of the republics. I purposedly write the word as plural number.
Due to the application of the principle of centralism within the communist party and to the peculiar personality of Stalin, this fiction or comedy lasted till 1990. The weakening of the Party resulted in the break-up of the USSR along fault lines ascending to the 1917-1922 epoch.
Fiction became reality.

In 1917 the Russian Jacobins created the Republic of Councils (I draw your attention to the singular). Lenin agreed with this fiction of the Union of Soviet Republics (I draw your attention to the plural) and tolerated it. From 1946 to 1949, at the climax of his power, Stalin too preserved this appearance of “Independent” States, extending from Poland to Bulgaria. One more theoretical imprudence.
The political state as opposed to the ethnic state
In the French dictionary “Le Petit Larousse” it is written that the conditions of uniformity for an ethnos are its language and its culture.

For the purposes of this analysis, I will give my own extended interpretation of this concept, having said that the unity of the ethnic state has its roots in the unity of race, religion, language, common imageries, common memories, common frustrations or fears.
The concept of the political state (as an open, expanding system) is fully opposite to the concept of the ethnic state (as a closed, fixed system). The political state is the expression of the will of free men to have a common future.

The political state, or more precisely the political nation-state – of which I am considered the modern theorist, after Ortega-y-Gasset (5) – allows the individuals to preserve their personal individuality (please forgive this barbarous, rough pleonasm) within the framework of society.
Less than two months ago (6) I stated my opinion about the importance of the concepts of Imperium and Dominium. Since 1964 I never stopped developing this concept of Roman origins.
To one political friend who called me “Vallon” (it was not enough for me!), I wrote, as usual, that I am neither Vallon, nor Flemish, neither German, nor Belgian, and not even European. I am me. The person of Jean Thiriart – this is Jean Thiriart, I wrote him. I do not like at all appearing together with other people in any file, in which it is said they “remember me”.
I want to constantly save my Socratic irony. A supporter of totalitarianism when the talk is about Imperium, I become an anarchist in the sphere of Dominium.

Marx and Engels knew absolutely nothing about this fundamental dicotomy Imperium/Dominium; this is why they wrote “The German Ideology”, addressed against Max Stirner. Stirner’s vision of Imperium (free federative choice, the right to secession, and so on) will always remain utopical and inapplicable. On the contrary, his vision of internal freedom, of the sphere of Dominium, will always be interesting. I am Bolshevik, Jacobin, Prussiam, Stalinan, whenever the speech goes about Imperium and its civil discipline, but my taste and intellectual interests concerning my private life, my life within the framework of Dominium, they go to Odysseus, the champion in imitating the Cynics, to Diogenes, who in reply to the question: “Can you see any good man in Greece?”, – answered ” Nowhere; but I see some good lads in Lacedemones…”.
It is known that Diogenes and the other Cynics admired the Spartan system because the Spartans were partisans of discipline and austerity and enemies of luxury and laziness.
So, like Diagoras, I am against religion. In the private sphere, of course!
Surely, I am famous as the messenger of united Europe from Dublin as far as Vladivostok (7).
But this united Europe, which I describe and invoke, is connected to the sphere of Imperium. And in my opinion such Imperium has to be powerful, dynamic, merciless – in order to be effective.
As to personality, it is connected to the cathegory of Dominium.

My cultural personality forbids me to choose among cathegories. It is unique, as unique is my genetic code.
Biologically, each person is an embodiment of a unique code. He is one. In the field of culture – music, architecture, literature, painting etc. – I claim for myself the status of unshakable individualist.
In the political state there can be no “minorities”, as these deal only with individualities, while collectivity deals with the Imperium.

These binds represent limitations, which I already mentioned above.
Recent misfortunes : federalism, confederalism
As soon as in the concept of construction of the state the twine concept of “Imperium-Dominium” is indroduced, such wicked solutions, as federalism or even worse than that, confederalism, lose any sense and usefulness.
I can not refrain from quoting here an American author, which I konow but for one single quote of his – but such a relevant quote:
“Any group of persons, whatever their number and reciprocal similarity, and whichever the degree of their firmness in assessing their opinion – any group ends with breaking into smaller groups adhering to different variants of the same opinion; in these subgroups in turn there emerge under-subgroups, and further on, down to last limit of such division – the single individual”.
These words are attributed to Adam Ostwald, author of a book under the title “Human Society”.

The anarchists of the XIX century and many others, including Proudhon, persisted in the gross blunder of believing that conflicts and tensions within the LARGE groups could almost disappear, finding themselves a solution in the SMALL groups.
That is the social harmony of the XIX century – the harmony of the small group, opposed to the horror of the intolerable domination of the large goup.
Even Lenin invented an historical nonsense within the framework of the absurd concept of the “ever-well-doing-and-harmonious-small-group” – which later forced him to write about the withering away of state, and also to wish and foretell it.

Europe as far as Vladivostok : the minimum size
The nation-state, wishing to be independent, is compelled to have adequate military means.
Possessing these means depends on demography, autarchy of raw materials, and the industrial power of the state. Between Iceland and Vladivostok we can unite 800 million people (at least for the sake of keeping the balance with the 1,200 millions Chinese) and yet find in the Siberian soil all that is needed to satisfy energetic and strategic requirements.
I affirm that, from the economic point of view, Siberia is the province of the European empire most necessary to its viability.

A great union of highly industrialized and technologically leading Western Europe with Siberian Europe, disposing of almost inexhaustible commodity reserves, will allow the creation of a most powerful republican Empire, with which nobody will but come to an agreement.
Limitations imposed by the European empire
This state is a unity. It does not want to know and will not suffer horizontal division (regional autonomies), or vertical division (social classes) (8).

Its main principle forms a uniform citizenship: in any place of the European empire, the citizen has the right to elect, to be elected and to work. He can absolutely freely change his residence and fis job. His professional qualification is recognized through all the Empire: the doctor who received his diploma in Madrid, without any limitations can practice in St.Petersburg.
Any regional corporativism is excluded.

Separation of any portion of territory is excluded by virtue of the main principle, postulate.
We shall again make use of the Jacobins’ principle: “The Republic is unitary and INDIVISIBLE”. It is not advisable to repeat Lenin’s mistake about “the right to self-determination “.
The “region” or the former national state enter in it forever. The unity of this state is irreversible consolidated by the constitutional law.

0n the contrary, this Empire can expand, not by “seizures”, but through annexation of those who want to join.
The army is popular and integrated. A military caste can not enjoy any monopoly or privileges under the excuse of professionalism. This army will be completely subordinated to political authority.
Within its first 25-50 years of existence, this integrated army will be given special attention so that that the recruits from different regions of Empire serve together.
It is not necessary to suppose the existence of Croatian regiments or French divisions or German or Russian armies.

There is one single currency. Possessing foreign exchange or using it as a means of payment is punishable.
Is not it humiliating, shameful, that today it is possible to go to Russia only having provided oneself with American dollars?

It is humiliating indeed both for the tourists from Western Europe, and for the Russians.
It is a symbol of our common fall: the West Europeans colonized since 1945, the East Europeans balkanized and colonized since 1990. It would be more correct to pay the Moscow hotel in European ECUs, instead of foreign dollars. English should be the common language (9). I did not write ‘American’. In it consists my pragmatical, inevitable choice. The concept of a uniform legislation is one of fundamental principles of this Empire. Civil laws, criminal laws, labour laws and commercial laws are uniform. Interpretation and application of the law are identical everywhere.

Dominium and its limitations

Each one knows the saying that one person’s freedom ends there, where freedom of another person begins.
In a previous article (6) I have indicated, among the general areas of Imperium, those in which unitary Republic “… never recedes… “. As to Dominium, it assumes unlimited freedom of choice, disposing of all personal liberties which do not harm the Imperium.
These freedoms are granted within the framework of private life.
In old (worn out, ailing) political systems and regimes, feelings, emotions, fears from private life will inevitably try to enter – much too often, alas – into political life.
Imperium should remain an area elaborated, structured and directed by the neo-cortex only.

In order to understand one person’s behaviour, it is necessary to study the mechanisms of the brain (10).
I shall repeat here my favourite joke about myself: “… I do not have soul. I have a brain. Actually, as any other individual, I have three brains, namely:
– the originary cortex, the most ancientt one (the old skin of brain), allowing to us to walk, climb, creep or give a basketball a spin;
– the “intermediate” brain (meso-cortex)), containing all my “programmed” emotional “software”, necessary for survival. Sergey Chakhotin, Pavlov’s scholar, long time ago has described these passions and emotions.
The survival of the individual is promoted by the impulses to fight and nutrition; thed preservation of a species – by sexual and parental (associative) inclination.
And finally the most modern of our three “maintenance programs” is the neo-cortex, this magnificent tool of the human being. An insuffiently used tool.
The ancient skin of the brain is already 200 millions years old. The neo-cortex was formed only one million years ago.

This doctrine (or thesis) about the three kinds of brain, “overimposed against each other”, or about a
three-fold brain, as written by the French translator Roland Guyon, was put forward by the American physiologist Paul D.MacLean (10). Itwas then made popular by Arthur Koestler (10).
In Otto Klineberg’s “Social psychology” there is a lenghty duscussion about the question of the emotional behaviour of the person.
Two centuries before the scientific works of Paul D. Mac Lean appeared, Sieyes anticipated this modern thesis about the superposition of three brains.

Bastide, in his 328 pages long dissertation, mentions Sieyes manuscript “About brain and instinct”.
Long before me, Sieyes was surprised and irritated because of pseudo-demonstrations in political language
If I too impose this digression on the reader, it is only to show that a very large part of bitter, aggressive political speeches stems from our superemotional average brain.
A good study of political speech is possible only knowing the working mechanism of human brain.
In this case it is easy to detect the reason of introversion, of hatred towards something. It becomes a simple clinical problem explained by brain physiology.
For many years I had to deal with “writers” describing politics as a reflection of “meso-cortical” behaviour (passion, emotion, impulse, frustration, fear, repulsion), whereas I with all my forces try to describe a “neo-cortical” Republic… sic!

One of my critics said that I am a “rational cold monster”.
I agree with him, and I prefer this condition to that of “irrational Bacchic monster”, so much loved by post-nietzschean rascals.
I persistently recommend the educated reader, who is interested in politics, to familiarize with the works of Paul D. Mac Lean.

The absurdity of pseudo-rational political speeches pretending to be persuasive (the attorney persuades, the scientist proves), is clearly evident from this statement by Marc Jeannerod:
“… the indirect character of relations between the subject and the external world. The subject creates to itself its own representation of this world, and this representation guides his action. In this prespective, action is not the answer to any external SITUATION, as the consequence or product of that particulat REPRESENTATION”.

Any primitive vaniloquy about “ethnos” is very simply explained through this concept of (fictitios) “representation” of a rejected reality (production of reality). Reject of reality, need for day-dream.
For the person who has received a rigid scientific education, politics and its language represent obvious absurdities.
People throw in each other’s faces inventions and fictions of personal hostility, refusing to accept those situations…

But we shall return to Mac Lean’s three kinds of brain.
When we consider the orbits of satellites, trajectory of space probes, durability of steel, optical corrections introduced in building a photolens, we use only our neo-cortex.

Duiring a quarrel between drivers, ending up in a fight, we use the so-called reactive (archeo-cortical) and emotional (meso-cortical) brain mechanisms and we behave as mammals and reptiles.
In the fight between drivers, aggressive impulses take the lead, gradually suppressing the regulating function of the neo-cortex. Sexual inclination, sometimes unbearable, will force us to desire the minor daughter of the neighbour.

The same person always functions with the help of this double “program”: the programs of impulses-passions-feelings-emotions, and the program of absolutely rational thinking.
This digression was necessary as a transition to the question of the government of peoples.
Religion refers to area of Dominium.

It is a private kind of activity, which should not have any possibility at all to exert influence on public life (with the consequent risk to see how “Islamists” challenged the authority in Yugoslavia). It is ridiculous to suppose that religion should interfere with a reasonable political life, in Imperium. Just because of neglecting this principle, mean and silly slaughters have taken place in Lebanon, Palestine, Armenia, Yugoslavia and Moldova.

Those who mix religion with politics are the present “apprentice sorcerers”. He is criminal, who has created this condition of strained relations, but, from the historical point of view, also criminal is he, who turned his eyes away from the fact that religious passions can be used in a political context.

In the laical Imperium of the United republics of Europe, religious freedom will be allowed (I would rather write “admitted”) within the framework of Dominium, and ruthlessly suppressed at the first attempt of interfering in the area belonging to Imperium. Unashamed and false racists coined the thesis of ethno-differentiation (sic) and of “ethno-cultural identities” (re-sic). As a result of it, true wars have arisen in Moldova, Yugoslavia, Caucasus – wars waged by common criminals, or, for the sake of precision¸ by gangsters.
Besides robberies, prostitution, gambling and narco-traffic, criminals and thugs for at least twenty years have been showing interest even for the question of “oppressed minorities”.

These religious and ethno-differential follies have been duly manipulated first by charlatans, and then gangsters – these so-called follies, leaning on deseperates with automatic gun in their hands, will throw us so low that we shall turn into the “thousands tribes of New Guinea”, hunting heads.
In summary, I shall say that Dominium means almost uncontrolled freedom of opinion (even the most idiot), but the Imperium of United laical republics never, even for instant, will admit the freedom to “do everything you want”. Since 1945 history teaches us clear and bloody examples of what ought NOT to be done. Of what should not be allowed to happen tomorrow.
When ill Moscow calls the aid of “old hands”
It is simply crazy, what is going on in Russia in the last two years.
The economy should have been liberalized step by step, from bottom (11) to top, staying on each stage for 2-3 years.

Instead of this, in Moscow the worst adventurers of international finance were admitted. The bargain sale of the results of the work of three generations of Soviet people is open.
Wall Street sharks begin excessively to show interest in the economy of the former USSR.
She should not weaken her political nuts, consenting to the separation of her peoples, even if Lenin, in his political illiteracy (an heritage of rising Marxism around 1848) conceded (very hypocritically and very carelessly) “the right to self-determination”.
The political and military partition of the USSR is and will always remain an unforgivable historical mistake. A fateful and irreversible event.

Centrifugal force will destroy in five years what centripetal forces had created in four or five centuries.
At first it would have been advisable to fill shops with sausage and bread, favouring the creation of one million small-sized economic enterprises (from l up to 50 workers). Simultaneously it was necessary to strengthen political repression AGAINST all these “fighters” for separation, independence and autonomy.
Another example of the suicidal behaviour of the new Russian leaders is their “trips” to Washington instead of agreeing upon receiving economic help from Western Europe.
From an historical and geopolitical point of view, the US are the special enemy of the USSR.
US historical strategy is to separate Europe and to partition the USSR.
All along four centuries England conducted the same politics against the Spanish kings, against France and Germany.

Today England left her place to the US. But only yesterday she tirelessly aimed at destroying the main continental force, capable to unite the european continent into a federation: the Spanish Absburgs, Bonaparte, Wilhelm II, Hitler.
“Lonely” Russia is the future “Brazil in the snow”
The partition of the USSR is irreversible. “Great Russia” is left with no more chances to be a great power.
Then “lonely Russia” is country with no the future, same as Germany since 1945, and France since 1962.
From an historical point of view Germany was devoided of any significance in 1945. Though she is today a great industrial power, she is completely passive, absolutely ininfluent in the international arena (12).
Yes – 47 years have already passed, since Germany does not have any more foreign policy. In itself, this is not so bad for European unity.

Nationalistic hysteria caused a lot of evil to Europe: two suicidal wars – in 1914 and 1939.
If some dreamer still hopes that Russia will become again “Great Russia”, a first-class power, let him know from the start that Washington has already many weapons left. Washington cynically played the Baghdad card against Teheran, and then the Riyadh card, and that of her accomplices in Damascus and Cairo, against Baghdad. Washington has still many knives in stock with which, in case of necessity, to finish the partition of the USSR, and then to attend to the partition of Russia itself.
If required, Washington without the slightest doubt will play against Moscow the Pekin card or the Islamist world card (from Pakistan to Morocco).
Today France, England, Germany are but the historical fiction of independent states, the parodies of them.
All these so-called “great” countries do not have foreign policies anymore.
The Iraqi war has shown that Washington needs France and England only as suppliers of “senegalese fusillers”.


(1) From 1981 to 1985 I published a number of works (some of them translated into Russian), advancing the theoretical possibility of uniting Europe from East to West through the repetition of an historical scenario so-called “Macedon”… Since 338 to the revolt in Galilee, at Cheronea, Philip Macedon actually accomplished the unification of Greece.
In those works the argumentation went about the proper ideological-military method of uniting Europe in the direction from Vladivostok to Dublin.
The Chinese continent was united 22 centuries ago by an outstanding politician – Tsin Shihuanti.
Tsin dynasty (221-206). Unitary centralized state, beaurocraric leadership; subordination of the feudal lords. Construction of the Great Chinese wall.

Subsequent events compelled to forget about fearing the Soviet Army and about the skilfully alimented disgust for communism. In 1992 the “Macedon” solution already appeared inadequate in comparison with the 1982-1984 period. Today we should elaborate a concept of regaining back the whole Soviet territory through the construction of Great Europe, formulate it¸ and urgently wish for its realization.
Child-like, antihistorical concept of the “Commonwealth of Independent States”, propoised by the ingenuous Gorbachev, had not the least chance of success. It was a dead born child. Its semantic absurdity is obvious: commonwealth of independents (sic)…; equally well it would be possible to speak about devote Catholics couples practising the free love.

(2) Rome was a POLITICAL STATE aiming to the expansion of its borders.
Not such were, on the theoretical plan, cities Sparta, Athens, and Thebes, with their concept, doomed to paralysis, of the “immanent and eternal state-city”. Approximately 2000 years after Prussia too would have become an expanding political state. However such expansion does not necessarily imply conquest. A theoretical and concrete example of this. If during the years 1950-55, in full cold war, the US had offered us the political integration of Western Europe into an honest and sincere “Atlantic” structure, we would have been witnesses of the birth of the Atlantic Republic, extending from San Francisco to Venice and from Los Angeles to Luebeck.
I bring this theoretical example so that the reader can distinguish a usual enslaving imperialism from integrating imperialism.
Such obvious ability to expand also should have the Uniform European Republic. All my geopolitical concepts postulate the necessity of preserving a of a vital nation-state.
I shall use geopolitics with the purposes of creation of the concept and description of vitality of Republic.
I am not a geopolitical theorist, whereas Haushofer and Spykman were among its ideologists.
Both are badly disguised imperialists.
The difference between the theorist and the ideologist is huge.
Haushofer only rationalized his animal pan-germanism. His concept of the “Berlin-Moscow-Tokyo” block is no more than rational masking his pan-germanist fictions.
As to the United States, they refer to their “Manifest Destiny”. It is ideological, messianic geopolitics, born out of imaginations, in turn caused by regular reading of a paranoid literature and raids through the biblical text.

Weinberg lists the expressive chapter titles to this historical paranoia: “geographical predestination”, “mission of regeneration”, “inevitable destiny”, “international police power”. Psychologists and psychiatrists will find there food for reflection and entertainment.
My geopolitical concept is completely different. I would say, that “the industrial and technological advance peculiar to United States must or can create such a situation, when one will reasonably and fairly administer the Continental State extending from Alaska to Patagonia.
Instead of provocatively “walk around” their fleet in the Chinese and Mediterranean seas.
Ideological geopolitical theories operate in the terms of subordination and/or explotation, whereas the theoretical geopolitics “in its pure state” deals with development and construction of vital states.

(3) Jose Cuadrado Costa “Insuffisance et depassement du concept marxiste-leniniste de nationalite”, October 1984, in “Conscience Europeenne” n.9, Charleroi Belgique. (Concept of “nationality” in Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin, Ortega-y-Gasset and Jean Thiriart). It exists in Spanish, French and Russian language.

(4) It is necessary to critically read this work by Daniel Guerin (“L’Anarchisme”, Poche Gallimard). There all nonsenses of XIXth century romanticism are written. It is difficult to find somebody more ingenous and more silly than Proudhon. He described an idyllic world, the world of “federations of federations”. He did not expect Moldavian, Croatian and Armenian wars with the purpose of brutal destruction of the “Minority of Minorities”. And with just one burst from an automatic gun!

(5) Jose Ortega-y-Gasset “La Revolte des Masses”, Editions Stock 1961; Jose Ortega-y-Gasset “La vocation de la Jeune Europe”, Revue de la S.S. Universitaire “LA JEUNE EUROPE” Berlin 1942, Cahier 8.

(6) Jean Thiriart “EUROPE: I’Etat-Nation Politique”, revue “Nationalisme et Republique” n.8, juin 1992 25, Cours Foch 13640, La Roque d’Antheron (France).

(7) Since already more than a quarter of century I have been developing the concept of Europe as: (a) unitary state, (b) of European nations. General De Gaulle wanted a strong (and united) France in an impotent (confederal) Europe.
Europe did not like such. As well as Maurras, he was caught in an impasse.
In 1965 the German writer Heinz Kubi attacked me about the ancient prophets of Great Germany, to which I supposedly belonged.
Kubi writes:
“L’Europe: une nation? (Europe: one nation?). The paradox of political landscape in Western Europe is that same people most intolerant to each other’s opponents (on the European question: gollists-confederalists and thiriarists-unionists – J.Th.) are supporters of the same concept of state. For De Gaulle it was unthinkable that the state could and should be something different from national state, as the nation is the only lawful basis for politics. The same concept is dominant among one faction of the European opposition, (“Jeune Europe ” – J.Th.). This one last wants to quit the national framework, but can not offer any other kind of state, except for national. So, they want to substitute the present states with the European national state. They dream of the European nation, and it is not casual, that on this matter they agree with the prophets of “Great Germany” and other fascists from the past.” (see page 312 of the French issue).
See ” PROVOKATION EUROPA “, Kiepenheuer und Witsch, Koln-Berlin, 1965. French translation: ” Defi à l’Europe “, Seuil, 1967.
The defeat of racist “Great Germany” I all too well have learnt, during war and after, in the years of reclusion. I have taken from it useful lesson about the fact that the racially united state (Hitler’s) could not extend without constant wars. Therefore in a dark cell I have worked out the concept of the expansionist political (not racial) united state.
I have taken and developed the concepts of Sieyes and Ortega-y-Gasset, the concept of political nation to be “rounded off” into a higher destiny, a European destiny.

(8) On a meeting, the 7th of September 1789, the abbey Sieyes clearly and unambiguously stated said and has repeated: “Sovereign is only the Nation. The Nation has neither orders, nor classes, nor groups. Sovereignity can not be divided and transmitted”. See Colette Clavreuil “L’influence de la theorie d’Emmannuel Sieyes sur les origines de la representation en droit public”, doctoral dissertations, Université de Paris, 1982. ; Jean-Denis Bredin “Sieyes, la clé de la Revolution française”, Editions de Fallois, Paris 1988; Paul Bastid “Sieyes et sa pensée” re-ed. Hachette 1970.
Nobody could formulate the concept of the Unitary state better than Sieyes. As to me, I transfer this concept of United and indivisible republic to my reflections about the creation of an Imperial republic from Dublin to Vladivostok. As well as Sieyes, I am sick of all these federative theories, sources of threats of civil wars, sources of territorial partitions.

(9) For the science educated person, all our languages are too weak, indistinct, obsolescing means of expression. Scientific language is unequivocal, the literary language is always ambiguous. For this reason “writers” are expressed so not clearly in sociology or politics. See the capital work by Louis Rougier “La metaphysique et le langage”, Denoel 1973.
Actually all over the world English is already and inevitably is the common language of science and technology. The Parisian Institute Pasteur does not publish anything any more in French. All its works are issued only in English.

(10) Paul D. Mac Lean “Les trois cerveaux de l’homme”, Robert Laffont 1990 (French translation); Arthur Koestler “Le cheval dans la locomotive ou le paradoxe humain”, Caiman-Levy 1968; see Chapter XVI “Les trois cerveaux”. Koestler addresses himself to the many educated readers. MacLean writes for the reader well familiar with brain neuropsychology.
Sergey Chakotin “Le viol des foules par la propagande politique”, Gallimard 1952. Chakotin is disciple and follower of Pavlov. His “Violence upon crowds” is a capital work indispensible to those, who want do go more in deep into the given question.
Otto Klineberg “Psychologie Sociale”, Presses Universitaires de France 1967.
Josè M.R. Delgado “Le conditionnement du cerveau et la liberte de L’esprit” Charles Dessart, Bruxelles 1972 (French translation).
Jean-Didier Vincent “Biologie des Passions”, Seuil 1986.
Marc Jeannerod “Le cerveau-machine”, Fayard 1986. Guy Lazorthes “Le cerveau et l’esprit – Complexité et malleabilité “, Flammarion 1982.

(11) Jean Thiriart et Rene Dastier (1962-1965) ” Principes d’Economie Communautaire “, 170 pages (various ed. by Luc Michel, 1986). A comprehensive work on socio-economic theories of Jean Thiriart. (Socialism on European scale: communitarianism). There is also a brief exposition of this doctrine in a small volume of 42 pages: Yannik Sauveur et Luc Michel “Esquisse du Communautarisme” (1987). And at last, the article by Jean Thiriart “Esquisse du communautarisme”, published in the journal “La nation européenne “, n.l, February 1966.
The present Russian regime is accomplishing the liberalization of the economy in the most pernicious direction. At first they invoked the aid of international financial sharks, which was the last thing to be done. And Yeltsin did it, proving himself to be a layman, a person without any knowledge both in the fields of economics and history.

It would have been much more correct: (a) immediately to liberalize all enterprises with a labour work force from l to 50 people; (b) in 2-3 years to liberalize enterprises with a labour work force from 50 to 500 people. It would have been necessary to go bottom-up, from immediate liberalization of very small enterprises to those of very major concern in 6-8 years. Free enterprise stimulates work. It is impossible to say the same about the speculative international finance, looking only to its own immediate benefit. Here we shall not describe the wide margin between industrial capitalism (“Ford”, “Renault”, “Citroen”) and speculative bank capitalism (International Monetary Fund). Hundreds pages of economic researches by Dastier and Thiriart (1962-1965) are devoted to this subject. Considerably simplifying, one might say that communitarism means a completely free economy for the enterprises with a volume of employment up to 50 people, regulated economy for those with more than 500, controlled – those above 5000, and state-economy for those with more than 50,000. It is “variable geometry” system, half-way between industrial capitalism and classical socialism.

(12) Modern Germany is an economic giant, on one hand, and political dwarf, on the other hand. It is a country historically evirated since 1945. Present Germany is one of the exploitation zones of the cosmopolitan economy based on Wall Street.
List brilliantly demonstrated the difference between cosmopolitan and political economy. Proceeding from this difference, Thiriart built the theory of the economy of power as opposed to the American economy focused on profit.

There is an excellent analysis of List’s ideas by the American author Edward Mead Earl (see Edward Mead Earl in “Makers of Modern Strategy”, Princeton University 1943). In 1980 the publishing house Berger-Levrault issued this work in French translation under the title “Les maitres de la strategie” (Chapitre 6: “Adam Smith, Alexander Hamilton, Friedrich List: les fondements economiques de la puissance militaire”).
List spent many years in the US. He said that “riches are useless without unity and power of a nation “. About the analytical quality of his work Edward Mead Earl wrote that it could be worth being included in an anthology of geopolitical studies.

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